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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHILDHOOD IN THE LONG NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 
Amanda Phillips Chapman, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015 
My dissertation argues that self-consciousness should take its place beside innocence and 
precocity as one of a constellation of terms crucial for understanding how paradigms of 
childhood and children’s literature developed side by side. By focusing on attitudes towards 
children and self-consciousness, I illuminate the ways in which discourses for and about children 
affected not only children’s culture but also British culture at large. My chapters examine the 
positive value placed on self-consciousness in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century 
children’s literature; the reconceptualization of childhood and self-consciousness by Romantic 
writers, who attached a new anxiety about self-consciousness to the figure of the child; the 
incredible popularity of Peter Pan, which results from the eternal boy’s combination of 
unselfconsciousness and theatricality; and the ways in which the British public school ethic of 
good form as well as the literary tradition of the school story reflect increasingly stringent 
demands that children be unselfconscious. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 “[A]ll sin, my dear child, is thus formed in our hearts, sometimes long, 
long before it breaks out, it becomes us therefore, carefully to watch our 
thoughts…” 
 -Mary Martha Sherwood, The History of the Fairchild Family (1818)1 
 “As a matter of fact, the natural child is an innocent, joyous, 
inconsequent thing, free from vanity, self-importance, and every form of 
self-consciousness.” 
 -Ernest Dowson, “The Cult of the Child” (1894)2 
Almost every survey of nineteenth-century British children’s literature remarks upon the 
inevitable presence of Mary Martha Sherwood’s The History of the Fairchild Family on the 
bookshelves of Victorian children. Though the story of the Fairchilds spanned three books 
written over the course of thirty years, the first volume in particular, published in 1818 and in 
print continuously for a century, seems to have been a fixture in the nursery. In part because of 
its ubiquity, when the end of the nineteenth century occasioned a host of retrospective reviews in 
popular periodicals of the last hundred years of children’s literature, critics tended to single out 
The Fairchild Family for especially acute condemnation. Given the post-Wordsworth 
reimagining of the child as a precious earthly manifestation of heavenly virtue,3 many of the 
criticisms leveled at Sherwood had to do with the strict Evangelicism of her text, which harped 
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on the natural depravity of her child characters. Most late-century detractors, for instance, 
pointed with horror to a scene in which Mr. Fairchild takes his young children to view the body 
of a man two days dead, employing the grisly spectacle as an object lesson in sin and death.4 It is 
not difficult to understand why an age dominated by the image of the child as a bright angel 
would shrink from such a scene. Harder to parse are the terms in which L. B. Lang, writing for 
Longman’s Magazine in 1893, censures the Fairchild parents—and, by extension, real life 
parents who continued to provide their children with copies of The Fairchild Family:  
One might have thought that the danger of self-consciousness arising from these 
perpetual religious conversations would have become obvious to the feeblest mind, but both 
parents appear to have regarded this unlucky habit as evidence of grace. The children are 
eternally watching themselves, probing themselves, writing down their bad thoughts, talking 
about themselves. It is Self, Self, Self from morning till night, and the more they talk about Self 
the more delighted their parents are….if people—and children—could forget themselves 
altogether, even if they sometimes forgot their faults too, both they and the world would be 
considerably the better. Nothing is so fatal to well-doing or well-being as the perpetual 
contemplation of self. But Mrs. Fairchild would consider these remarks rank heresy.5 
Lang is not alone in this vein of criticism; a writer for The Quarterly Review thirty years 
earlier had excoriated Sherwood for her tendency to write the kind of pattern good boy who not 
only displays model behavior but furthermore, worse, is “able to make edifying remarks on his 
own conduct.”6 In what way is it dangerous for children’s literature to cause self-consciousness 
to arise in child readers? Why should a character in a child’s book not be able to reflect on his 
own conduct? What makes “Self, Self, Self” an apparently self-evident evil in a child’s book? 
Why is it desirable for children to “forget themselves altogether”? Mrs. Fairchild, and many 
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other parents and child-experts of the early nineteenth century, would indeed consider these 
remarks rank heresy, for, as I will show, they considered self-contemplation of paramount 
importance for children. So what changed between 1818 and 1893 to transform childhood self-
consciousness from an agreed-upon good to a near-unanimously condemned evil? 
This book answers that question. In constructing an answer, my book argues that “self-
consciousness” must take its place beside “innocence” and “precocity” as one of a constellation 
of terms crucial for understanding how paradigms of childhood and children’s literature 
developed side by side. I intend to broaden the field of inquiry in children’s literature studies and 
childhood studies to include historical factors in the construction of childhood and children’s 
literature that have been overshadowed by a prolonged focus on Victorian preoccupations with 
children’s sexuality and agency. Innocence is perhaps the most frequently interrogated of the 
terms applied to children in popular nineteenth-century discourse. As a critical focus within 
childhood studies, innocence tends to highlight questions about child sexuality and the denial of 
adult sexual knowledge to children. As any reader of Wordsworth knows, precocity in children 
was a principal nineteenth-century preoccupation. But while the term precocity invites 
consideration of the accumulation by children of a wide range of knowledge and manners 
considered appropriate to adults, my dissertation focuses on one specific kind of childhood 
knowingness—consciousness of self.  
One of the artistic achievements of the age, according to Victorian critics, was the 
explosion of a literature written specifically for children—what critics would later term the 
Golden Age of children’s literature.7 This explosion occasioned the kinds of retrospective 
surveys of earlier children’s literature mentioned above; the rapid growth of the children’s book 
market begged the question of what had happened over the last hundred years to create this 
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astonishing flood of fairy tales, fantasies, and poetry collections just for children. Again and 
again later-nineteenth-century adults contrasted their own paltry childhood libraries with the vast 
catalogues of books available for modern children.8 The widening horizons of the children’s 
literature market led to a corresponding expansion in the perceived need for criticism of this 
literature, and a number of periodicals ran articles advising parents how to choose among the 
array of children’s books. That childhood self-consciousness was a serious preoccupation for the 
Victorians is proven by the frequency with which both of these periodical genres—the survey of 
a century of children’s literature and the review of new entries into the category—turn to 
considerations of whether a book, or even a genre of books, is thought to induce self-
consciousness in child readers.  
E. M. Field in The Child and His Book (1891) discouraged the circulation of children’s 
books that were “calculated to make the child-reader sadly self-conscious.”9 Her fellow critics 
promoted narratives of fantasy and adventure as preserving a state of unselfconsciousness10 in 
child readers, whereas many writers rejected the kinds of domestic realism that had dominated 
the children’s books of earlier popular authors like Maria Edgeworth and Sarah Trimmer. As 
early as 1860, the author of an article on “Children’s Literature” in the Quarterly Review 
recommended “stories of pure imagination” over tales of home life.11 Children’s books were 
policed for content that would encourage the child to reflect on herself in relation to realistic 
child characters that were depicted self-consciously shaping their behavior in response to social 
cues. Because of the emphasis on the child’s place in the social milieu, domestic stories often 
contained child characters that the author of “Children’s Literature” found distasteful; such 
socially conscious protagonists, he complained, have “early learnt the art of moralizing, or of 
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talking with a view to being praised by good people.”12 “We wish the little interlocutors were 
less self-conscious,”13 he lamented.  
Reading fantasy, on the other hand, would deflect the “whole observant and reflective 
faculties” of the child from himself and instead engage the child’s imagination, through which 
“the thoughts of a child are carried out from himself”—thus avoiding “unhealthy 
introspection.”14 The right reading should prevent the “reflex action”15 of thought in the child, 
and instead direct his attention outwards. Writing twenty years after the Quarterly Review critic, 
R. L. Stevenson replicated this distinction between realism and the fantastical when he wrote 
disparagingly of the novel’s tendency to engage the writer in moral criticism and introspection, 
and praised romance for inviting readers to “be rapt clean out of ourselves.”16 Late-nineteenth-
century critics overwhelmingly endorsed fairy tales for children’s reading, an endorsement they 
inherited from William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge,17 who recommended fairy 
tales because they believed the genre encouraged children to direct their thoughts outwards. 
Twentieth-century critics of Victorian children’s literature would take the preference for and 
celebration of fantasy in children’s books to be one of the great achievements of the Golden Age 
of children’s literature. As a result, though domestic realism maintained a strong presence in the 
Victorian children’s book market, the Golden Age canon minimizes the genre. One advantage of 
recovering and scrutinizing the cultural history of self-consciousness as a context for nineteenth-
century childhood and children’s literature is that doing so illuminates the fact that the Golden 
Age canon leans so heavily towards the fantastical precisely because fantasy was thought to 
combat self-consciousness. 18 
Nineteenth-century views on childhood self-consciousness continued to shape responses 
to children’s literature into the twentieth century. Children’s literature historian Gillian Avery, 
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writing in 1965, invokes the tie between valuations of childhood self-consciousness and the 
Golden Age canon when she remarks that fantasists Dinah Maria Mulock and George 
MacDonald were “outstanding writers” precisely because their child characters were “natural 
and unselfconscious.”19 She also singles out Juliana Ewing for escaping the “fault” that marred 
“most domestic stories for the young” by writing “with complete lack of self-consciousness.”20 
But Avery does not question these designations. She, like the majority of twentieth-century 
critics of children’s literature, inherits but does not question the nineteenth-century use of self-
consciousness—whether it belongs to the writers, characters, or readers of children’s literature—
as an index for quality and canonizability. In order to recognize that it is no more natural to sort 
children’s literature on the basis of perceived unselfconsciousness than it is to judge it by 
standards of innocence requires a cultural history of the complex intertwinings of the concepts of 
childhood, children’s literature, and self-consciousness in the nineteenth century. 
Writing such a cultural history means beginning well before the Golden Age. 
Accordingly, this book begins with an examination of the prehistory of the anti-self-
consciousness decree, then reconstructs the complex nexus of cultural forces that created the 
widespread conviction that self-consciousness is bad for children, and finally illuminates some of 
the repercussions of that judgment on children and children’s literature. This prehistory reveals 
how widespread was the prescription for the young to engage in serious self-reflection, as seen, 
for example, in English writer Isaac Taylor’s Advice to the Teens; or, Practical Help Towards 
the Formation of One’s Own Character (1818). The youth “seriously engaging in Self-
Cultivation,” Taylor writes, should be first and foremost “watching his own mind.”21 An 
American admirer of Taylor’s book, Lydia Maria Child wrote as a champion of abolition, 
women’s rights, and Indian rights, and her many works garnered her a wide audience, many of 
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whom would have read, in her Mother’s Book (1831), that children “should be accustomed to 
look into their own hearts.”22 Literature for children from the early nineteenth century commonly 
depicts child characters soberly contemplating their innermost thoughts, motives, and feelings, 
and often discussing them with an adult interlocutor. Child readers were expected to emulate this 
rigorous self-examination, and, similarly, to be able to articulate their findings, often in the form 
of writing in a diary. Yet by 1880 the protagonists of this early children’s literature were 
pilloried by critics of “goody-goody stories,” and the very ability to articulate his interior state 
disqualified the self-reflecting child character from being a child: his was an “unreal” 
childhood.23 What happened between the injunction for the child to watch his own mind and the 
conviction that any child who does so is no child at all? In short, Romantic philosophy and 
poetry installed self-consciousness as the vexed defining attribute of the mature human, and they 
concomitantly redefined childhood as a naturally unselfconscious state. 
Although critics have long identified Romantic thought as a key influence on the 
development of children’s literature and the conceptualization of childhood, most of this 
scholarship focuses on the invention of “innocence” as the essence of childhood, and on the ways 
in which the Romantic distaste for intellectual precocity in children led to a rejection of didactic 
literature. This critical narrative has become the de facto explanation for the prevalence of 
fantasy in the Golden Age canon. According to the established story, intellectual precocity 
threatened the line the Romantics drew between child and adult, the Romantic ideal of the child 
as an innocent from birth meant a rejection of the natural depravity doctrine of Evangelical 
childhood, and these forces combined to sweep overtly didactic and religious literature out of the 
nursery and replace them with fantasy. I do not mean to challenge the veracity of this narrative. 
What I do mean to do is establish that Romantic writers who have already been recognized as 
7 
crucial influences on concepts of childhood—writers like Wordsworth and Coleridge—made 
another enormously important contribution to the history of childhood and children’s literature 
by exiling self-consciousness from the realm of childhood, and that this exile shaped the fantasy 
leanings of the Golden Age canon as much as ideas about childhood innocence and precocity. 
As this book will demonstrate, establishing self-consciousness as a central concern for 
nineteenth-century childhood will deepen our critical understanding of the ways in which 
children’s literature has been written, read, and canonized. It will also shed light on the 
experience of childhood over the course of the nineteenth century. Additionally, this cultural 
history of childhood and self-consciousness will, I hope, serve to contextualize some aspects of 
contemporary childhood. To give one example of how this might work, we might consider the 
curious plight of the modern day child performer. Ken Cerniglia and Lisa Mitchell have recently 
written about the process of recruiting, training, and gently saying goodbye to the many child 
performers (casts are big and they age out quickly) who appear in Disney’s stage productions. 
Cerniglia is a dramaturge and literary manager for the Disney Theatrical Group, and Mitchell is 
the Education and Outreach Manager for the same, so they have the inside perspective on the big 
business of children on stage. Their article in a collection of scholarly essays on children in the 
entertainment business, Entertaining Children (2014), provides ample evidence for the longevity 
of a desire for the unselfconscious stage child, an ideal embodied by Peter Pan, the central figure 
of my third chapter. As Cerniglia and Mitchell write, “Although some degree of training is 
important, ideal professional child actors need to bring their natural ‘child’ selves to the stage.”24 
They quote a Broadway producer as stating “We want an open, kidlike spirit. If a child becomes 
too self-aware that they’re doing something cute—or I’m performing now—they lose their 
natural manner.”25 They go on to give many more examples of directors and casting agents 
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expressing a desire for child actors who are “rough” and “absolutely natural” and not “slick” or 
“coached.”26 Audiences love to see the child perform, but must not suspect that the child is self-
consciously performing childhood itself. Performing in huge touring productions like Disney’s 
would be hard work for any actor, but the child actor has the added difficulty of needing to at 
least seem like they aren’t working at all. Recovering the history of self-consciousness and 
childhood can help us understand how children ever found themselves in such odd predicaments. 
But what does “self-consciousness” mean? And why are its various conjunctions with childhood 
so fraught? A brief consideration of etymology will clarify my use of this key term and further 
reinforce the history of self-consciousness as a nineteenth century concern that I have been 
sketching here and will elaborate on in the chapters to come. The Oxford English Dictionary lists 
two major senses of the term “self-conscious,” both of which bear out my assertion that self-
consciousness is valorized or neutral in the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, but 
becomes a much more complex matter beginning with the Romantic period and the work of 
writers including Rousseau, Schiller, Wordsworth and Coleridge. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the first sense of “self-conscious” as having “consciousness of one's identity, one's 
actions, sensations, etc.; reflectively aware of one's actions.” This is the philosophical sense of 
the word, and the quotations the Oxford English Dictionary provides in support of this definition 
makes it clear that in earliest usage being self-conscious marked humans as higher beings set 
apart from the rest of nature. Thus seventeenth-century theologian Ralph Cudworth’s Treatise of 
Freewill is quoted as maintaining that the human ability to reflect upon ourselves is “a 
reduplication of life in a higher degree,” the very thing that brings us closer to God than the rest 
of animal life.27  
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This unambiguously positive sense of “self-conscious” arose with the concept of a self in 
the late seventeenth century, which the Oxford English Dictionary identifies as the origin point 
of the modern philosophical sense of the self: “That which in a person is really and 
intrinsically he (in contradistinction to what is adventitious); the ego (often identified with the 
soul or mind as opposed to the body); a permanent subject of successive and varying states of 
consciousness.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the very earliest uses in Germanic 
languages of “self” was to indicate identity, or sameness, as in "the man himself," that particular 
man and no other. It could also be used in reference to materials to indicate their un-mixed 
nature, as in the case of unblended whisky, or a piece of clothing in which the trim is made of the 
same material as the rest of the garment. The Oxford English Dictionary speculates that 
eventually the grammatical meaning of "herself" shifted to "her self," in which possession was 
implied—she has a self, the self belongs to her. Here begins the split wherein she and her self are 
identical but somehow divided into two nouns. That split is the genesis of the whole Romantic 
problematization of self-consciousness.  
The early positive valence of “self-conscious,” which positioned man just below God in 
the great chain of being, dominated throughout the eighteenth century and into the early 
nineteenth century, confirming, as it did, the rational humanism of the Enlightenment. John 
Locke, arguably the most influential of Enlightenment thinkers in England, concurred that self-
consciousness made humans closer to God than to the animals.28 This valorizing sense of self-
consciousness also dovetailed nicely with Evangelicism’s association of nature with sin and 
personal salvation with stringent self-examination, pairings readily apparent in the first epigraph 
to this introduction. In the passage from Sherwood’s Fairchild Family, Lucy’s mother assures 
her that her natural inclinations are sinful, and that only by carefully watching her heart can she 
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fight that nature. Romantic philosophy, however, maintained self-consciousness as the essence of 
humanity, but re-evaluated the split between human and nature, and the split within the self-
reflecting self, finding in these divisions two sources of tragic alienation that haunted humanity. 
The second sense of “self-conscious” listed by the Oxford English Dictionary, the negative 
sense, arises with the latter end of the Romantic period: "Marked by undue or morbid pre-
occupation with one's own personality.” The Oxford English Dictionary’s first citation for this 
sense is from an 1834 letter written by J. S. Mill, in which he postulates that he has cured himself 
of the disease of self-consciousness, an “irrepressible” plague that he wrote about at length in his 
autobiography.29 By the time Mill published the autobiography in 1873, he hardly even needed 
to explain why self-consciousness might be considered a disease: that it was one was a readily 
recognizable cultural truth. 
Though in chapter two I will delve much more deeply into the work of Romantic thinkers 
who effected this shift, for now it will be useful to briefly outline the ways in which self-
consciousness was troubling for writers like Wordsworth and Friedrich Schiller, and later Mill 
and Thomas Carlyle, and how those concerns shaped concepts of childhood as well as children’s 
literature. In the eighteenth century the division of man from nature inherent in the definition of 
self-consciousness had supported dominant views of the privileged superiority of man over 
nature. This definitional split between man and nature came to seem less felicitous later, when, 
for instance, the Lake Poets idealized nature, and envisioned humanity’s alienation from it as a 
state of fallen-ness from an originary unity between man and nature. In addition, in a perplexing 
sense self-consciousness makes one both subject and object of one’s own reflection. This internal 
division engendered discomfort about alienation from oneself, and threatened the self-conscious 
subject, who makes of herself an object, with thingliness. Perhaps this threat of the subject with 
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object status accounts for the extremely frequent association of the term “morbid” with the term 
“self-conscious”30: mere things do not live. Also suggested by the association with “morbid” in 
that second Oxford English Dictionary definition (“undue or morbid pre-occupation with one's 
own personality”) self-consciousness came to be understood as a melancholy, brooding form of 
self-absorption, which cut the brooder off from healthy social interaction and created another 
form of isolation. In short, self-consciousness constructed a subject alienated from nature, from 
himself, and from other subjects. The same Romantic writers who articulated these dire 
concerns—as I will explore at length in chapter two—invented a developmental narrative of 
human life in which children lived in a state of total unselfconsciousness—and thus total unity 
with nature, self, and others—and only with the onset of adulthood did they too fall into a self-
conscious state. Thus a number of Romantic writers made unselfconsciousness a defining 
characteristic of true childhood, and initiated an anxious sense that childhood 
unselfconsciousness could be undone prematurely by, among other threats, the wrong reading.  
Paradoxically, while self-consciousness threatened to inhibit social connection, it could 
also foster too much dependence on social ties. In other words, anxiety about self-consciousness 
could point either inward or outward. The nineteenth century experienced anxiety about the 
tendency of self-consciousness to lead to a preoccupation with the inner self that cuts the self off 
from the community. But they were also anxious about the possibility that self-consciousness 
would engender in individuals a preoccupation with how one is judged by outward social norms, 
by others, and thus create a lack of autonomy. The nineteenth century valorized autonomy and 
authenticity, and self-consciousness could imply an over-concern with shaping oneself as an 
object of the regard of others. It is this concern we should hear when Edward Salmon, writer of 
several articles on children’s literature in the late nineteenth century, singles out Maria 
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Edgeworth’s tales of domestic realism for particular scorn, calling them a “bane rather than a 
boon to young minds” because they encouraged children to jump “from the nursery to take part 
in the full regime of the drawing-room.”31 Too early an entrance into the social world of the 
drawing-room jeopardized the authentic self of the child, Salmon and many others worried. A 
child who learned too soon to shape herself self-consciously to meet social approval would 
succumb to a life of inauthentic social mummery. To prevent this ill outcome, writers not only 
implored parents to keep children out of actual drawing-room situations but also recommended 
keeping drawing-room scenes out of children’s literature.  
In the chapters to come I will argue that this push to protect children from self-
consciousness was primarily motivated by an adult desire to improve adult life. Self-
consciousness could potentially alienate one from others. In addition it could lead to self-
alienating revelations: I do not know myself; I know my behavior to be in some ways an 
inauthentic expression of my true inner self; I have developed a habit of seeing myself as an 
object rather than a subject. Self-consciousness, then, potentially leaves the subject alienated 
from everyone including himself. No wonder the supposed unselfconsciousness of childhood has 
held such an attraction. If nineteenth-century adults could imagine themselves to have been, at 
one time, alienated neither from themselves nor from others because of the simple fact that as 
children they were unaware of themselves as selves, then they could hope for the restoration of 
this unalienated state. By assuring that self-consciousness arrived only at the proper point in the 
developmental timeline of the young, concerned adults hoped to build a society of more 
authentic individuals. This is the hope that prompts Rousseau to write his monumental 
educational fantasy-cum-treatise, Émile (1762). 
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The structure of my book begs some explanation. The first two chapters range widely over a 
disparate networks of texts, collecting and collating treatises on education, conduct handbooks, 
religious tracts, theater reviews, and more in order to outline a shifting consensus on notions 
concerning childhood, self-consciousness, and children’s literature. These early chapters turn to 
close readings of children’s diaries (chapter one) and children’s books (chapter two) relatively 
briefly. The latter two chapters continue to cast a wide net for evidence, but rely more 
substantially on close readings of either one crucial text—the Peter Pan narratives in chapter 
three—or a series of texts representative of a crucial genre—the school stories of chapter four. 
The tendency toward overviews of broad discourse archives earlier in the book results from my 
conviction that thin description32 (that is, describing texts in detail, but without strenuous 
interpretation) of a discourse is a way of taking seriously the stated beliefs and intentions of a 
historical moment. In other words, I first want to know what the Evangelicals or the Lake poets 
or German philosophers were saying right there on the surface.33 The close readings, then, turn 
to thick description to understand more fully how the discourse of one period—the early 
nineteenth century—came to undergird the representations, ideals, and expectations of childhood 
in another—the later nineteenth century.  
Though I value and employ thick description—in other words, close reading that situates 
a text within particular, not necessarily obvious, historical contexts—I do hope to avoid 
inhabiting the role of the critic-as-hero that has recently been correlated with the practice of thick 
description within literary criticism. This self-assumed critical role has come under fire from a 
variety of dissenting writers who follow Bruno Latour in a general critique of critical 
hermeneutics within the humanities.34 The critic-as-hero operates under the hermeneutics of 
suspicion, using close reading either to out the text that doesn’t know what it says, or to outsmart 
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the text that sets out to hide its nefarious purposes behind a mask of good intentions—or both. 
Though I’m wary of this suspicious, antagonistic orientation towards texts, I do recognize that 
sometimes the text wears a mask constructed by the exigencies of time or audience, and a critical 
unmasking is called for in order to recover meanings that simply aren’t easily accessible. After 
all, my starting conviction in this book is that in order to recognize that preferring 
unselfconsciousness in both children and children’s books is neither a natural nor an ahistorical 
phenomenon, we must recover a history that has up until now gone unnoticed or un-interrogated. 
Thick description allows me to recover the many contexts and histories that don’t float on the 
surface of texts because they seem, by the late nineteenth century, to go without saying, or to be 
difficult to say without alienating one’s audience. Perhaps, for instance, Barrie’s charming but 
sad Peter Pan was the best way he could say that holding ideals of childhood 
unselfconsciousness might make for beautiful art and good philosophical shortcuts, but it 
amounts to wishing children were dead. Walking out on stage with that bald pronouncement 
would have cost him his career; embedded in the play and the novel, the statement becomes a 
mood, a nagging doubt, a critique sunk deep in delight that requires, at this remove especially, 
thick description to bring it to the surface. 
For many years critics produced almost exclusively thin description of children’s 
literature. Early scholarship in the field, from the Victorian period through the mid-twentieth 
century, provided historical details about authors and the trade in children’s books, and outlined 
a particular view of the development of children’s literature as an exercise in canon-building, but 
rarely engaged in sustained analysis of particular texts as objects of literary-critical interest. For 
example, in the preface to his widely-cited Children’s Books in England (1932), which stood for 
much of the twentieth century as the standard work on children’s literature, F. J. Harvey Darton 
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described his book not as an effort of literary criticism, but as a “minor chapter in the history of 
English social life.”35 In the mid-twentieth century, adherents to the New Criticism were 
insisting that literary texts, with their complex systems of meaning, demanded scrupulous, 
exacting analysis. To use the terms at hand, the New Criticism advocated thicker descriptions of 
how the text functioned as an aesthetic object. Yet very few scholars were turning that kind of 
focused attention to children’s literature. In part the descriptions failed to thicken for so long 
because children’s literature was thought too simplistic to require explication. The canon of 
children’s literature, built over the course of the twentieth century by readers, writers, and 
scholars fully under the sway of the ideal of unselfconscious childhood, was organized on the 
criteria that children’s literature was, like childhood, transparent, self-evident, and 
unselfconscious. That criteria also happened to exclude it from the realm of rigorous literary 
criticism, which was aimed at texts deemed complex, self-conscious, and opaque. Tellingly, 
when in 1972 Francelia Butler founded the first academic journal on the subject, Children’s 
Literature, she subtitled it The Great Excluded. 
One consequence of the rise, in the 1980s, of what has variously been called 
symptomatic, suspicious, or paranoid reading36 is that the insistence that all texts were shaped by 
and participated in the construction of complex cultural systems led more scholars to cast a 
critical eye on corners of the literary landscape hitherto ignored by rigorous academic literary 
criticism, including criticism of children’s literature. And although the critical work that has 
resulted from that fresh perspective on children’s texts has helped to denaturalize much of what 
had been taken for granted about the character of childhood and its books, including their 
axiomatic simplicity and transparency, a healthy dose of suspicion is still a useful critical tool for 
scholars of children’s literature simply because the texts under scrutiny are the founding 
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documents of so many of our received truths about childhood. By employing both thin 
description (or surface reading, reading with the grain) and thick description (or close reading, 
reading against the grain), I hope to benefit from the best of both critical practices while also 
avoiding their respective weaknesses: the possibility of stubborn naiveté in regards to thin 
description, and the dangers of self-congratulating, paranoid criticism on the part of thick 
description. 
I begin with a chapter that establishes a prehistory to the anti-self-consciousness 
sentiment that dominated most of the nineteenth century. This chapter demonstrates that late in 
the Georgian period, experts on childhood from Enlightenment philosopher John Locke to 
educational reformer Sarah Trimmer actually encouraged self-examination and sober reflection 
in children in order to usher them into rational adulthood or religious salvation—or both. An 
examination of texts for children from this era—including Sarah Fielding’s The Governess 
(1749), Maria Edgeworth’s Early Lessons (1801), and Ellenor Fenn’s The Fairy Spectator 
(1789)—demonstrates that children’s literature, often using the emblem of the mirror, urged 
children to reflect on themselves in order to perfect their own behavior. The chapter then turns to 
explore an archive of children’s diaries in order to examine how children responded to the 
prescription to review their own thoughts and actions as part of a program of rigorous self-
cultivation. 
The second chapter charts the course from a widespread understanding that self-
consciousness is good for children to a re-theorization of self-consciousness as bad for children. 
This chapter analyzes the work of writers such as Schiller, Heinrich von Kleist, Rousseau, 
Wordsworth, and Coleridge in order to show that, at the same time that Romantic thought 
situated self-consciousness as the defining center of human subjectivity, childhood was re-
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defined as a pre-self-conscious stage of incubation for the developing self. To reveal how this 
emerging description of childhood quickly became, in fact, a prescription for children to be—or 
at least seem to be—unselfconscious, the chapter considers two transitional works of children’s 
literature. Close readings of Catherine Sinclair’s Holiday House (1839) and Harriet Mozley’s 
The Fairy Bower (1841) show that while both books retain some pre-Romantic sense that 
children should engage in self-reflection, they also expose a newly emerging consensus that 
childhood should exist as an Edenic state before the fall into self-consciousness. 
In the third chapter I take up one of the complex outcomes of the Romantic re-evalutation 
of childhood self-consciousness: the phenomenon of Peter Pan. This chapter acknowledges the 
uneven development of attitudes regarding childhood self-consciousness by tracing in the 
Victorian period a cultural tension between a commonly expressed predilection for the 
unconscious child and a similarly prevalent celebration of the theatrical child, often understood 
as a figure of consummate self-consciousness. After mapping an increasing Victorian anxiety 
about self-consciousness through the writings of Thomas Carlyle and John Stuart Mill, and 
tracing the effect of this mounting worry in the burgeoning field of children’s literature, I argue 
that the incredible popularity of Peter Pan, both on the page and on the stage, should be 
understood as a result of his ability to satisfy seemingly antithetical cultural demands, to embody 
an impossible ideal for his audience—artfulness without self-consciousness. 
My last chapter engages the British public school in order to illustrate the effects—both 
on literature and on actual children—of the increasingly strident disavowal of childhood self-
consciousness. This chapter examines the particularly public school formation referred to as 
“good form,” an ethic of behavior and being that demands both perfect manner and perfect 
unselfconsciousness. Charting the development of the school story genre—one of the most 
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popular subsets of nineteenth-century children’s literature—from Tom Brown’s Schooldays 
(1857) to The Loom of Youth (1917), the chapter demonstrates this literature’s exposure of the 
incredible psychic demands that the doctrine of good form imposed on public schoolboys, and 
also displays the genre’s own self-conscious anxiety about the impossibility of representing good 
form without being in bad form. This closing chapter reveals that by the end of the Edwardian 
period, the anxiety about childhood self-consciousness had mounted into a concern that 
prescribing unselfconsciousness for children might in fact be self-defeating. 
Finally, my epilogue briefly highlights one of the ways in which the nineteenth century’s 
verdict against childhood self-consciousness continues to shape our thinking about children. I 
contend that psychoanalysis is built upon the assumption that childhood is a period of 
unselfconsciousness. Psychoanalysis requires an occluded history of the self that childhood self-
consciousness would obviate. The work of the analyst is to lead the patient to a revelatory 
understanding of the self commonly predicated on a retrospective consideration of a childhood 
that could not be consciously comprehended as it happened. The adult becomes conscious of 
what the child could not have been—the self. Thus one of the pre-eminent discourses of 
selfhood in the twentieth and twenty-first century has been erected on the foundation of a theory 
of the unselfconsciousness of children, the invention and effects of which my dissertation traces 
over the course of the long nineteenth century. 
At the end of the twentieth century, the mantra most repeated to American children was 
“Be Yourself.” It is a fundamentally twentieth-century thing to say to a child. It assumes that the 
child already has a fully-formed, unique self. “Be Yourself” presumes also that the child’s self is 
effortlessly knowable to the child. Most strangely, the command imagines that the child is in 
danger of being someone else. How is the child to know when she is being herself and when she 
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is not? What kind of bizarre ontological proposition is this? If “Be Yourself” is the bewildering 
ontological demand made on children of the twentieth century, “Forget Yourself” was the 
similarly baffling epistemological demand on children of the nineteenth century. As a 1891 
child-rearing manual notes, telling a child to “Forget Yourself” only leads to more thinking about 
the self, and in fact the harder the child tries to forget the more painfully self-conscious he is 
likely to become.37 “Forget Yourself” was a weird and paradoxical command issued to the 
children of the nineteenth century, and its effects were often weird and paradoxical as well—as 
this study will show. 
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2.0 EXCHANGING MASKS FOR MIRRORS: THE SELF-CONSCIOUS CHILD IN 
THE LATE GEORGIAN ERA 
The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, 
with gay relativity and with the merry negation of uniformity and 
similarity; it rejects conformity to oneself. 
---Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (1968)38 
The mirror continues to provide a way toward self-examination. 
---Benjamin Goldberg, The Mirror and Man (1985)39 
Before Romantic writers inspired a nearly culture-wide revulsion for self-consciousness in 
children, theorists of childhood in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century held quite the 
opposite opinion regarding the matter. They sought to awaken and cultivate self-consciousness in 
children. Children’s authors of the period, such as Maria Edgeworth, Mary Sherwood, and 
Hannah More, offered explicitly didactic texts that often aimed to induce a state of constant self-
reflection in child readers, who were asked to examine their thoughts, their behavior, and the 
state of their souls. In other words, children’s literature in some of its most influential early 
incarnations intended to cultivate self-consciousness in children as a step towards rational 
adulthood and as a primary Christian virtue, an accounting of the self that would lead children 
onto the path of righteousness. Adults urged children to use books as mirrors that would help 
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them peer deep into themselves, reveal their inmost being, and correct any faults in what they 
found. 
This chapter will provide a prehistory to what became common sense by the end of the 
nineteenth-century: that children’s literature should prevent the growth of self-consciousness in 
child readers. This prehistory will show that prior to the denigration of self-conscious childhood, 
the trope of the book-as-mirror grew out of a widespread belief that self-consciousness was 
crucial to an optimal childhood. The mirror was not only a metaphor for the child’s book; it also 
figured as an emblem in many tales for children, literalizing the injunction to the child reader to 
use the book to scrutinize her self. Children were also encouraged to keep diaries that would 
inculcate further self-reflection, and this chapter will examine a number of extant children’s 
diaries from the period in order to consider how children responded to this particular 
prescription.40   
While I will argue that there was in fact a highly significant shift from the turn-of-the-
century emphasis on the importance of self-scrutiny for children to the later-nineteenth-century 
rejection of self-conscious childhood, I will also trace the ways in which the seeds of the 
Romantic discomfort with self-consciousness were already present in the earlier ways of thinking 
about children and their capacity for self-reflection. Not all forms of self-consciousness were 
positively valued during this pre-Romantic period of upholding self-reflection as a childhood 
virtue. In the latter decades of the eighteenth century, even before the particularly Romantic 
discomfort with self-consciousness in children took hold of the English, even as self-
examination, sober reflection, self-discipline, and the deliberate imitation of literary model-
children were modes of self-consciousness actively encouraged in children, other forms of self-
consciousness were reviled in the young. Most frequently late-century authors term this 
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negatively charged self-consciousness “affectation,” and the discourse surrounding children and 
affectation foreshadows the full-blown devaluation of self-conscious childhood that Chapter Two 
will examine at length. 
2.1 BEFORE THE MIRROR, THE MASK 
First, at the risk of an infinite regress, we should consider the prehistory of the prehistory. A brief 
meditation on children’s relationships to books before the book-as-mirror model took hold will 
illuminate the importance of the late-eighteenth century for making conscious reflection on a 
deep-seated selfhood a concern for childhood for the first time. Before children’s reading 
encouraged them to take up the mirror, books taught children something very different: how to 
wear the mask. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century some of the relatively few books aimed 
at the young were conduct manuals, which provided detailed instructions on polite behavior for 
those striving to maintain or, more likely, improve their social standing. This advice literature 
grew out of an early modern tradition of courtesy books, but unlike those guidebooks for court 
life, the conduct manuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth century shifted the audience to the 
expanding middle classes.41 Books like Adam Petrie’s Rules of Good Deportment, or of Good 
Breeding (1720) and Reverend Wettenhall’s Letter of Genteel and Moral Advice to a Young 
Lady (1740) brought the possibility of self-fashioning, already available to the elite, down to the 
much larger ranks of the professional and merchant classes. Stephen Greenblatt has established 
that “in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the 
fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process.”42 Greenblatt’s representative 
early modern figures, however, are exceptional for their time: artists and statesmen and courtiers. 
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For the general public, self-fashioning did not become a common concern—even a possibility—
until later.  
Partly responsible for extending the art of self-fashioning to a larger population, the 
conduct books explicitly described the self as an artifice even when targeting the young, as in the 
case of Lord Chesterfield’s Letters to His Son on Men and Manners (1744), published twelve 
times between 1774 and 1803 alone. The book, comprised of letters the famous statesman wrote 
to his illegitimate son over the course of his illustrious life, became a standard handbook for 
middle-class consumption. It focuses on politeness and decorum, on perfecting the social mask 
so as to be well-received and at ease in any company. Lord Chesterfield advises “due attention to 
the manners of people of fashion,” which will enable the reader to imitate successfully their 
habits, speech, and appearance. The aim is to act genteel so as to be taken as a gentleman, and 
the advice indicates that success lies less in perfecting some inner nature and more in paying 
scrupulous attention to the effect of one’s exterior. For example, Chesterfield cautions against 
using common proverbs, “which are so many proofs of having kept bad and low company.”43 He 
also points out that a “man of sense” is just as assertive as an impudent man, only he has “art 
enough to give an outward air of modesty to all he does.”44 This is a type of self-consciousness, 
but not one concerned with the deep self. The conduct manual constructed a sense self-
fashioning as an outward-directed process of crafting and seamlessly wearing a social mask. The 
inside mattered much less than the outside—if it mattered at all. 
The emphasis on outward manifestations over inner truths explains why rules from early 
modern courtesy books written for members of the court, like The Babees Book and The Boke of 
Nature, were reprinted in eighteenth century conduct manuals for middle class youths, like John 
Garretson’s The School of Manners, or, Rules for Children’s Behaviour: At Church, at Home, at 
24 
Table, in Company, in Discourse, at School, abroad, and among Boys (1701). Young readers 
were assured that they need only memorize and enact rules of aristocratic deportment (such as 
“Sing not nor hum in thy mouth while thou art in company”) in order to achieve greater social 
stature. If you wear the mask of gentility perfectly, these books promise, you will achieve the 
status of gentility.45 The reader is enjoined not to perfect an inner self but to perfect his 
performance of an artificial role. Indeed, the preface to Present for an Apprentice; or, A Sure 
Guide to Esteem and an Estate (1740), written by former Lord Mayor of London John Barnard 
and addressed to his son, explains that the book is intended to help the reader enter “gracefully 
on the Stage of the World” by teaching him to act his part well, “in order to come off with 
Applause”—as open an acknowledgement of artificiality and other-directed self-fashioning as 
one could ask for.46 Likewise, with its copious language of gilding, varnishing, painting, hiding, 
and disguising, the Rules of Good Deportment makes clear that its maxims construct an outward 
self, an artful bit of theater—without much concern for what lies beneath the meticulously 
fabricated mask. 
If conduct literature encouraged children to take up not mirrors but masks, affectation 
was still, even at this early stage, a concern, albeit with a different valence than it would take on 
at the end of the eighteenth century. Writing in the late seventeenth century, John Locke defines 
affectation as “an awkward and forced imitation of what should be genuine and easy, wanting the 
beauty that accompanies what is natural.”47 Importantly, for Locke, the awkwardness of 
affectation results from an insufficient education in which the pupil is taught the theory of 
fashionable manners and conversation without being required to practice them until they become 
natural. In other words, affectation is not a result of role-playing in general; rather it is an effect 
of an imperfect performance. The performance needs to be improved, not abandoned.  
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By the turn of the nineteenth century, however, many commentators condemned all 
performance as an affectation that destroyed unselfconscious simplicity. Sarah Trimmer, in the 
Guardian of Education (1802-6), the first English periodical dedicated to advising parents on the 
matter of children’s literature and arguably the beginning point of a canon of English children’s 
literature, declares Lord Chesterfield's Letters to His Son “a very dangerous book, unfit for the 
perusal of youth” because of the “fatal experience” of many “who, while they have been 
studying in it the science of the graces, or, in other words, a system of artificial manners, devoid 
of religious or moral principle, have made shipwreck of their sincerity and virtue.”48 Similarly, 
she objects to M. Berquin's suggestion in the preface to The Childrens' Friend (sic) that children 
should be encouraged to come forward and be made easy in adult company:  
[O]n the contrary, they rather require, according to our idea, to be kept back, to 
prevent their losing that graceful bashfulness which is natural to the child who is 
taught to look up with reverence and respect to his superiors in age and 
knowledge; and which, so far from being a disadvantage to childhood, is one of 
the greatest charms of that age of innocent simplicity.49 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a commonplace that good reading encouraged 
children to develop their reflection and self-discipline—positively valued forms of self-
consciousness—while bad reading fed the growth of affectation —a negatively valued forms of 
self-consciousness which by this point included any hint of artifice. The self as theater, as mask, 
was out; the authentic self, the inner nature, was in.  
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Figure 1: “Children Playing with a Mask,” O.G. Rejlander (1894).50 The older, wiser, more loftily seated 
child motions to the younger to put down the mask. 
The shift from an open embrace of the artifice of self-fashioning in conduct manuals read 
by children to a subsequent rejection of artifice and elevation of earnest, inward-directed self-
scutiny is vividly illustrated in a story provided by William Mavor in his Youth’s Miscellany of 
1798. Titled “The Dangerous Consequences of Encouraging a Theatric Taste in Youth,” the tale 
recounts the history of a merchant’s daughter who gets so wrapped up in the theater that she 
nearly marries an actor—an outcome that Mavor lets his readers know would be nothing short of 
disastrous. Poor Clarinda Hartley is infected by mere exposure to the artifice of the theater: “The 
tender mind easily assimilates itself to the objects before it: I soon caught the rage of imitation, 
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and the flame of emulation; encouragement fanned the passion of my soul, and praise animated 
me to endeavour at excellence.”51 Like the readers of conduct manuals before her, Clarinda seeks 
social approval by constructing a highly artificial performance of self. Flattered by actors, whose 
“good opinion I regarded as the highest eulogium,” she comes to believe that she too has acting 
talent and goes so far as to build a theater in her own home.52 The text’s suspicion of flattery and 
its connection with insincere performance echoes, as we will see, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
warnings in Émile (1762) that exposing the child to flattery plants “the germs of artificiality,” 
which are the enemy of “self-knowledge and self-control, the arts of life and happiness.”53 
Indeed, it is the newly valued self-conscious art of reflection—an avenue to the self-knowledge 
exalted by Rousseau—that saves Clarinda from an irreversible immersion in the theater through 
marriage to an actor. The suitor favored by her father writes a poem in which he laments that 
Clarinda has “stoop[ed] to art.”54 Reading the poem is a sobering experience for Clarinda, and as 
“To be grave is to reflect,” the missive sparks a crisis of conscience in which she vows to swear 
off the theater and marry the young merchant-poet.55 Clarinda is infected by one form of self-
consciousness—seeking approval from fashionable society through performance—but receives 
an antidote in the form of another kind of self-consciousness—self-reflection brought on by an 
act of reading. Good self-consciousness combats the now thoroughly disreputable art of self-
fashioning. 
In part these shifts in ways of thinking about children’s self-cultivation may have been a 
result of the emergence of a new form of subjectivity in the late-eighteenth century, an 
emergence traced in Dror Wahrman’s Making of the Modern Self (2004). Wahrman argues that 
between the “immortal soul as self” paradigm of the pre-eighteenth-century West—shared by 
everyone from medieval Catholics to seventeenth-century Puritans—and the “deep interiority as 
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self” paradigm the modern world inherited from the Romantics, there were eighty years or so in 
the eighteenth century during which the English seemed to have an epistemological moment that 
looks terribly postmodern from today’s perspective but explains the frank embrace of artifice in 
the conduct manuals: namely, England in the early to middle eighteenth-century thought of the 
self as outwardly-directed, as performative, as a shifting assumption of types in response to 
social cues.  
By tracing the history of a few prominent identity categories—gender, race, and human 
versus animal—over the course of the eighteenth century, Wahrman demonstrates that during the 
first eighty years of the century these categories were fairly fluid, one emblem for which is the 
popularity of the masquerade ball, a form of entertainment that delights in the mutability of 
identity.56 However, in the last two decades of the century, identity categories began to grow 
much more rigid, and the masquerade ball fell out of vogue. In short, selfhood entered a process 
of stabilization at the end of the century. Of course, in terms of self-development, the shift from 
conceiving subjectivity as essentially mutable to believing it to be essentially stable switched the 
cultural emphasis from becoming the self one wants to be—donning the right mask and wearing 
it convincingly—to discovering what self one has, knowing its faults, and continuously, forever 
striving to correct them—studying oneself in the mirror, no masks involved. It is no accident, 
then, that Clarinda finds the poem about the ills of performance inside a mask that has been 
pointedly positioned on a statue of Mercury in her garden. The medium, in that case, is the 
message. Both the mask and mutable Mercury were emblems of what Warhman calls the ancien 
régime of identity, the sense of the identity as something to be artfully shaped to court social 
success. Mavor’s self-theatricalizing Clarinda is being warned that by 1798 a new regime is 
taking hold, and the mask must be discarded. 
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Instead of perfecting one’s performance, late-eighteenth-century English literature 
insisted, one should be practicing self-reflection in order to perfect the authentic inner self. Thus 
children, rather than being taught to assimilate fashionable manners, were asked at the end of the 
eighteenth century to shun artificiality (bad self-consciousness) and embrace quiet reflection 
(good self-consciousness). In agreeing that children should look inward, and that their reading 
should help them to do so, these various late eighteenth-century schools of thought on childhood 
sought to inculcate self-consciousness in children, and sought to do so using children's literature 
as a key tool. Children were asked to exchange masks for mirrors, and some of those mirrors 
took the forms of the books they were given to read, while others took the form of blank books 
they were asked to fill out with their own reflections on their worlds and their selves. 
2.2 THE BOOK AS MIRROR 
Self-conscious reflection was necessary for both the development of the intellect and the 
salvation of the soul. The Puritans, who were, according to Mary Jackson, the most influential 
group in directing the early juvenile book trade, had brought to children’s reading an insistence 
on private spiritual reflection.57 As D. W. Bebbington emphasizes, the Puritans, painfully 
preoccupied with attaining some assurance of salvation, dealt with doubt through “rigorous self-
examination.”58 James Janeway’s A Token for Children (1671), depicting thirteen ecstatic deaths 
of exemplarily pious children, demonstrates the need for children to engage in private reflection 
in the name of ultimate salvation. Little Sarah Howley, first up in the litany of child mortality, 
retires to a private chamber to weep and search her heart immediately after coming home from 
the sermon that began her spiritual conversion. Through such private reflection she is “made 
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deeply sensible of the condition of her Soul”; self-consciousness is one of the first stops on the 
road to achieving Salvation.59  
This emphasis on self-reflection, not confined to the Puritans but rather a general feature 
of Protestant culture, coincided with the middle-class practice of prudent business strategies to 
create a discourse and practice of spiritual accounting, in which one casts up one’s accounts with 
God through habitual self-examination, often recording sins and good deeds in a journal just as 
one would record expenses and profits in a ledger, or even making and filling out checklists to 
help distinguish between “sanctifying” and mere “temporary” grace.60 Just like their elders, 
Protestant children were required to account for their souls, and one method of encouraging the 
child to keep tabs on her spiritual state was to give her books featuring model children like Little 
Sarah Howley against whom to measure herself. Children were to observe the model children of 
late-eighteenth-century children’s literature, reflect upon their own character in comparison, and, 
hopefully, improve as a result of this self-conscious endeavor.  Trimmer insisted that 
encouraging serious reflection from childhood on, particularly that directed inward, was of 
national importance: “In order to a national reformation, every individual must look first at 
home, and be intent upon mending himself; for which purpose, there should be a deliberate and 
close inspection into our own hearts and ways.”61 Through her work on the Guardian, Trimmer 
sought to identify and champion works that included fictional children who modeled this 
positively valued form of self-conscious reflection, thus encouraging self-reflection on the part 
of child readers.62 The injunction to consider a model may seem to echo the conduct book. But 
while Lord Chesterfield and the other conduct manual authors focused on polishing outward 
manners, writers in this new tradition focused on molding a deep-seated and mostly 
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private self into the best possible shape. The conduct book urged imitation of an exterior; the 
new children’s literature encouraged children self-conscious reflection on and perfection of 
something invisible but of monumental importance; the true, inner self. 
An early model of self-conscious reflection was an adult character in a book meant 
primarily for adult readers but, with Rousseau’s singular approval, appropriated by the nursery. 
Daniel Defoe’s hero Robinson Crusoe, upon first going to sea, gets seasick and for seemingly the 
first time in his life spends some time in self-reflection: 
I began now seriously to reflect upon what I had done, and how justly I was 
overtaken by the judgment of Heaven for my wicked leaving my father's house, 
and abandoning my duty; all the good counsel of my parents, my father's tears and 
my mother's entreaties came now fresh into my mind, and my conscience, which 
was not yet come to the pitch of hardness which it has been since, reproach'd me 
with the contempt of advice, and the breach of my duty to God and my father (9).63 
First, note how closely reflection is tied to conscience—as though the conscience were the 
muscle and reflection were the exercise thereof. Second, note that reflection comes out of 
adversity; indeed, Crusoe abandons it as soon as he recovers from his seasickness. But of course 
he soon finds himself in a near-constant state of peril when shipwrecked on his island, a time of 
hardship during which he embraces reflection through writing in a journal, including a two-
column “Evil” and “Good” entry, an act of accounting both material (“I have not clothes to cover 
me”) and spiritual (“he that miraculously saved me from death, can deliver me from this 
condition”—the “condition” being at once the states of both mortal peril and sin), and a model 
for the account books kept by some children (54). More reflection during an illness leads him to 
existential questions—“What is this earth and sea of which I have seen so much, whence is it 
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produced, and what am I, and all the other creatures, wild and tame, human and brutal, whence 
are we?”—which ultimately lead him to God (74). He is “struck dumb” with his reflections, and 
has “not a word to say, no not to answer my self” (75). Self-reflection alone is not enough; 
ultimately it is just a step on the path to answers from God. But by the time his ink starts running 
out, he has established an observation of the Sabbath, so that his journal can be limited to writing 
down “only the most remarkable events…without continuing a daily memorandum of other 
things” like his thoughts (83). Through self-conscious reflection and diary-keeping Crusoe 
reaches salvation and sets an example for doing so for generations of child readers. 
Evangelical writer Hannah More takes up the pattern established by Defoe in her story 
“The History of Tom White” in Tales for the Common People, one entry in her series of tracts 
meant for working-class adults and children alike. After being thrown from his horse during a 
carriage crash caused by his own recklessness in showing off, Tom has a long convalescence to 
reflect on how he has been going to the bad—much like Crusoe during his sea-sickness on the 
first voyage. He comes to see his accident as a “happy affliction,” for “long sickness and solitude 
gave him time to reflect on his past life,” repent, and improve.64 More wanted readers to submit 
to self-reflection now and not wait for an illness, when it might be too late to repent; Tom, after 
all, only narrowly avoids a death which would have left him heading to the afterlife in a dubious 
spiritual state. More believed all youth to originate in a dubious spiritual state from which self-
reflection could lead them to God and salvation. “Histories” like that of Tom White could 
encourage readers to engage in such self-reflection. 
The conservative Christian women writing specifically for children and about children’s 
literature at the turn of the century strongly valued self-conscious spiritual accounting.  In the 
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Guardian, Sarah Trimmer, despite some misgivings, praised the work of Madame de Genlis in 
such a way that makes it clear she believed that children's reading should lead to self-conscious 
reflection:  
We can readily believe that the Author has, as she professes, drawn from the life, 
for all the characters she gives are to be frequently met with among children; and 
she has described them in such lively colours, as cannot fail, we think, of leading 
young readers to the consciousness of their own particular faults, and to such an 
observation of the failings or amiable qualities of their young companions, as will 
conduce to the forming of their own characters to whatever is good and 
praiseworthy.65 
The nicely delineated characters of the children’s story should motivate readers to engage in the 
self-conscious formation of their own selves in accordance to what they learn about good and 
bad qualities from their reading. In her own most popular book for children, Fabulous Histories 
(1786), Trimmer’s child characters are asked repeatedly by their parents to reflect upon 
themselves—on their difference from the animals they lovingly observe, for instance, or on their 
own behavior generally—an invitation extended implicitly to young readers. Her use of natural 
observation as a starting point for self-conscious reflection extends the pattern established by 
Anna Laetitia Barbauld in her Hymns in Prose for Children (1781): first, the observation of 
nature through sensory impression; second, a reflection on divine truths brought about through 
these observations. This pattern is also the pattern of Lockean education—sensory observation of 
the outside world leading to inward reflection. 
Not infrequently the children’s literature of the eighteenth-century literalizes the 
metaphor lurking in this use of the term “reflection” by employing the mirror as an emblem for 
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reading-enabled self-consciousness or even explicitly defining the mental faculty of self-
conscious reflection as a superior sort of looking-glass. The link between the proliferation of 
mirrors in Enlightenment Europe, the discoveries in optical science enabled by mirrors, and the 
growth of subject-centered epistemologies has been traced by a host of scholars.66 To summarize 
the aspects of that scholarship most relevant here, the concepts of conscience, consciousness, and 
self-reflection developed side-by-side with optical science. Protestant doctrine required that one 
could know one’s own moral state independent of mediation through a priest or interpreter of the 
holy word. They taught, therefore, that God had provided man with conscience, a metaphorical 
light illuminating the bearer’s soul. The metaphor of light, as Gilbert Ryle notes, was drawn from 
the optically discovered world of Galilean science.67 Thus when Locke wrote about the mental 
process of self-scrutiny, he, like many others, called it reflection, invoking the image of the 
mirror. 
In J. H. Campe's Elementary Dialogues for the Improvement of Youth (1792), a book of 
lessons and stories premised as a Socratic dialogue between a tutor and his students, the tutor 
teaches that “The looking-glass only represents something, whereas the soul represents it to 
itself, or rather, the soul possesses an inward sentiment, the consciousness as well of itself as of 
the things it represents to itself.”68 Self-consciousness is that faculty that represents the self to 
itself—an invaluable ability, and one that sets humans apart from the rest of creation, according 
to Campe. Sarah Fielding’s The Governess: or, the Little Female Academy (1749) also takes up 
the mirror as an emblem. The episodic novel begins with all the girls of the academy fighting 
over apples in a garden—a fracas meant to alert us to their lack of spiritual grace through the 
heavy-handed allusion to the Fall. Miss Jenny Peace, eldest student, afterwards persuades the 
pupils to reconcile, and then suggests that they spend their leisure time alternately telling 
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fictional tales (for example, the tale of two kidnapped lovers, a giant, and a heroic male dwarf 
called Mignon) and the stories of their own lives. The autobiographical mode of the majority of 
their shared stories makes the form of the novel one that emphasizes the importance of self-
reflection. One of the girls enthusiastically thanks Jenny “for having put me into a Way of 
examining my Heart, and reflecting on my own Actions” (105).69 Later, for the Romantics, the 
dawning of self-conscious reflection would be linked to the Fall as one of its unfortunate 
causes—both because Adam and Eve eat of the fruit and become self-conscious and thus exiled, 
and because the dawning of self-consciousness in the child comes to be seen as the beginning of 
the end of the paradise of childhood—but in this eighteenth-century children’s novel, self-
consciousness acts as the corrective for the unfortunate squabbles in the garden. 
If the form of the pupils’ brief memoirs embodies the act of self-conscious reflection, the 
content of the fanciful tales thematizes self-consciousness. One tale illustrates the distinction 
between the good self-consciousness of the girls' autobiographical enterprise, and the bad self-
consciousness that the tale refers to as “artfulness” (95). Two cousins, courted by the same man, 
are each approached by him in turn and asked to critique the other. The first cousin, Chloe, 
falsely reports that Caelia possesses two undesirable traits: “an Artfulness of Temper, and some 
few Sparks of Envy” (95). These are in fact the very faults that Chloe displays in lying about her 
cousin. Of course, the all-knowing suitor detects the lie and marries Caelia; Chloe feels so 
terrible about her deceit that she nearly dies (what else!) before reconciling with the newlyweds 
and living with them happily ever after. In another tale appears a magic mirror, which has the 
power to show anyone who gazes into it her “inward self”—a handy metaphor for the stories the 
girls tell of themselves, and, on a larger scale, a metaphor for the intended purpose of realistic 
eighteenth century children's literature (125). Children’s literature sought to be a mirror in which 
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child readers studied themselves, and furthermore it aspired to teach children to internalize this 
mirror and practice self-conscious reflection on their own. 
The experts in the fields of child-rearing and children’s literature in the eighteenth 
century cautioned, however, that not all reading encourages the proper mode of reflection. 
More’s Strictures on Female Education (1799) argues that the “indolent repose of light 
reading”70 engaged in habitually and enthusiastically by the young (girls in particular) qualifies 
as nothing short of a form of dissipation that leaves “neither time for reflection, nor space for 
self-examination.”71 Popular, non-religious literature, in More’s estimation, weakens the reader’s 
capacity to engage with better literature, the kind that cultivates the desired habits of self-
examination. The problem is solved fairly easily; the young person, or the guardian thereof, must 
simply discern between good reading and bad, and discard the bad in favor of the good. Maria 
Edgeworth’s concerns about children’s literature and self-consciousness are less easily resolved. 
In Practical Education (1798), she worries that children will imitate what is too far from their 
own reality, particularly sentimental literature, and thus appear “ludicrous”72 in their affectation: 
“All the simplicity of youth is gone the moment children perceive, that they are extolled for the 
expression of fine feelings, and fine sentiments.”73  
Once again affectation looms as a bugbear of late-eighteenth-century thought on youth, 
an insidious form of negatively valued self-consciousness difficult to identify and root out 
because the sentimental craze for simplicity means that what appears to be the most natural may 
in fact be the most affected. More marvels at “the quantity of art some people put in practice in 
order to appear natural; and the deep design which is set at work to exhibit simplicity.”74 
Edgeworth cautions that we must not scold children for being proud of their accomplishments, 
for doing so can lead to false humility—another affectation75: “The affectation of 
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humility…appears full as ridiculous, as troublesome, and as offensive as any of the graces of 
vanity, or the airs of pride. Young people…are not so easily cured of any species of 
affectation.”76 Again the language of disease attaches to the problem of childhood affectation, a 
dangerous condition that seems to frustrate efforts to “cure” it because it poses as its own 
opposite: 
And indeed this feigned simplicity is the most mischievous, because the most 
engaging of all the Proteus forms which dissimulation can put on. For the free and 
bold sentiments have been sometimes hazarded with fatal success under this 
unsuspected mask. And an innocent, quiet, indolent, artless manner has been 
adopted as the most refined and successful accompaniment of sentiments, ideas, 
and designs, neither innocent, quiet, nor artless.77 
The difficulty of discerning between true simplicity and affected, self-conscious simplicity 
leaves adults in a state of suspicious watchfulness of children that can even cause them to suspect 
the innocent of artful deception. In fact, in at least two of Edgeworth’s more popular tales, 
“Simple Susan” and “Lame Jarvas,” the drama derives from the misperception of affectation. 
Cynical adults and children, believing Susan and Jarvas to be a little too humble and simple, 
persecute them for an affectation they do not possess. 
The only solution to this problem is for adults to assure the young that, though their 
affectation might deceive some, their insincerity will always be exposed to those of perfect 
perception. In The Fairchild Family (1818-47), for instance, Mary Sherwood repeatedly 
admonishes her child characters—and child readers—to remember that God sees the evil in their 
hearts, even when they have successfully concealed it from their parents and fellow children. 
Ellenor Fenn, in The Fairy Spectator: or, The Invisible Monitor (1789), sweetens the lesson by 
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replacing the stern and watchful God with a beautiful and charming fairy, but the child 
understands that her tutor’s fanciful tale of a fairy with magic mirrors—one of which shows the 
child as she is, and one of which shows the child as she should be—encodes a deeper truth: 
“Miss Sprightly, retiring to her own chamber, wrote as follows in her memorandum book. May I 
always consider that God is every-where present; that He knows all which we do, say, or even 
think; and oh! may I always strive to please Him!” (11-12). 
Miss Sprightly’s convictions are only strengthened by the tale her governess, Miss 
Teachwell, tells her of the fairy, the mirrors, and the reformation of one Miss Child. Miss Child, 
losing her mother at the age of five, is given over to a governess who focuses on outward 
accomplishments. Well-dressed and well-groomed, Miss Child nonetheless grows “proud, 
selfish, peevish, and vain” (16). She likes only the pictures in books, but doesn’t read and take to 
heart their good lessons. She “kept no account” of her spendings, which is of course meant to 
show us that she keeps no account of her self either (18). While admiring herself in a mirror one 
day, a fairy appears over her shoulder, reveals that she has been monitoring Miss Child’s inner 
state all her life, and produces two “enchanted glasses: one shows you as you are, the other as 
you might and should be” (25-6). The fairy then tells Miss Child two tales of two girls whose 
names reflect their faults, Miss Pettish and Miss Lavish, both cured with the fairy's mirrors—and 
with some self-reflection: “You are to observe, that I insist that my pupils shall write an account 
of what passes, as they find it in the mirrors; this is to be done journal-wise, in two opposite 
pages of the same book” (28-9). What this means is that Miss Pettish—and then, at more length, 
Miss Lavish—writes first what she did, said, and thought in reality, then writes what she should 
have done, said, or thought instead. The “images” in the “mirrors” are just a metaphor for the 
process of written self-reflection and self-correction. All the children of the book—and there are 
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many, given the structure of a story within a story within a story—find the “mirror” of the 
journal to be an effective method of self-development. The child reader learns that, with the help 
of a pen and a blank book, she can be her own fairy spectator, her own self-reflecting mirror. 
2.3 THE DIARY AS MIRROR 
Children’s literature in the late eighteenth century, then, often recommended the keeping of a 
journal as a method of developing self-consciousness. Mrs. Fairchild, matriarch of The Fairchild 
Family, gives her daughter Lucy a journal in which to record “every day the naughty things 
which pass in your heart”: 
You will then find, my dear, that many days, when you may appear to be very 
good in the eyes of your papa and mamma, and of other people, you are in reality 
in the sight of God very naughty. This custom, my dear child, will teach you to 
know your own heart, and will keep you from being proud, and thinking better of 
yourself than of other people.78 
The child reader observes as Lucy vows to be good, determined to write only good things in her 
journal, but inevitably fails. Yet Lucy still becomes more self-conscious and thus self-
disciplined, and the child reader is advised to “get your friends to give you a blank book, and a 
pen and ink, that you also may keep an account of the sins of your heart, in order to keep you 
from being proud.”79 The diary should make the child self-conscious in a way that is not self-
aggrandizing—that would lead to affectation—but rather self-disciplining.  
Diary-keeping was practiced by eighteenth-century adults as well as children. Protestant 
and Rationalist mindsets came together to recommend the practice of casting up accounts with 
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God, applying the scientific method of orderly observation to create a method of spiritual 
accounting that borrowed, as mentioned before, the sound business methodology of book-
keeping. Clergyman Benjamin Bennet proposed that the pious use a diary to “settle Accounts 
every Day” so as to simplify matters at death, for if the “Records of Conscience” are “summ'd up 
and stated at the Bottom of every Page,” the process of Judgment will be expedited.80 This 
account book of the soul is compared explicitly with the “Book of Accounts for an Ordinary 
Trade,” Bennet asking why Christians would hesitate to keep such records of their souls when 
they are so accustomed to do so for their trade.81 A host of others repeated the exhortation to 
“Make it part of your daily work to call your Heart to an Account.”82  
Once more it is worth noting that the practice of diary-writing also gained popularity due 
to the emergence of new forms of subjectivity as illuminated by Wahrman. The motives behind 
diary-keeping—the value placed on the expression of individuality and the imperative towards 
self-examination—resulted from a freshly sprung conception of the self as a relatively stable (but 
still shapeable, improvable) inner essence. Stable but capable of development, crucially; the 
point is to know your inner state so as to steadily alter it towards an ideal. Off the table, however, 
is the option that dominated earlier conceptions of selfhood, the choice simply to don a new 
mask and become a new person. The mask has been exchanged for the mirror, the act of 
reflection, often written, that reveals the self in order to perfect it. For children this act was 
imbued with a particular urgency, as adults, following Locke, understood childhood to be a time 
of rapid and perhaps irreversible development. It is not surprising, then, that children’s diaries 
were often monitored by parents eager to peruse the expressions of their child’s developing 
consciousness.  
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Self-consciousness and diary-keeping were mutually reinforcing tools that adults urged 
upon children to encourage the internalization of self-discipline. But until that internalization had 
been completely accomplished, parents would have often felt the need to maintain discipline 
through observation of the child. In Edgeworth’s Early Lessons (1801), Rosamond’s mother 
enjoins her “tell me what you think, and what you feel, so that I may help you to manage 
yourself so as to make you wise and good and happy; but, unless I know what passes in your 
little mind, I shall not be able to help you.”83 Reading the child’s diary enabled the adult to 
investigate the written articulation of selfhood at a remove, perhaps in hopes that the child would 
reveal himself more readily when not face-to-face with authority. Though certainly a form of 
surveillance, this parental monitoring of the child’s diary does not necessarily suggest 
compulsion. American child diarist Anna Green Winslow seems to have been eager to submit 
her diaries to her parents’ review; occasionally within the pages of her diary she sulks mildly 
because they have failed to comment on what she has written in earlier entries. Of course, not all 
children would have enjoyed keeping and sharing a diary. Arianne Baggerman and Rudolf 
Dekker make it clear that the Dutch boy who is the subject of their study Child of the 
Enlightenment (2009) often resented his assigned diary-writing and his parents’ review of it. And 
yet, as Baggerman and Dekker point out, though Otto starts out his diary-keeping years by 
constantly shirking his task of self-examination, he does eventually internalize his parents' 
discipline and become autonomously self-reflective.84  
Some child diarists do not seem to have needed any adult encouragement to engage in 
intense self-criticism. The preface to the posthumously published excerpts of Mary Gilbert’s 
journal was written by founder of the Methodist movement John Wesley, who promises that her 
diary was a place where “she set down from time to time, merely for her own Use, just what 
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occurred between God and her own Soul,” on which account the record promises to be all the 
more valuable as spiritual inspiration: “But on this very Account, Persons of Understanding will 
set the greater Value upon it: because it contains only genuin Christian Experience, painted in its 
native Colours.”85 According to Wesley, the very lack of “Art or Ornament” in her writing, and 
the fact that she wrote entirely for herself, guarantees the power of her diary as an exemplar of 
Christian self-examination—there is no mask here, only a mirror. 86 Gilbert, a pious Christian 
whose diary evidences the fact that she took to heart injunctions to continuously cast up accounts 
with God, was born in Antigua in 1751 but did not begin her journal until New Year’s Day 1765, 
at the age of thirteen. She wrote fervently and faithfully until her death at sixteen, a month before 
her seventeenth birthday. Her earliest entries display a habitual anxiety about her mind’s 
tendency to wander from pious thoughts, to be overtaken by a “light, trifling spirit” (17).87 
Commonly she records, in addition to brief mentions of visits and other daily activities, her 
success, or, more commonly, lack thereof, at keeping her mind “fixt entire” on God (12). 
Anything less than perfect mental attendance to religious thoughts tormented her, especially on 
Sundays, when she tended to write at more length, presumably because quiet reflection was one 
of the few activities that could be considered appropriate for the Sabbath. But she does not have 
to have her diary before her to examine the movements of her mind; she reports sleepless nights 
of “strict self-examination” while lying in bed (31). The diary shows the energy and desperation 
with which she monitored her own inner state, until towards the end of her life she exclaims 
“Lord, I am sick, sick of sin, and truly sick of self” (76). All this with no adult reading over her 
shoulder, indicating how successfully she had internalized the injunction to self-examination. 
The diary as spiritual biography, in the style of Mary Gilbert, was encouraged not only by 
clergymen like Bennet and Wesley but also by Trimmer, the doyenne of children’s literature. 
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Trimmer reviews and extracts from a book titled From MS. Papers found in the Writing-Desk of 
a Young Lady after her Decease: 
[Her] papers afford of recommending such an example of early piety to the 
imitation of young persons…we would advise their adopting the pattern she has 
set, by writing down her thoughts and reflections, as a great help to devotion, and 
a happy means of advancement in Christian knowledge and practical piety. We 
have known this method applied with good effect to the purposes of self-
examination, as a regular part of the Sunday-evening employment, by keeping a 
weekly register of sins committed, blessings and mercies received, and new 
resolutions formed, accompanied by fervent prayers, written from the heart, for 
grace to keep them.88 
Trimmer assures her readers that keeping such a meticulous register of one’s innermost self will 
not result in any negative forms of self-consciousness. Of another diarist, whose posthumously 
published journal she also recommends as a model, Trimmer says that one might think that “so 
much exactness in private, must have a little affected her behaviour in society, and yet nothing 
could be more free, simple, and natural…never was there a more deep, unfeigned, and artless 
lowliness of mind.”89 The self-consciousness bred by diary-keeping is in no way understood by 
Trimmer to compromise natural artlessness or lead to affectation. In fact, Trimmer seems to 
suggest that the diary is conducive to simplicity; good self-consciousness keeps bad self-
consciousness at bay. But not all diarists’ writing bears out Trimmer’s promise. Child diarist 
Emily Shore of Suffolk, after nearly ten years of diary-keeping, confesses that despite her 
enthusiastic devotion to her intensely self-conscious journal, she has been guilty of affecting an 
undeserved (in her later estimation) reputation as a prodigy.  
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Shore began her diary at the age of eleven, inspired by the gift of a “small pocket-book,” 
and for the first five years she writes from her quiet and studious home in Suffolk, recording 
mostly observations on natural history, records of her impressive, self-directed course of studies, 
and intelligent critiques of her wide-ranging reading (138).90 Early on most evidence of self-
examination takes the form of scholarly self-criticism, as when she resolves to stop being such a 
“superficial botanist” and begin studying plant life more systematically (89). She turns to more 
spiritual reflections after her first bout of illness, using especially birthdays (she was born on 
Christmas Day) and New Year’s Days, as was common in diary-writing, to review her inner 
state.  
On Christmas Day 1836, while staying with family in Devonshire, Shore outlines what 
she believes to be a basic element of her nature: dissatisfaction with herself. She confesses that 
she feels “I am not what I am supposed to be; I am liked and loved far more than I deserve” 
(175). She rebukes herself again two years later, at the end of her life, for having cultivated a 
reputation among her friends and family, particularly while in Devonshire, as “a wonder, a 
prodigy of talents, goodness, etc” (337). Because she has shared her diary with loved ones, it has 
served in part to help construct this reputation, and thus, she believes she has been “instinctively 
limiting the extent of my confidence in ink and paper” (262). In other words, the diary itself, 
though certainly self-conscious in the way recommended by Bennet and Trimmer, has been in 
part affected. Diary-keeping has encouraged self-consciousness of both sorts, good and bad. 
Shore resolves to start a separate, entirely unaffected diary, into which she “shall pour all the 
secret feelings of my heart; my sins, my weaknesses, my progress towards goodness, or, if 
unhappily necessary, an occasional relapse or decline” (263). No such second volume exists. 
Perhaps the possibility of posthumous publication—she more than once excoriates the practice of 
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publishing private diaries—stopped her from unlocking “the secret chamber of the heart” (262; 
emphasis original). If so, she was not mistaken, of course; unsurprisingly, when her sisters 
published her diaries in 1891, they expurgated the passages in which Shore denounces the 
publication of private journals. 
The Quaker youth Frederic Post fits into the same tradition of self-conscious diary-
keeping as Mary Gilbert and Emily Shore, and he also evinces some level of concern about the 
potential public-ness of his writing. Like Emily Shore, his diary begins with entries that are more 
outward-looking—he too writes about natural history, his reading, matters of the external 
world—before turning his gaze ever more inward to review his own thoughts, the quality of his 
inner being, often in a self-critical register worthy of Mary Gilbert: “Thoughts enter my mind 
that I detest, that I abhor, that I would wish in the wide space of aether, rather than in my breast, 
as a canker-worm to destroy every goodly leaf that would flourish therein, but I cannot eradicate 
them.”91 He too seems to be constrained in some ways by the possibility of an audience. Though 
he exclaims “Think not that my diary is intended for publication,” he apparently doth protest too 
much, for only a semi-colon separates that injunction from the caveat “but [published diarists] 
Evelyn or Burton, perhaps, thought the same,” followed by “a few remarks” offered to any future 
readers, should the diary “be discovered in the 20th century, and reprinted.”92 These remarks 
betray an anxiety that he will be misread: “I flatter myself, some advance of intellect may be 
discovered, but I am aware, I am still but a youth. The reader is unjust, if he accuse me of flattery 
or egotism in a history of myself.”93 For Post, diary-keeping induces not only a self-conscious 
examination of interiority but also a self-conscious concern with the estimation of others. Here 
again we seed that the seeds of Romantic discomfort with self-consciouseness were already 
germinating even at a time dominated by a positive valuation of childhood self-scrutiny. The 
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child diarists show an uncomfortable awareness that their private self-reflection may potentially 
become public, or—even more disquieting—that the habit of self-examination might always 
already be tainted with a degree of affectation, a consciousness of performing a socially 
prestigious act. 
Of course, not all child diaries evince self-consciousness, as not all diaries are accounts of 
the individual soul. Michele Cohen points out that many girls kept diaries that functioned 
primarily as a record of stimulating conversation, meant to educate them in the arts of social 
life.94 In these cases, the diary was an aid in shaping the social self just as much as the still 
surviving conduct book was. As always, we must keep in mind the uneven developments in 
cultural formations as broad as the cultivation of selfhood in children. As John Brewer remarks, 
in addition to or instead of examining the inner self, the diary often “helped shape a polite 
person” by serving as a workbook in the social graces.95 It is to this use that the diary is put in 
Mary Cockle’s children’s book The Juvenile Journal, or, Tales of Truth (1807). This fictional 
diary records not the thoughts and self-examinations of the little girl who is its subject; rather, 
the diary is kept by Caroline’s governess, Mrs. Villars, who each day writes to praise Caroline 
for the social graces she successfully observes and also to point out areas where she could 
improve, such as devoting herself more seriously to her studies. Only once does Caroline write in 
the journal herself, and then only to promise her governess that she has been dutifully attempting 
to follow the suggestions she is given. Her inner life seems of only secondary importance, with 
reflection encouraged primarily in service of perfecting her manners. Unlike the religious diarists 
who write to save their eternal souls, Mrs. Villars writes to save Caroline’s reputation as a 
respectable, well-mannered gentleman’s daughter. It is worth keeping in mind that before the 
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mirror became an emblem of reflecting on an interiorized self, it adorned dressing tables and 
drawing rooms, where it aided in the donning and perfecting of the socially acceptable visage. 
The real-life diaries of Elizabeth and Eugenia Wynne also record sociality much more 
than they reveal internality. English Catholics who spent most of their youth avoiding the French 
Revolution while traveling about Europe, the sisters keep a lively record of aristocratic excess, a 
constant round of what Hannah More would surely term “dissipations,” which rarely afford the 
girls a moment for self-reflection. They spend a lot of time visiting big estates and having 
seemingly nightly impromptu parties, one of which ten-year-old Elizabeth (or Betsey, as she was 
called) breathlessly describes as “the loveliest and maddest of balls, mascarades (sic), changing 
of sex, tumbling of women and men on to the floor—in short, we stayed up, all of us, still 
dancing, until after midnight” (6). In their wealthy European milieu of the 1790s the stabilization 
of identity that Wahrman traces in England has not yet set in, and the popularity of the 
masquerade endures. Only occasionally do the girls trade their masks for the mirror of self-
examination, and generally only long enough to flippantly record shrugging observations about 
their character: Betsey writes, “Read to-day some of my journals of last year and found them 
very stupid I am pretty certain that these will not be any wittier” (232). The diary can usually 
only engender the merest hint of self-consciousness in these irrepressible girls. Eugenia does 
write one paragraph-length reflective entry, in which she frustratedly laments her turbulent inner 
life, complaining that “I have two persons in me, one scolds me and disapproves of all I do, the 
other flatters my passions and counsels me to follow their dictates” (153). By the end of the 
entry, though, she seems reconciled to the fact that she is an “enigma” to herself—a state of 
uncertainty about identity tolerable and even, perhaps, preferable for a pair of masquerade-loving 
sisters who have not yet fallen under the spell of the new identity regime (153). 
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Fully immersed in that new regime of essential, stabile identity, nineteenth and twentieth 
century commentators on and editors of eighteenth and early-nineteenth century child diarists are 
frequently concerned to assure readers of the authenticity of these children’s journals and tend to 
disavow that the children display any self-consciousness at all. Under the influence of the 
Romantic trend of despising self-consciousness in children, these later writers misread the diaries 
and obfuscate the self-consciousness that was so often the whole point of the endeavor. In an 
article on children’s diaries, A. O. J. Cockshut declares that a “diarist, especially a child diarist, is 
the least traditional of writers; there is no parody, no cunning imitation, no ‘anxiety of 
influence.”96 He particularly praises the Wynne sisters “for their lack of self-consciousness,” and 
though he might be right about them, it is difficult to see how one could agree that a diarist like 
Emily Shore does not engage in any cunning imitation, given her precocious study of natural 
history, recorded using the best Enlightenment methods of scientific observation.  
Counter to the assumptions of some modern readers of children’s diaries, often child 
diarists did not “speak in secret to themselves,” whether because, like Otto van Eck, they were 
compelled submit their writing to their parents’ review, or because, like Anna Green Winslow, 
Emily Shore and Marjory Fleming (of whom I will have more to say shortly), they shared their 
diaries willingly.97 Even those diarists who did not share their writing while alive probably did 
not write “unconstrained words,” since, like Frederic Post, they would have been wary of the 
possibility of posthumous publication.98 Anthony Fletcher’s conviction of the absolute 
authenticity and utter lack of self-consciousness to be found in children’s diaries ignores the 
likelihood of parents or older siblings reviewing a child's diary and neglects to take into account 
the inevitable constraints placed on a child's writing—just like anyone else's—by attempts to 
conform to conventions of writing and to desired models of self-presentation. It is hard to take 
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his word for it that child diarists “opened their hearts, in the privacy of bedrooms, writing 
journals which they regarded as holding a confessional status.”99 To write in a diary seems to 
have nearly always been, in one way or another, a self-conscious exercise not of opening one’s 
heart, but rather of examining it, turning the mirror of consciousness on one’s own thoughts, 
becoming the object of one’s own observations.  
The case of Marjory Fleming is instructive in understanding the ways in which post-
Romantic readers of child diaries have written over the self-conscious reflection that had been 
the purpose of the diary with a new narrative of natural, unconscious, spontaneous expression. 
Born in 1803 to a middle-class Scottish family, Marjory died just short of her ninth birthday, 
leaving behind four journals written in the two years before her death.100 H. B. Farnie published 
extracts the journals in 1858, framing them as the delightful works of “Pet Marjorie,”101 an 
extraordinary child. John Brown, reviewing Farnie’s volume, embellished the myth of Pet 
Marjorie, inventing a friendship with Sir Walter Scott, and making her a household name in 
Victorian England and beyond. Her admirers included Robert Louis Stevenson and Mark Twain. 
Fleming’s beloved cousin and tutor Isa assigned her the task of writing in a journal 
chiefly as an exercise in improving her hand-writing. But hand-writing could be practiced in a 
number of other forms—copying out passages from other texts, writing letters, etc.—and the fact 
that Isa assigned a diary suggests that she, like so many instructors of children at the turn of the 
century, thought it would be good for Marjory to engage in self-reflective writing. In fact 
Fleming’s journals do evince the kind of sober reflection seen in other child diarists of the 
period. In her first journal, her original poems her poems follow the pattern of Barbauld's hymns, 
with descriptions of nature—“leaves that once was green and beautifull now withered and all 
wed away scatering their remains on the footpath and highroads”—leading to religious 
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reflection—“But when we think that if we died No pleasure there would be denied There 
happiness doth always reign And there we feel not a bit pain” (sic).102  The second journal is 
much more focused on Fleming’s self-accounting of her faults—she, like other child diarists, is 
internalizing self-conscious discipline.  She reflects on the nature and outcomes of transgression, 
opining that “wickedness and vice makes one miserable & unhappy as well as a concousness of 
guilt on our mind,” and “Vanity is a great folly & sometimes leads to a great sin disimulation I 
think is worse” (sic).103 These passages reveal a child ruminating on morality, religion, and the 
necessity of accounting for one’s inner state. 
Yet her admirers celebrate Fleming’s diaries as “artless writings,” calling her a “merry 
inconsequent babbler, as every real child should be.”104 Her diaries were understood to evince 
“no trace of the morbid tendencies too often associated with child prodigies.”105 Judith Plotz has 
noted that Fleming’s nineteenth-century admirers saw her as not so much a child prodigy—those 
often hated or pitied figures of precocious learning or achievement—as a prodigy at being a 
child.106 The excerpts most prized from her diaries were not the serious reflections or Barbauld-
esque verses, but rather her more silly entries, like a famous poem on turkeys.  The self-rebuke, 
the meditations on sin, were either ignored or waved away as so much obligatory, hollow 
moralizing, there only to appease her cousin. When Twain raves about the journals’ “delightful 
jumble of first-hand cloth of gold and second-hand rags,” of course it is all the somber reflection 
that Twain discards as rags, assuming they cannot be thoughts original to his “little scamp,” his 
“little rascal,” his “Wonder Child”:107 
She was made out of thunder-storms and sunshine, and not even her little 
perfunctory pieties and shop-made holinesses could squelch her spirits or put out 
her fires for long. Under pressure of a pestering sense of duty she heaves a 
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shovelful of trade godliness into her journals every little while, but it does not 
offend, for none of it is her own; it is all borrowed, it is a convention, a custom of 
her environment.108 
For Fleming’s nineteenth-century readers—her idolaters, even—the self-conscious reflections on 
nature, religion, and self-improvement must be discarded as unnatural to the image of 
unconscious childhood they yearn to exalt.  
And the reinvention of Fleming as paragon of unconscious childhood is not contained 
within the bounds of the nineteenth century; the introduction to a 1921 reprinting of the journals 
declares that her writing charms because she is “wholly unconscious” of its attractiveness.109 
Even many contemporary scholars of children’s literature have inherited the nineteenth-century 
vision of Fleming as unselfconscious child. Gillian Avery, following Twain, seems sure that the 
pious things written by Marjory Fleming are “dutiful clichés” through which "the real Marjory 
keeps breaking through.”110  Judith Plotz too seems to endorse many of the views of Fleming as 
merely parroting “dutiful moral maxims,” but more truly exemplifying “unselfconscious 
curiosity” about the outside world.111 Our modern desire to find free expression where there is in 
fact meticulous self-study is an artifact of the Romantic devaluation of self-consciousness in the 
child, the same devaluation that led post-Romantic critics of children’s literature to excoriate 
writers like Edgeworth, More, and Trimmer for inducing self-consciousness. This devaluation is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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3.0 NO “SMACK OF HAMLET”: THE REJECTION OF SELF-CONSCIOUS 
CHILDHOOD 
Nothing should be more impressed on parents and tutors than to 
make children forget themselves. 
---Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “New System of Education,” 
a lecture delivered in Bristol on 18 Nov 1813112 
During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, a new way of conceptualizing the 
relationship between childhood and self-consciousness supplanted the previous consensus in 
Britain that self-conscious reflection was good for children, in that it aided them in achieving 
salvation, or rationality, or both. Instead, British writers—many of them routinely grouped by 
scholars under the rubric of Romanticism113—increasingly represented childhood as an era that 
should remain free of self-consciousness. Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth, 
who together exerted an immense influence over nineteenth-century thinking about childhood, 
are united in prohibiting self-conscious contemplation through literature for children. On the 
contrary, Coleridge opines, children should be restricted to reading literature that positively 
discourages self-conscious thought. In an 1813 lecture on education, immediately following the 
sentence that forms this chapter’s epigraph, Coleridge elaborates on the proper choice of 
literature for children: 
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[B]ooks which only told how Master Billy and Miss Ann spoke and acted, were 
not only ridiculous but extremely hurtful; much better give them ‘Jack the Giant-
killer’ or the seven Champions, or anything which, being beyond their own sphere 
of action, should not feed this self-pride.114 
For Coleridge, books that teach correct social conduct through the presentation of contemporary 
child characters like “Master Billy” invite the child reader reflect on her own social self, and thus 
maker her self-absorbed, full of “self-pride”—self-conscious. However, fantastic literature, like 
the fairy tales of Jack the Giant-killer, has the desirable effect of making children “forget 
themselves” and thus remain blissfully unselfconscious. Master Billy and Miss Ann are the 
pattern children of the late-eigtheenth-century’s largely female-authored works of children’s 
literature, works which Charles Lamb dismisses as “nonsense” sure to cause “conceit”115 in child 
readers, and which Wordsworth calls “trumpery”116 and exiles from the nursery in favor of, once 
again, fairy tales. 
The shift at this time towards drawing a bright line between childhood and self-
consciousness requires explanation, given the paradoxical fact that so many Romantic writers, 
both in Britain and on the continent, were, at the same time, busily arguing that self-
consciousness defined humanity. They posited that the self-consciousness of the human 
accounted for his superiority to all lesser creatures and made him capable of union with the 
divine. For these writers, though self-consciousness might be a painful, fallen state of alienation 
from oneself and from nature, the fall was a fortunate one. Writers from Friedrich Schiller to 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge theorized a dialectical process whereby humans, collectively and 
individually, move from naïve, unselfconscious union with nature, through a fallen and alienated 
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but necessary state of self-consciousness, to, finally an ideal synthesis of nature and 
consciousness that reunifies the self and reunites humanity with the divine.  
This chapter considers why, given the Romantic theory of the necessity of self-
consciousness for full subjectivity and eventual transcendence to divinity, many Romantics 
insisted upon the unselfconsciousness of children to the point of actively attempting to prevent 
children from entering into self-consciousness. The easiest answer—and certainly not an untrue 
one—is that the child became a treasured symbol of a previous, unfallen state that self-conscious 
adults could admire while at the same time feeling superior to it. Yet, the child also becomes a 
tool for thinking through the problems presented by the Romantics’ new theories of subjectivity: 
the paradox of an age that valued autonomy and authenticity but found their defining 
characteristic—self-consciousness—to be at war with those qualities; and, the great mystery of 
self-consciousness, that one becomes simultaneously subject and object to oneself, and the horror 
attendant on self-objectification.  I will argue that the Romantics sought to hold off the dawning 
of self-consciousness in children not out of any particularly tender feelings toward children, but 
rather for the good of society, having decided that the optimum conditions for the ideal subject 
within human society required a kind of incubation period for the self that corresponded, for 
them, with childhood. As the chapter closes, I will discuss the ways in which children’s 
literature—in a reversal of late-eighteenth-century thought on the subject—was re-theorized as a 
medium that, at its most pernicious, encouraged self-consciousness, and, at its best, stalled it. 
The Romantic attempt to purge children’s literature of anything that could promote the growth of 
self-consciousness in the child gives us, among other oddities, one of the strangest Romantic 
Hamlets imaginable. 
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3.1  CHARLES LAMB’S HAMLET 
Laurence Olivier prefaced his film adaptation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet with the line, “This is the 
story of a man who could not make up his mind.”117 Olivier has been roundly abused for this 
“fatally reductive dogma,”118 but truly he has merely offered up a classically Romantic reading 
of the character of Hamlet—distilled perhaps to inanity, but faithful nonetheless to the 
pronouncements of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Friedrich Schlegel, and their many contemporaries 
of the same mind. To be fair, literary critic Harold Bloom exposes himself as equally guilty of 
slavishly parroting the Romantics, and in an equally reductive manner, when he declares that the 
“enormous subject of [Hamlet] is the meaning of self-consciousness.”119   
Olivier and Bloom can so readily summarize Shakespeare’s complex and tangled play by 
reference to the mental state of its hero—paralyzed into indecision and inactivity by an excess of 
self-consciousness—because they are authorized to do so by the Romantic interpretive consensus 
on the play, a reading that held sway over critics at least until T. S. Eliot’s extremely vocal 
dissent at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which continued to exert an influence on 
productions of the play even after Eliot.120 It is as a descendant of the Romantics that Bloom can 
offhandedly remark that Hamlet’s self-consciousness—by 2008 such a commonplace that Bloom 
barely offers any explanation of how the term fits the character—makes him “the Western hero 
of consciousness.”121 Romantic criticism made Hamlet synonymous with self-consciousness, as 
well as making both the character and his disposition synonymous with modernity. And yet 
when Romantic essayist Charles Lamb produced a version of Hamlet for children in Tales from 
Shakespeare (1807), his Danish prince lacked the very characteristic that he had come to stand 
for. A brief meditation on these two Hamlets—the self-conscious Romantic hero and Tales From 
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Shakespeare’s unselfconscious prince—will serve to illustrate how complex the issue of self-
consciousness and childhood became in this period. 
Jonathan Bate proclaims in the introduction to his collection The Romantics on 
Shakespeare, the “Romantics’ reinvention of Hamlet as a paralysed Romantic was their single 
most influential critical act.”122  His assertion highlights the three features of the Romantic 
Hamlet that I want to elaborate on momentarily.123 First, a group of Romantic writers 
collectively reinvented Hamlet; second, their Hamlet is paralyzed; third, their Hamlet is a 
Romantic. The extent to which the celebration of Hamlet was unusual before the early nineteenth 
century might be represented by means of a single quotation from Voltaire, who observed that 
Hamlet “seems the work of a drunken savage.”124 French neo-classicism, which dominated 
eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, not only discounted Hamlet but also devalued Shakespeare 
himself. Romantic writers, flying in the face of aesthetic rules, discovered in Shakespeare one 
model of poetic genius and, in his creation Hamlet an opposite but still potent model of the same. 
They made Shakespeare the protean, sympathetic, natural genius; simultaneously, they made 
Hamlet stand for the self-conscious, introspective, detached genius.  
Hamlet’s paralysis by way of crippling—but admirably deep and philosophical—self-
consciousness probably originated with the German Romantic critic A. W. Schlegel. Schlegel, in 
the course of his lectures on dramatic art in the nineteenth century’s first decade, posits that 
Hamlet “is intended to show that a calculating consideration, which exhausts all the relations and 
possible consequences of a deed, must cripple the power of acting.”125 Unlike the English 
Romantics, Schlegel does not seem to find this Hamlet’s “calculating consideration” to be the 
sign of a noble mind; on the contrary, with a note of disgust he remarks that Hamlet “has a 
natural inclination for crooked ways,” and that his “far-fetched scruples” amount to “mere 
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pretexts,” a convoluted form of “artifice and dissimulation” calculated to “cover his want of 
determination.”126 The English Romantics echoed Schlegel’s analysis of Hamlet as a practitioner 
of “never-satisfied meditation,”127 but dropped the German’s accusations of affectation. 
Coleridge writes of a Hamlet who is “the victim of circumstances,”128 and who cannot be blamed 
for the resultant unbalancing of his mind, which traps him in the “world within him.”129 William 
Hazlitt names him the “prince of philosophical speculators,”130 and when, by the end of the 
Romantic period, Byron complains that he has had enough of Hamlet—“Weak, irresolute, a 
talking sophist. Yet—O I am sick of this most lame and impotent hero!”131—Shelley admits that 
the play demonstrates the “errors to which a contemplative and ideal mind is liable,” but still 
vaunts the prince as a “profound philosopher.”132 
Probably the clearest indicator of the Romantics’ regard for their constitutionally 
brooding Hamlet133 is their habit of identifying with him. Hazlitt proclaims, “It is we who are 
Hamlet,”134 that “we” expanding to enfold all who live under modernity. Coleridge trades on 
Hamlet’s rising popularity as a figure of tortured, self-conscious genius in declaring, “I have a 
smack of Hamlet myself, if I may say so.”135 Critic Martin Greenberg argues that both Coleridge 
and Wordsworth felt called to something they thought of as—though he coined the term—their 
Hamlet vocation: 
I mean their being ‘called,’ each in his own way, to a life of inwardness, 
introspection, mind—with all its danger. What dangers? The dangers of the 
reflective mind split apart from the effective will; spirituality parted from vitality, 
from human life and action; in Wordsworth’s own language: knowledge and self-
knowledge purchased by the loss of power. But this is an actual condition rather 
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than a danger only threatening—the condition of the man of modern 
civilization… 136 
The Romantics give us the self-conscious Hamlet, who is for them the supreme emblem of a 
problem they discover at the heart of modernity: the problem of the self, and the dizzying 
impossibilities of knowing its mysteries. 
I dwell on the Romantic re-imagining of Hamlet in part because it encapsulates many of 
the ways in which self-consciousness was central to the Romantic self-image and to their 
philosophical enquiry, and in part to ask this question: given the Romantic consensus on Hamlet-
as-self-conscious-hero, how can we account for the superlatively unselfconscious version of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet that Lamb wrote for Tales from Shakespeare? Lamb, who co-wrote the 
volume with his sister Mary Lamb, was no dissenter from the Romantic consensus on Hamlet. 
He too understood Hamlet to be a character defined by contemplation; he wrote that nine-tenths 
of the character consists in “solitary musings.”137 Yet his prose version of the play for children 
disposes of all of those musings. His chosen device of an omniscient third-person narrator allows 
the text to dispense with dialogue, with two brief exceptions: the heated argument between 
Gertrude and Hamlet, and Gertrude’s lament for Ophelia after her death—and those, even, are 
altered from Shakespeare’s original wording. The reader finds no trace of Hamlet’s famous “To 
be, or not to be” soliloquy, none of his conviction that “conscience does make cowards of us 
all,”138 and none of the self-analysis of the wavering position that made him, for the Romantics, 
the essence of self-conscious inactivity. Tales from Shakespeare thus passes over the very 
soliloquy that Marjorie Garber points out “has become the hallmark of interiority and 
consciousness, the speech that -- quoted, parodied, parsed, and pondered -- has come to define 
modernity and modern self-consciousness, the birth, in effect, of the modern subject, of modern 
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subjectivity itself.”139 In addition, Lamb almost entirely elides Hamlet’s agony in 2.2, when he 
sees the player’s passion in performance and excoriates himself for not feeling such 
overwhelming motivation to action as he has surely been provided by the ghost of his father: “I / 
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak / Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause / and can 
say nothing.”140 In its place, Lamb offers this comparatively mild sentence: “His very 
melancholy, and the dejection of spirits he had so long been in, produced an irresoluteness and 
wavering of purpose, which kept him from proceeding to extremities." Lamb’s Hamlet for 
children shows no trace of the prince as originator of modern self-consciousness that the 
Romantics so recently and so enthusiastically had discovered in the play. 
So here is a Hamlet in which readers find none of Hamlet’s famous soliloquies, and the 
thoughts of his to which they are privy, as a result of the omniscient narration, could be read as 
unselfconscious. In other words, a reader might easily assume that the narrator—not Hamlet—
peers into Hamlet’s mind and soul and tells us what Hamlet feels deep down, what thoughts lie 
in his unconscious, and thus a reader might come away from the Lamb re-write believing that 
Hamlet himself never indulges in introspection. Why offer children this version of Hamlet that 
abstracts everything about the prince that made him so dear to the Romantics? Why create this 
unselfconscious Hamlet for child readers? I propose that Lamb altered his Hamlet radically for 
the very purpose of saving child readers from exposure to the self-consciousness of the 
philosopher prince.141 No child, Lamb’s alterations imply, should have, like Coleridge, a “smack 
of Hamlet.” Already afloat in Romantic criticism was the notion that the play not only depicted 
self-consciousness but also induced it in spectators and readers of the play. To watch or read 
Hamlet was to become oneself a little more like Hamlet. Schlegel contended that the play was 
“calculated to call forth” meditation on “human destiny” and “the dark perplexity of events of 
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this world” in the “minds of spectators,”142 and Coleridge thought consideration of the play 
required that “we should reflect on the constitution of our own minds.”143  Byron intends 
mockery when he declares that after a solitary reading of the play he feels “perplexed, confused, 
and inextricably self-involved,”144 but the dangers he proposes one invites by reading Hamlet are 
likely the very dangers Lamb hoped to prevent through his radical re-write of the play for 
children. The self-consciousness of modern humanity might elicit a lament from Romantic adults 
who look back longingly on lost unity of self, but it is also, as Friedrich Schiller makes clear145, a 
necessary step toward attaining an even higher ideal than unselfconsciousness. Yet Lamb’s 
Hamlet for children demonstrates the extent to which, beginning in the Romantic period, many 
adults shrank from associating self-consciousness with childhood.146 Lamb’s Hamlet may very 
well stand as the Romantic inauguration of a practice of creating children’s literature intended to 
thwart the flowering of self-consciousness in the child reader. But why did the Romantics seek to 
prevent children from entering self-consciousness, and why use children’s literature as a tool in 
this crusade? The rest of this chapter will seek answers to those questions. 
3.2  THE ROMANTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
In contrast to the child theorists of the late eighteenth century, who distinguished between 
positive forms of self-consciousness in children (reflection) and negative forms (affectation), the 
English Romantics in the early nineteenth century began a tradition of posing any self-
consciousness in children as a dire affliction. By tracing the influence of Rousseau and his 
German followers on English Romantic thought, we can see that the problem of self-
consciousness is, at its heart, a problem of modernity and its effects on subjectivity. As Stephen 
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Bygrave points out, the “status of the self” “has long been recognised as a central feature in 
Romanticism. However, this truism conceals the extent to which the self was a problem for 
Romantic writers: it is a problem having moral, metaphysical and political implications.”147 In 
the narrative of modernity collectively created by thinkers from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to 
Friedrich Schiller to Georg Hegel, modern man, upon entering society, became self-conscious; 
that is, he began to see himself as the object of the gaze of others and became an object to 
himself as he attempted to mold himself to the expectations of that external gaze. For Rousseau, 
this self-objectification constitutes a regrettable loss of autonomy and authenticity. As 
Alessandro Ferrara makes clear, Rousseau proposes not a reversal—he does not, despite what his 
critics may say, advocate a return to a state of nature—but a corrective in the form of education: 
How can the self be made more impervious to the effects of a competitive society 
without isolating it from all social relations? How can moral autonomy and 
personal authenticity be attained? The answer to these questions is sought by 
Rousseau in the direction of education and 'personal reform' toward an authentic 
conduct of life.148  
In part through the nineteenth-century focus on the education of children as the key to curing the 
ills of modern subjectivity, the problem of self-consciousness was increasingly attached to the 
child. The English Romantics agreed that the problem with society was that it required authentic 
individuals, and agreed that those individuals were to be made (or protected) in earliest 
childhood, through a properly administered education.149 But education was not the only factor 
tying the problem of self-consciousness to childhood in the Romantic period. In the early 
nineteenth century the working out of anxieties about subjectivity often centered on the child,150 
one figure useful for the culture as a heuristic for thinking through a vertiginous puzzle. 
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Many Romantic writers, particularly lyric poets like Wordsworth and Coleridge, were 
both fascinated with and tortured by what Deborah Forbes calls the "persistent philosophical 
paradox of self-consciousness," that it can at once be the defining feature of the human 
experience and also threaten to leave humans hopelessly alienated from a direct experience of the 
world and themselves—a threat that escalates the more the paradox is pondered.151 So integral to 
the philosophy of the early nineteenth century is this ontological problem that Forbes goes so far 
as to propose that Romanticism may be "defined as the recognition and elaboration of self-
consciousness."152 Forbes emphasizes the vertiginous nature of this Romantic project of 
contemplating the self: "self-consciousness implies an infinite regress, in which the self that is 
conscious must be supplemented by the self that is conscious that it is conscious, and then the 
self that is conscious that it is conscious that it is conscious, and so forth."153 
Here it will help to consider the seismic shifts in theorizations of selfhood that led up to 
the Romantic period and its obsession with self-consciousness, returning also to the familiar 
emblems of mask and mirror that formed a thread through the last chapter. Perhaps the most 
pertinent forces founding the cultural centrality of individual selfhood were Enlightenment 
political philosophy and Protestant religious doctrine.154 Enlightenment political theory 
established the importance of the individual by elaborating the concept of natural rights, and 
Protestant theology insisted on the individual’s unmediated relationship with divinity. Together 
the Enlightenment and the Reformation gave people a sense of themselves as individuals—but 
did not immediately create a sense of stable selfhood. In the early-to-mid-eighteenth-century the 
individual likely had no sense of a deep and constant core of self, but rather changed selves like 
changing masks. The trick for this era was to wear the mask perfectly, with no slipping. But the 
invention of the stable self, defined in terms of self-consciousness by Locke and others, led to an 
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increasing anxiety about the status of the self. Thus we first find a serious attention to the child 
self, in the late eighteenth century, when masks are eschewed in favor of mirrors: rather than 
perfect her performance of a role (wear the mask with no slipping), the child must strive to be 
self-conscious, to perceive and perfect her inner self (peer into the mirror and regulate what is 
found).  
As the self becomes more and more precious during the early Romantic period, anxiety 
grows that it could be lost or damaged irrevocably, and new theories of self-consciousness begin 
to posit that to know oneself is to be divided from oneself. Romantic writers begin to evince a 
desperation to move through this damaged, self-conscious, fallen state to a new, improved ideal 
consciousness. In the case of children, however, a different rule applies; they are to be kept back 
in unselfconsciousness. If the experts on childhood of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century understood a certain kind of self-consciousness as necessary to engender rational 
adulthood and promote Christian virtue in children, many Romantic writers feared the 
objectification of and estrangement from the self that they perceived as proceeding from the 
child's entrance into socially-aware self-consciousness. In this formulation, the mirror of self-
consciousness works as a catalyst for the construction of the mask, the inauthentic selfhood that 
alienates one from one's own inner truth. The new ideal of childhood is one of utter 
unselfconsciousness, a childhood without masks or mirrors. 
The tenor of this new Romantic sensibility regarding self-consciousness and childhood 
can be readily illustrated by way of an 1810 essay on marionette theater by Heinrich von Kleist, 
a German Romantic. Kleist demonstrates his allegiance to the Romantic equation of the 
entrance into self-consciousness with fallen-ness in a letter to a young protégé: “[e]very initial 
gesture, everything that is done spontaneously is beautiful; but once conscious of itself, it 
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becomes twisted and distorted.”155 The marionette essay uses the device of a narrator’s 
conversation with an imaginary leading dancer, Herr C.; their subject is the advantages a 
marionette has over a living dancer: “First a negative gain…: that such a figure [the marionette]  
would never be affected.”156 The distaste for perceptible affectation echoes Locke, who defines 
affectation as “an awkward and forced imitation of what should be genuine and easy, wanting 
the beauty that accompanies what is natural.”157 However, Locke thought the affectation would 
disappear once the performance was perfected, while Kleist believes the human dancer will 
never be as perfect as the marionette. The mistakes dancers make due to affectation, Herr C. 
continues, “are inevitable because we have eaten of the tree of knowledge,”158 and that state of 
fallen-ness cannot be reversed. (We can see in Kleist the insistent Romantic association of the 
fall into self-consciousness with Adam and Eve’s fall from Paradise.) The fallen human dancer 
can never perfect his performance enough to rival that of the marionette dancer. In fact, as the 
second half of the essay will argue, practice, rather than making perfect, makes matters worse. 
For Kleist, the object—the marionette—is more admirable and natural than the human can hope 
to be.  
His position here is instructive, as it parallels the Romantic position regarding children 
and self-consciousness. The pre-self-conscious child is effectively objectified because the 
Romantic philosophy, as we shall see, defines full subjectivity as self-conscious; but at the same 
time, the child is considered an object worth regarding with a certain kind of admiration. Of 
course Kleist would never prefer to be a puppet rather than a person, and most adults do not 
truly wish to be the unself-conscious child again. But that does not stop them from lamenting 
the child’s loss of “natural charm” as it enters self-consciousness, even if the “fall” also means 
an entrance into full subjectivity. Kleist’s narrator agrees heartily with Herr C. about the pitfalls 
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of self-consciousness, and tells the tale of a sixteen-year-old boy, a “young friend” on the cusp 
of adulthood who “lost his innocence, and Paradise too” by happening to glance into a mirror 
and notice how he resembled a popular statue. When he tried to recreate the effect for the 
narrator, he had lost his “natural charm.” Afterward, “an inexplicable change took place,” and 
the young man “began to stand in front of the mirror all day long, and one virtue after another 
dropped away from him.”159 The entrance into self-consciousness, coincident here with the exit 
from childhood, comes off with the aid of a mirror, and leaves the young man bereft of grace. 
What I am hoping to convey here is the complexity of the Romantic theorization of self-
consciousness both in general and in relation to childhood. I contend that their anxiety about 
self-consciousness and childhood has less to do with children than it has to do with their worries 
about adult subjectivity—and its implications for society. First, there is the aforementioned fear 
of self-objectification. To be conscious of oneself as a self is to be at once subject and object of 
one’s own perceptions. Perhaps the most worrisome implication of this outcome is that 
objectification is kindred to death. Second, to be socially self-conscious is to become aware of 
onself as the object of another’s perception, meaning a loss of autonomy; your subjectivity 
depends on another’s. Formerly affectation, a bad form of self-consciousness, was a concern 
because of the demand for sincerity—the outward-directed responsibility to show your true self 
to others. It remains a bad form of self-consciousness, but for different reasons: to be affected is 
to be inauthentic, to betray an inward-directed responsibility to one’s true inner self.  This 
chapter, though, is most invested in exploring my third answer to the puzzle of why so many 
influential thinkers of the early nineteenth century embraced self-consciousness in certain ways 
for adults but inaugurated a deep distaste for any association of self-consciousness with 
childhood. Though Romantic writers have often been understood to spurn social harmony in 
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their preference for the internal harmony of the sacred individual, my third answer sees early 
nineteenth-century writers on self-consciousness and childhood as acting not out of anti-
social impulses, but in fact quite the opposite. I argue that they wanted to protect the child 
from self-consciousness out of concern not so much for the child as for the future adult, and 
thus the future of society. To explain that contention I will trace the leading theories of self-
consciousness and childhood from Rousseau and Schiller to the Romantic poets.  
3.3 ROUSSEAU, SCHILLER, AND THE CHILD 
Scholars of the history of childhood often focus on Rousseau as giving us the child as precious 
seed protected in the fenced garden of the home, guarded from the evils of culture. What too 
frequently gets left out of this account of his work is the complexity of the reasoning behind that 
protection. Rousseau has no interest in guarding the child for its own sake. His history of 
abandoning his own children in infancy should be enough to demonstrate Rousseau’s lack of 
concern for actual children. Rousseau believes in protecting the child only so as to produce a 
superior adult and thus a superior culture. Guarding the child—from culture, and from self-
consciousness—is Rousseau’s solution to a problem that has little to do with childhood and 
everything to do with adult society.  
Hazlitt wrote of Rousseau that he “had the most intense consciousness of his own 
existence.”160 In his Confessions Rousseau certainly represents himself as self-conscious from 
early childhood. He dates the dawn of “an uninterrupted consciousness of myself” (325) at the 
tender age of six:161 
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My childhood was not that of a child. I always thought and felt like an adult. It 
was only in growing up that I rejoined the class of ordinary men, which I had left 
upon being born. The reader will laugh at my modesty in presenting myself as a 
prodigy. So be it. But when he has finished laughing, I will ask him to find me a 
child of six who is so drawn to novels, transported to the point of hot tears; find 
me such a child and I will admit that vanity is ridiculous and that I am wrong. 
(390) 
The quote reveals a number of themes that will resound throughout nineteenth-century thought 
on childhood. First, for many, not every child can rightly be considered a child. Often, only the 
unselfconscious child earns recognition as a true child. Rousseau characterizes himself at age six 
as something other than a child, a prodigy who thinks and feels like an adult. Second, being a 
prodigy may make Rousseau extraordinary—which cannot but kindle his prodigious pride—but 
the Romantic consensus on prodigies will be damning, a point Wordsworth makes most 
famously in his Prelude, where he writes of a child prodigy as a “monster birth.”162 Third, 
Rousseau instructs us to see his premature self-consciousness emerging specifically as a result of 
his reading. From novels he gains a “great facility in reading and in understanding myself” (326). 
Many child theorists of the late eighteenth century would have welcomed this development, as it 
involves their two most urgent prescriptions for children: early literacy and early self-reflection. 
Yet Rousseau calls it a “dangerous method,” for the reading leads him into self-contemplation 
and an indulgence of the passions, both of which he considers premature for a child of six (326). 
In Émile, then, Rousseau provides an imagined corrective to the problems of his own 
childhood. Famously, of course, one of his first steps as the tutor of the hypothetical Émile is to 
banish all books—save Robinson Crusoe—from the nursery. Together with shielding the boy 
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from commerce with society, the erasure of literature from his life will prevent Émile from 
premature self-consciousness. Unlike other tutors, Rousseau refuses to encourage “development 
of the germs of artificiality” in his young charge; these, he says are the enemy of “self-
knowledge and self-control, the arts of life and happiness” (16).163 It is not the case, then, that 
Rousseau and his many followers desire the child to be completely without a sense of self; self-
knowledge nurtured in solitude, however, is vastly preferred to self-consciousness born of social 
intercourse, and mostly consists, for Rousseau, of accurately assessing and responding to one’s 
needs—as opposed to imagining needs which are in fact implanted in one by social contact, such 
as the need for fame or luxury.  
By fifteen, though, Émile must learn to enter society, and here is where Rousseau begins 
to distinguish between “self-love” and “selfishness,” which seem to correlate respectively with 
the distinction between “self-knowledge” and “self-consciousness.” Self-love “concerns itself 
only with ourselves” and consists entirely in answering to the needs of one's own physical and 
mental health (174). Selfishness, “which is always comparing itself with others, is never satisfied 
and never can be; for this feeling, which prefers ourselves to others, requires that they should 
prefer us to themselves, which is impossible” (174). What makes a man “really bad is a 
multiplicity of needs and dependence on the opinions of others” (175). Note that self-
consciousness carries a negative value due to its tendency to wrap the youth up in dependency. 
Those qualities Rousseau condemns the most heartily—“vanity,” “emulation,” “boasting”—are 
“those sentiments which force us to compare ourselves with others” (187). Self-consciousness 
makes the child envious of those who seem better in comparison to himself, dependent upon the 
regard of others, and deceitful in his attempts to live up to standards received from society.  
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Writing in 1762, Rousseau prefigures and perhaps helps initiate the late-eighteenth-
century disdain for masks:  “The man of the world almost always wears a mask. He is scarcely 
ever himself and is almost a stranger to himself; he is ill at ease when forced into his own 
company. Not what he is, but what he seems, is all he cares for” (191). While Rousseau is 
willing to concede that some level of dependency is the inevitable result of social life, he 
maintains that Émile can avoid wearing the mask while still learning to recognize the masks 
others wear—and to disdain them. At eighteen Émile will learn about masks by beginning his 
first course of reading, specifically in classical history:  
[I]magine my Émile, who has been carefully guarded [from reading, and social 
life in general]…when the curtain goes up casting his eyes for the first time upon 
the world's stage; or rather picture him behind the scenes watching the actors don 
their costumes, and counting the cords and pulleys which deceive with their 
feigned shows the eyes of the spectators. His first surprise will soon give place to 
feelings of shame and scorn of his fellow-man; he will be indignant at the sight of 
the whole human race deceiving itself and stooping to this childish folly. (203-4) 
Reading, theater, spectacle, shame, self-consciousness: all are correlated here, and against all 
stands Émile, the child who sees through it all, who knows but remains innocent. His “heart is as 
pure as his body”; he “has all the indiscretion of innocence” and “is absolutely out-spoken” 
(283). An anti-theatrical child, Émile’s authenticity makes him transparent to the eyes of his 
tutor: “I often know what he is feeling before he is aware of it himself” (284).  Émile needn't 
know these things about himself—it is enough that the tutor can discern his pupil's simplicity—
because Émile only needs the instinctive distaste for theatrical, self-conscious display to protect 
him from its degradations: “Émile, in the sleep of ignorance, escapes the perils which he does not 
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see” (284). When Émile finally does enter society, he shows himself to be “neither shy nor 
conceited, but natural and sincere,” for “he is just the same among a group of people as he is 
when he is alone” (301). To be shy is to self-consciously worry about one's failures in the eyes of 
others, and to be conceited is to self-consciously preen about one's successes in winning the 
regard of others, but Emile shuns both forms of self-consciousness by having no concern for 
their regard whatsoever: “he scarcely troubles himself at all about what people think about him, 
and he is not the least afraid of ridicule” (302). Rousseau’s ideal is a society composed entirely 
of Émiles, autonomous and authentic citizens who do right because it is right, unselfishly and 
without regard to others—in the best way possible. 
Writing thirty years later and clearly under the influence of Rousseau, Friedrich Schiller 
initiated the strongest link between self-consciousness and the child. In his essay “On Naïve and 
Sentimental Poetry” (1795), Schiller aligns the child with the “naïve,” which—in ancient 
literature, in children, and in ancient peoples—consists of a direct, unmitigated, unconscious 
identification with nature.164 Conversely, the “sentimental”—which for Schiller includes 
adulthood, the literature of modernity, and modernity itself—is the product of our alienation 
from nature, and our self-conscious mourning of that alienation. In identifying childhood with 
the naïve, Schiller shapes the child into a figure of creativity, self-sufficiency, pure potentiality, 
wholeness, and consummate authenticity. He contrasts the “unmutilated” naturalness of 
childhood to the artificiality of “civilised humanity,” suggesting that the various demands of 
civilized society inevitably disfigure the adult self, and that the authenticity of the child rests on 
its isolation from the social (34). The notion of the child as existing in a state of autonomous 
separation, free from insidious interpolation and deformation by the social, reverberates through 
Romantic discourse. Furthermore, Schiller reverses what was still a cultural commonplace in the 
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late eighteenth century: the elevation of the rational, complete adult over the irrational, unshaped 
child. Schiller claims we adults do not look down on the weak, unformed child “from the height 
of our strength and perfection” but “from the limitation of our condition which is inseparable 
from the determination which we have reached” (23). The adult is radically determined, warped 
and solidified into an unnatural, externally imposed social role, and looks up longingly to the 
“limitless indeterminable nature of the child and to his pure innocence” (23). As adults, we 
regret having “abandoned” our childhood potentiality, and thus the “boundlessness” of the child 
will make him a “sacred object” (24). For the German and English Romantics, and for the 
Victorians and Edwardians who inherited their philosophy, to grow up is to experience a 
narrowing of possibilities, a hardening of what was formerly malleable into a shape much 
diminished from the expansive, amorphous self of the child. To grow up is to fall from 
boundlessness into boundedness. 
It is important to recognize, however, two points about Schiller’s elevation of the child. 
First, as Goerge Boas notes, “when one has studied Schiller's essay, one finds little in it which 
extols the child's manners and thoughts.”165 Like Rousseau, Schiller’s idealization of 
unselfconscious childhood does not grow out of any particular regard for actual children. Indeed, 
Schiller makes it clear that it is not so much actual children who are to be revered, but rather “it 
is an idea represented by them which we love in them” (22). In fact “the naive is a childlike 
quality where it is no longer expected and cannot therefore be attributed in the strictest sense to 
real childhood” (24). Their “perfection is no merit of their own” because they are what they are 
out of necessity, as nature is. And here we come to a crucial second point: however fallen the 
adult may be, adults remain morally and spiritually superior to the childlike and the natural 
because “[w]e are free and they are necessary; we change, they remain one” (22). In leaving 
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behind the admirable unity and potentiality of childhood, the adult advances spiritually toward 
the ideal end of a dialectical process: only when the naïve and the sentimental are combined will 
“the divine or the ideal” emerge (22). For Schiller, it would be a mistake to wish to regress into 
naïveté: 
The nature for which you envy the unreasoning [such as children] is not worthy of 
any respect, any longing. It lies behind you, it must always lie behind you. 
Abandoned by the ladder which carried you, there is now no other choice open to 
you than to seize the law consciously and voluntarily or to sink without hope of 
salvation into a bottomless pit….Think no more of changing places with [nature] 
but receive her into yourself and strive to wed her endless superiority to your 
endless privilege and from the two conceive the divine. (32) 
In the image of the self-conscious modern receiving nature into himself, and combining his 
power and hers in wedded bliss in order to give birth to a new divinity, we might perceive a male 
Romantic fantasy of usurping the powers of female reproduction in order to assure complete 
autonomy.166 In the meantime, until the divine apotheosis is accomplished adults are caught in 
the uncomfortable stage of self-consciousness, what Coleridge—who visited Germany and read 
the German philosophers—laments as a “between-ness,”167 and must continue to strive towards 
the ideal by exercising their self-conscious minds in contemplation of unselfconscious objects—
a contemplation that for many of the English Romantics takes the form of poetry.  
Multiple critics have made the case that Romantic poetry was largely born out of the 
problem of self-consciousness. Deborah Forbes posits that lyric poetry is peculiarly well 
designed to embody and investigate the paradoxes of self-consciousness.”168 Like Forbes, 
Michael O’Neill understands these paradoxes of self-consciousness not as a hindrance to 
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Romantic poetry but rather as productive of some of its most stunning effects.169 English 
Romantic poets, Geoffrey Hartman argues, read and wrote in the belief that “self-consciousness 
cannot be overcome; and the very desire to overcome it, which poetry and imagination 
encourage, is part of a vital, dialectical movement of ‘soul-making.’”170 Many Romantic poets 
grappled with self-consciousness through their art, poems which engaged the adult reader in his 
own process of reflection as a step forward in that dialectical movement towards transcendence. 
And yet often these same poets—Wordsworth and Coleridge most influentially—barred from the 
shelves of the nursery any reading that might engender a similar state of reflectiveness in child 
readers. 
3.4 COLERIDGE, WORDSWORTH, AND AN ANTI-SELFCONSCIOUS 
CHILDREN’S LITERATURE 
In the Biographia Literaria (1817), Coleridge theorizes a hierarchy of consciousness: at the 
bottom stands the being aware only of “pleasant or unpleasant sensations caused in him by 
external impressions”; at the top the one who “reflects on his own reflections.”171 These limits 
map on to the primary figures of his poem “Frost at Midnight,” the sleeping infant and the poet-
speaker. In “Frost at Midnight” the reflection of the poet upon his childhood leads to another 
memory of remembering as a child—a hall of mirrors of self-consciousness that alienates the 
speaker from his surroundings but also leads to the creation of poetry. And yet the poet praises 
his sleeping baby for being so calm, inhabiting a state so unlike his father’s self-reflection that he 
“vexes meditation.”172 The speaker praises the unselfconscious child as though that mental 
stillness, that inability to reflect on the self were truly preferable, though it generates nothing. 
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The child’s importance lies in providing an outward reflection of the poet, pinning Coleridge to 
the world so that he does not get lost in the hall of mirrors, memories, and reflections. The 
unselfconsciousness of the child is valued for its usefulness to the adult. 
Likewise, Wordsworth’s poetry has much to say about the self and self-consciousness, 
often in relation to childhood, but very little to say to children. Laurence Lockridge points out 
that Coleridge “used the world ‘self’ more insistently than any previous writer,”173 but it was 
Wordsworth who went about coining a whole bevy of extraordinary reflexive adjectives with 
“self” as a prefix. Lane Cooper’s Concordance to the Poems of William Wordsworth records 
fifty-three instances of “self” as a stand-alone word and a whopping 178 instances of “self” used 
as a prefix (with the Prelude’s “self-haunting” as perhaps the most famous), in addition to 
eighty-nine permutations of the term “conscious.” Hazlitt opines that Wordsworth is the writer of 
his own times who most closely resembles Rousseau in his intense self-consciousness. Both, he 
proclaims, “wind their own being round whatever object occurs to them.”174 Certainly 
Wordsworth’s poetry, from the Lyrical Ballads to the Prelude, consists primarily of an enquiry 
into the mind and being of the poet. Though the ostensible subject of his poems maybe be some 
aspect of the exterior world—commonly a “simple” or “naïve” object such as nature or a laborer 
or a child—contemplation of that object serves chiefly as a catalyst for self-examination. 
Interestingly, this pattern of observation and reflection in Wordsworth’s poems aligns them with 
works of children’s literature such as Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s Lessons for Children (1778) and 
Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1786), which employed a pattern, derived from Locke, of 
leading the child from observation of nature to reflection on their own moral being. Yet 
children’s literature of this type was heartily denounced by Wordsworth—and his fellow English 
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Romantics—precisely because it would, they contended, lead children into premature self-
consciousness.  
Wordsworth’s Prelude presents a most dire, and famous, warning against the dangers of 
wrong reading.175 In Book V of The Prelude, Wordsworth contrasts the well-read Infant Prodigy 
with the Romantic (but quite possibly illiterate) figure of the Boy of Winander, a contrast that 
exemplifies, as Judith Plotz puts it, the poet’s “notoriously violent” and hugely influential 
“contempt for premature self-consciousness.”176 The Infant Prodigy’s educational reading has 
made him self-conscious, so that he can only be said to be “innocent himself” insofar as he “can 
read lectures upon innocence”177 and self-consciously emulate what he reads (V.312-3). Of 
course, as per the Romantic ideal, true innocence cannot know itself to be innocent, which is 
why we smile fondly with Wendy in Peter Pan when her young and innocent daughter exclaims 
“I do wish I were young and innocent!”178 Plotz notes that true innocence, for Wordsworth and 
the Romantics, is “privative,” characterized not as a positive quality to be willfully cultivated 
through self-reflection but as a “lack of self-conscious knowledge.”179 In contrast to the 
unconscious Romantic babe, the Infant Prodigy has un-child-like powers of self-reflection, keeps 
tabs on his own mind, and “must live / Knowing that he grows wiser every day,” anxiously 
conscious of his growing stockpile of useful learning (V.341-2). Wordsworth depicts him as a 
horrifying freak of nature worthy of the carnival sideshow; he is a “monster birth,” (V.292) a 
“dwarf man,” (V.295) not a child anymore but not yet an adult either, a kind of grotesque figure 
prematurely issued forth from the womb of childhood. As a “noontide shadow of a man” (V.297) 
(that is, a nothing, since a man casts no shadow when the sun reaches its apex) the Infant Prodigy 
has been divested of his sacred unconscious joy and takes delight instead in adroitly 
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deconstructing subtle social interactions and reading the wonders of nature as though they were 
cold compendiums of scientific knowledge, mere objects of study.  
Wordsworth argues that rather than be trapped in “the pinfold of his own conceit,” 
(V.362) made tragically self-conscious by the didactic literature crammed into his over-taxed 
brain, the child should instead be given what the poet estimates to be proper children’s 
literature—fairy tales and fables. The child given tales of Jack the Giant-killer and Robin Hood 
reaps a “precious gain,” for absorbed in the fantastical literature “he forgets himself” (V.369). 
Like Coleridge, then, Wordsworth identifies tales of wonder as the proper literature of childhood 
for the very reason that he believes fantastic literature to keep the child unselfconscious. Even 
better, however, for Wordsworth, is the child who eschews books entirely and learns from that 
“wiser spirit” (V.385) nature—not reading it as a compendium of scientific fact like the Infant 
Prodigy, but simply letting it “enter unawares into his mind” (V.410) like the Boy of Winander. 
This nature child Wordsworth describes as a lonely figure communing directly and wordlessly 
with the owls, the rocks, the streams and the woods. Unlike the Infant Prodigy, his powers have 
nothing to do with the social; his powers come from his autonomy, his unity with nature, and his 
unconsciousness. As Plotz points out, Wordsworth effects a “systematic transvaluation—by 
redefinition or omission—both of children’s inadequacies (ignorance and naïveté are promoted) 
and competencies (precocity and work skills are demoted).”180  
Like Schiller, Wordsworth values the unboundedness of the child not yet interpolated 
into a prescribed social role, and de-values the supposed limitations of self-consciousness. If the 
Romantic child can even be said to have a self of which to be conscious, it is a self 
undifferentiated from animate and inanimate nature, undetermined by the specificity of relations 
to other humans, pre-social, numinous, and exactly identical in each individual incarnation. 
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Each Romantic child has the same self as all the others, because it is a self defined by a lack of 
definition, by continuity, by eternalness. The tragedy of becoming self-conscious, against which 
nineteenth century adults are so eager to guard their children, is exactly the process of acquiring 
a socially aware, socially determined self. Thus the answer to the question “What should children 
read?”—a question asked repeatedly over the course of the nineteenth century—is almost always 
“literature that will prevent the dawning of self-consciousness,” which can also be understood as 
“literature that will prevent the construction of the social self.” 
The suggestions for children’s reading material issued by the great Romantic thinkers and 
poets are echoed and re-echoed throughout the nineteenth century. In 1891 E. M. Field criticizes 
“our school-reading books” for being “over-full of instruction” and children’s stories for being 
not “for children, but stories about children, careful dissections of character” that seem 
“calculated to make the child-reader sadly self-conscious.”181 As a result of this promotion of 
self-consciousness in children’s literature, Field claims, children “live less in their own fairy 
world; ‘Heaven lies about them in their infancy’ less than formerly; they are more quickly grown 
up and dispel the glamour of those happy mists of childhood.”182 While she concedes that 
children must be educated, she pleads that “children should be children—while they can.”183 
Echoes of Wordsworth, indeed; quite literally Field echoes the Romantic poet in the form of the 
famous quote from the Immortality Ode; but also she echoes the Romantic alignment of the 
“fairy world” with “the mists of childhood,” and the notion that growing up means being barred 
from the cherished state of childhood. Growing up means loss, and the proper children’s 
literature should stave off that loss by preventing the insidious growth of self-consciousness in 
the child. 
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3.5 CHILDREN’S LITERATURE IN TRANSITION: HOLIDAY HOUSE AND THE 
FAIRY BOWER 
We can see some of the ways in which these prescriptions began to shape children’s literature by 
taking a look at two transitional novels: Catherine Sinclair’s Holiday House (1839) and Harriet 
Mozley’s The Fairy Bower (1841). Critics have tended to interpret Holiday House in terms 
bequeathed to us by the Romantics: as casting mischief in “an amusing light,” “perhaps for the 
first time”184 in children’s literature; as inaugurating the tradition of “delight”—as opposed to an 
earlier, and regrettable, preoccupation with “instruction”—in children’s literature185; and as 
thankfully doing away with “pious prigs” and “idle and dishonest imps of Satan” in favor of  
children who are neither “unnaturally good or unnaturally bad.”186 Sinclair’s own preface to the 
novel teaches us to read this way. Her opening sentence recalls at once Thomas Carlyle’s “Signs 
of the Times” (1829) in its alarm about the mechanization of humanity and Wordsworth’s 
warnings that schoolrooms have alienated children from nature: 
The minds of young people are now manufactured like webs of linen, all alike, 
and nothing left up to nature. From the hour when children can speak, till they 
come to years of discretion or of indiscretion, they are carefully prompted what to 
say, and what to think, and what to look, and how to feel; while in most school-
rooms nature has been turned out of doors with obloquy, and art has entirely 
supplanted her. (v)187  
As an antidote to the mind-manufacturing tendencies of instructional literature, Sinclair 
undertakes to portray a different “species” of children, noisy, frolicsome, mischievous children 
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who are certainly no Master Billy and Miss Ann, and in fact have never even met that vexing 
pair, not being the most studious or reflective of readers. 
The puzzle in this book is the (mostly absent) presence of Harry and Laura’s older 
brother Frank, who does get “stories about bad boys and good boys” from his mother (“all very 
interesting, and all told on purpose to show how much happier obedient children are, than those 
who waste their time in idleness and folly”) and himself reads like a pattern child of the old 
school (1-2). As Mrs. Crabtree remarks, he “speak[s] like a printed book sometimes” (61). His 
goodness takes the form of, among other things, complete unselfconsciousness: “Frank was so 
completely unselfish, that Peter Grey once laughingly said, ‘Frank scarcely remembers there is 
such a person as himself in the world, therefore it is astonishing how he contrives to exist at all” 
(263). Yet for all his goodness, his main role in the novel is to die, not nobly and with a brave 
smile on his face, but painfully and fretfully, taking a number of tense and dreary chapters to 
finally pass away. The grimness of his fate in this otherwise rollicking romp of a novel adds 
ambivalence to the status of good boy, and Robin Hoffman suggests that perhaps we should read 
Frank more as a caution against pattern children than an approving portrait of a good boy.188 
Harry and Laura’s own brand of unselfconsciousness is at once more lauded by the novel 
and, not coincidentally, more Romantic.  
Neither of these children intended any harm, for they were only heedless lively 
romps, who would not for twenty worlds have told a lie, or done a shabby thing, 
or taken what did not belong to them. They were not greedy either, and would not 
on any account have resembled Peter Grey, who was at the same school with 
Frank, and who spent all his own pocket-money, and borrowed a great deal of 
other people’s, to squander at the pastry-cook’s….Harry was not a cruel boy 
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either; he never lashed his pony, beat his dog, pinched his sister, or killed any 
butterflies, though he often chased them for fun, and one day he even defended a 
wasp, at the risk of being stung, when Mrs. Crabtree intended to kill it. (6-7) 
They are “bad” in all the right ways (and, emphatically, none of the wrong ones), “heedless” and 
unselfconscious in a way that also makes them unselfish and neither greedy, nor underhanded, 
nor calculating. Uncle David openly encourages their “thoughtless and forgetful” ways (87). He 
praises Laura for spending her pocket-money right away, declaring that “he cannot endure saving 
children, and that he wishes all money were turned into slates, when little girls keep it longer 
than a week” (56). Clearly the eighteenth-century lessons of keeping clean accounts and saving 
one’s money have gone out of style, perhaps because they require calculation and not 
heedlessness. Reflection is something the children are happily free from until the illness of 
Frank. Before then, it is their very un-reflective nature that both gets them into scrapes and 
excuses them from blame for those scrapes. But though this book bears the mark of the 
Romantic’s elevation of the unselfconscious child, it also appears to teach that heedless 
childhood comes, appropriately, with an expiration date. 
In the story-within-a-story that occurs at about the halfway point of the book, both 
reflection and bookishness are recommended. A young naughty Master No-book, after wasting 
his hours idly, is seized to be eaten by a giant named Snap-‘em-up. While he hangs in the larder, 
awaiting his hour of cooking, Master No-book has time for the first time to do a little self-
examination: “[T]he wretched boy began at last to reflect seriously upon his former ways” (190). 
Thus in the middle of the novel, for the first time, reflection seems to be recommended to the 
child reader. Of course No-book is saved and reformed and becomes a paragon of industry. 
Shortly hereafter, grandmama Lady Harriet observes to Frank that we should read about 
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paragons of virtue: “Our leisure should be bestowed on reading of wiser and better people than 
ourselves, which will keep us humble while it instructs our understandings, and thus we shall be 
fitted to associate with persons whose society is even better than books” (199). Again, this 
constitutes a drastic change from where the book begins. 
As Harry and Laura travel by steamboat to the bedside of the dying Frank, we get the 
portrait of an irritable old woman, Mrs. Percival, who complains loudly and bitterly of every 
inconvenience, and seems convinced that the Captain, steward, engineer, and weather all 
function in reference to herself alone. It seems an oddly bad-natured comic portrait of curious 
placement in this otherwise generous and gently humored book; but in fact it serves as a contrast 
to the behavior of Frank—and Harry and Laura—in the final chapters. Frank knows he is dying, 
but endeavors all the time to resign himself happily to his fate and give his loved ones as little 
cause for concern as possible. Likewise, Harry and Laura, when finally reunited with their 
brother, are enjoined to show no signs of their distress at his deterioration, so that they do not 
excite him so as to surely kill him immediately. Thus the last two chapters of the book go on 
with all parties refusing to indulge their own feelings in front of one another, and trying their 
utmost to serve each other rather than think of themselves. Frank keeps his deathbed reflections 
in a diary rather than troubling others with his thoughts: “he kept a little book in which were 
carefully recorded such texts and reflections as he considered likely to strengthen his own faith, 
and to comfort those he left behind” (341) By the last pages of the book, Harry and Laura are 
grave, pious, self-reflecting pattern children: “All was changed within and around them,—sorrow 
had filled their hearts, and no longer merry, thoughtless young creatures, believing the world one 
scene of frolicsome enjoyment and careless ease” (353). The sobering and dull ending to the 
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book suggests that leaving behind heedless childhood might be necessary, but the entrance into 
self-consciousness cannot but be a cause for mourning. 
Harriet Mozley’s The Fairy Bower is, like Sinclair’s Holiday House, a children’s novel 
that combines, with some confusion, late-eighteenth-century thought on children with Romantic 
ideals of childhood. Also like Sinclair, Harriet Mozley uses the occasion of her preface to declare 
against pattern children in children’s literature. The opening sentence of the “Advertisement” 
establishes this book in contradistinction to the pattern good (or bad) girls and boys of the 
rational tale for children: “It is hoped that the following Tale may be looked upon as an attempt 
rather to represent characters as they really are, than to exhibit moral portraitures for unreserved 
imitation or avoidance” (6).189 Portraits, like the good boys and girls of moral literature, are 
famously “improved” versions of the living subject, and Mozley purports to eschew such 
enhancement in her penning of child characters. Yet her protagonist, Grace Leslie, is a pattern 
child in many ways, as a quick summary of the novel will evince. The Fairy Bower unfolds the 
story of a party of children gathered, with their elders, into a grand home for a celebration of the 
coming new year. In private conversation with another child, Mary Anne, young Grace 
offhandedly suggests a scheme of crafting paper flowers in order to make up an anteroom as a 
fairy bower, for the amusement of the party, and finds the next day that Mary Anne has proposed 
the idea to the other children as her own. Grace, unsure of how to react, decides not to out the 
other girl’s deception. Despite her best intentions though, Grace’s friends and admirers 
eventually guess at and expose the truth. Grace is relieved to no longer keep her secret, but also 
wonders—seemingly without resolution—whether she behaved rightly by not speaking up 
sooner. Mostly, Grace’s own doubts aside, the novel casts her as an unfailingly good girl, 
properly reticent, unconditionally sympathetic, and well-versed in the art of self-control. So 
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while the preface might lead us to expect the untamed child of nature precious to the Romantics, 
what we get with Grace looks a lot more like the socially adept and quietly self-reflecting 
children of Maria Edgeworth’s rational tales. 
The novel does in fact show traces of Wordsworthian Romanticism. The title page 
trumpets forth an epigraph from a Wordsworth poem—but one of the most Evangelical-friendly 
of his poems: the “Ode to Duty,” a paean to those who do good unthinkingly, without needing to 
be conscious of anyone—even God—watching. The novel abounds in critiques of various 
educational systems, critiques in line with Romantic warnings about over-educating the young. 
Mrs. Leslie seems to have done the best job of educating her daughter, mainly by virtue of not 
thinking much about the matter: “Mrs. Leslie had not studied the subject of education, like some 
mothers, and did not feel capable of forming any original plans” (11). Her convictions about the 
bringing up of children are few; she believes in the unwavering routine of daily lessons, and feels 
that children should not mix too much with adults—she herself is “of a temper to feel the 
objection of the constant presence of other people’s children” (286). In this, Mrs. Leslie 
anticipates many late-century pundits who objected to the practice of trotting out children for 
display to company. Mrs. Leslie’s “great simplicity of mind,” which Grace, we are told, 
inherited, makes her the consistent moral compass of the tale (193). Another of her convictions 
involves preserving the privacy of Grace’s mental world. Grace does not often put her thoughts 
into words, and Mrs. Leslie thinks “she had best perhaps not be made to,” implying that 
articulating her mind would somehow be a detriment to Grace, perhaps because it would require 
her to think too much about her own thoughts (10).  
Mozley also critiques several adult characters who fault Grace for her reticence—for not, 
essentially affecting sensibility—and who suspect her, paradoxically, of affecting simplicity. The 
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concern about affectation in children is one thing one which the older and newer models of ideal 
childhood agree. Late-eigtheenth-century child characters like Maria Edgeworth’s Simple Susan 
evidenced an anxiety that a child’s genuine simplicity might be mistaken for affectation, as 
happens with Grace. Grace’s simplicity is mistaken for affectation or “a great slyness” (211)—
she is “too grave for a child” (122) and seems to be acting the part of an un-spirited adult to 
many onlookers. These mistaken adults prefer the antics of more expressive children, such as 
Anna Wilson, a virtuoso practitioner of the art of emotional display who faints, cries, and has 
“strong hysterics” in public (17). Her mother, Mrs. Wilson, doubts whether Grace isn’t 
“perfectly insensible” (14): 
I never could bear that child; I am sure it would break my heart if my dear Anna 
showed so little sensibility. Why she cries at the least appearance of distress; do 
you know, one day she came in sobbing as if her little heart would break, because 
she was afraid she had hurt a ‘poor, poor butterfly,’ she had been trying in vain to 
catch; and if she thinks me unhappy, or even displeased, I am sometimes afraid 
she will go into fits. But then she has a very tender heart, and such wonderfully 
refined feelings for a child of her age. (15)  
Of course, we as readers are invited to see that Anna Wilson’s outbursts of “sensibility” are pure 
affectation, meant to disguise tears of pique at being unsuccessful at her butterfly hunt, or to 
persuade her mother to administer sympathy rather than a scolding. Through Grace’s aunt’s 
replies to Mrs. Wilson, we can see that Grace saves her tears and prayers for private moments 
when she believes herself unobserved, so as to spare her mother and others the distress of 
observing her pain. Where Anna practices an affectation of sensibility to manipulate social 
situations, Grace shows true empathy for others by concealing her sincere sensibility. The book 
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thus quickly establishes her reticence in matters of thought and feeling, a reticence that 
establishes the depths of both her mind and heart, but which also make her in some ways 
unsociable, or at least incapable of carrying out the same social manners fashionable among her 
set. 
As Grace joins a party of children at the home of her Aunt Williams for the New Year’s 
season, her quiet, modest ways continue to be illuminated by contrast with the theatrical 
Williams children, George and Emily, who do spot-on impressions of the adult company and 
propose mock trials, as well as in contradistinction to the Duff girls, who make a great show of 
outward piety, and “silly and affected” Isabella Ward, a little girl who puts on such sophisticated 
mannerisms—and such extravagant dress—that “it is difficult…to believe she is not a woman” 
(146): “Her manners were more than womanly: and so anxious was she for her dignity, that with 
children, they appeared little less than a piece of acting” (56). All these children, Grace excepted, 
make theater of their feelings in order to establish their social position, whether that position is 
clever youth, righteous abstainer, or distinguished lady. Grace instead projects little more than 
caution in society, prompting puzzlement and sometimes hostility from her fellows: “I says she’s 
a little old maid, and a tiresome squeamish prude,” George declares when Grace refuses to 
accept a bet that she cannot jump a gate (91). Yet eventually all of the children—with, perhaps, 
the exception of the devious Mary Anne—come to respect Grace’s rectitude and admire her 
sympathetic and gentle nature. 
Another element of Grace’s character which Edgeworth and Wordsworth would have 
agreed to bestow approval upon is her reluctance to become the center of adult attention. Mrs. 
Leslie feels that children should not mix too much with adults—she herself is “of a temper to 
feel the objection of the constant presence of other people’s children” (286). In this, Mrs. Leslie 
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echoes Edgeworth’s advice to keep children out of adult conversations, channels Wordsworth’s 
preference for separating the child from the social, and anticipates many late-century pundits 
who objected to the practice of trotting out children for display to company. For example, an 
1879 article titled “Tyrants of the Nineteenth Century” bemoans the prevalence of the self-
conscious child, “the little mincing, studied, over-conscious mannikin or womankin, that can 
sustain with perfect self-possession the attention of some twenty or thirty people,”190 and that 
wields absolute power in the middle-class home. Far from a little womankin who struts on the 
domestic stage, Grace cannot even imagine why adults might enjoy the company of children. She 
“wonder[s] very much why people should like to see children, and said she was sure they only 
said so from kindness” to her mother (206).  
When the spotlight does fall on Grace, her wariness of it protects her from becoming 
theatrical. Her godfather Mr. Everard, before all the company at dinner one night, declaims an 
original poem figuring the child as one of the ancient Graces; Grace, overcome with anxiety, 
manages a proper response, in verse, that clearly demonstrates her classical learning, but doesn’t 
even realize she has been complimented by these attentions until her mother alerts her to the fact 
later. In fact, on this occasion, as usual, she “received praise as a piece of politeness to her 
momma” (210). The narrator, quick to support Grace’s supposition, adds: “which, in fact, the 
praises of children usually are” (210). In contrast, Mary Anne Duff revels in the spotlight when 
singled out for praise from the whole company for designing a delightful fairy bower—the idea 
which, known only to Mary Anne, Grace and Emily, originated in truth with Grace. Though she 
should be ashamed of herself for her deception, “[s]o blunted were her feelings by self” that 
Mary Anne frequently forgets her crime and accepts the compliments she considers her due 
(169). The novel asks its readers to understand that the difference between Mary Anne and Grace 
87 
is precisely a difference of self—or rather of consciousness of self. Mary Anne, thinking always 
of herself, acts badly; Grace, thinking of others, instinctively does right. When Mary Anne’s 
deception is uncovered, it happens off-stage, so to speak, Mozley “spar[ing] her the degradation 
of exhibiting her personally in her well merited exposure” (285). One wonders whether Mozley 
isn’t rather denying the spotlight-loving sneak the satisfaction of another satisfyingly theatrical 
scene.  
Despite The Fairy Bower’s evidence of Wordsworthian influence, it remains a distinctly 
transitional work of children’s literature, with plenty vestiges of a pre-Romantic sensibility about 
children. For instance, the novel opens on a scene of Grace absorbed in reading, not fairy tales, 
but what appears to be a domestic tale, probably full of pattern children. She also engages 
habitually in Mary-Gilbert-esque bouts of deep and often troubling metaphysical reflection. 
Some days she wakes early and lies abed full of “thoughts and reveries on her past and present 
being; the existence and character of God; the true meaning of that, to her, most awful word—
Eternity; the fearful sense of the doctrine of eternal punishment” and “numberless topics” 
likewise deep and perplexing enough to prove “that there is the germ of philosophic yearning, 
and heretical wanderings in the mind, as soon as it is capable of embracing a thought, or 
receiving any revealed doctrine” (12). The mention of heresy casts doubt on whether a child like 
Grace should be indulging such “wanderings.” The other time for fancies is when she plays the 
piano, which leads most often to thoughts of her beloved mother.  
She would think, “What a small creature I am! but what great things I can think, 
and nobody knows my thoughts! Yes, I suppose God knows them. I am sure He 
does, though I cannot think how; and besides, I think mamma knows them; I think 
all mothers must have the power of knowing their children’s thoughts. She does 
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not say so, but I think mamma knows all mine.” Then she would get bewildered 
in the mazes of metaphysics. (12) 
Like Lewis Carroll’s Alice, Grace sometimes finds herself puzzling over what it means to be 
herself and not another—what is self, anyway?—a query that lands her again in the “depths of 
metaphysics” (85). Those mazes and depths do not seem at all like the proper place for a child, 
judging by Grace’s relief when she shakes herself free of them, and these passages seem 
ambivalent. Mozley seeks to establish at once that Grace is a pious and thoughtful child and that 
being thoughtful and pious can lead her into trouble.  
The plot of the novel, of course, turns on a similar paradox: Grace keeps a secret because 
she hesitates to shame another girl, but in keeping the secret lets the girl be ensnared in further 
sins. In fact, the whole point of the book might be that had she thought less and acted more 
spontaneously, the entire mix-up of the bower might have been avoided. It does become difficult 
to adjudicate whether Grace’s timidity isn’t rather a fault. Her quiet rectitude keeps her from 
coming forward to claim ownership of the fairy bower, thus allowing the morally weak Mary 
Anne to fall further into disgrace as she follows one lie with another to keep up the pretense that 
the fairy bower is rightfully hers. She is too thoughtful and good to rat on her friend, but also too 
paralyzed by wondering what is the right thing to do that she fails to save the poor girl from 
sinking deeper into iniquity. There is, maybe, something of Hamlet about Grace. At the end of 
the novel, after Mr. Everard steps in to reveal the truth of the situation to all involved, Grace 
expresses vague regrets to her mother: 
“I am still sure, mamma, that I was wrong,” returned Grace, once more, with a 
mixture of humility and heroism natural only in characters as hers. “I have 
thought that if the story of the Fairy Bower were written and read, a good many 
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people would say I was wrong, and I should be among the number myself. I 
think I shall say so all my life.” (294) 
Of course that story has been written by Harriet Mozley, but in reading it one finds it hard to say 
where Grace went wrong. Though Grace herself feels all would have been amended had she 
immediately informed her mother of the truth, her mother assures her that she would have done 
just as Grace did in her place. Given Mrs. Leslie’s position as the novel’s moral compass, should 
her words assure us as readers that Grace never did go wrong? Was Grace too simple and 
retiring, to the detriment of another girl’s character, or would any other course of action have 
tainted that simplicity?  
The epigraph to the chapter following Grace’s meta-statement about the reading of her 
own story only complicates the issue. Taken from Wordsworth’s “Character of the Happy 
Warrior,” the epigraph is a single, misquoted half-line: “Daily self surpassed,” (295) reads 
Mozley’s version; Wordsworth’s phrase was hyphenated, “daily self-surpast.”191 In 
Wordsworth’s poem on the death of Nelson at Trafalgar, “daily self-surpassed” refers to the 
hero’s habit of improving on his valiant deeds day by day—he surpasses his own former feats. 
Mozley’s slight edit gives us a phrase that, referring to the “humility and heroism” of Grace, 
seems more to indicate that daily Graces surpasses her self by her empathy and selflessness. In 
other words, she does not improve on her earlier feats of heroism by topping them with ever 
more glorious exploits like a little Nelson, but rather every day she puts aside her self and acts in 
accordance with the needs of others. Does this encomium absolve her of any guilt in the affair of 
the fairy bower?  
The bower itself is a strange artifact for Grace to create: does she conjure nature out of 
paper like a powerful Romantic child?  Or does she excel at artifice in a highly un-Romantic and 
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un-naïve way? After all Schiller notes that our admiration of the naive presupposes that “neither 
affectation nor any other accidental interest plays a part”192: “If one could give an artificial 
flower the appearance of nature so that it deceived completely, then the discovery that it was 
imitation would completely destroy the feeling under discussion.”193 The confusion of values in 
this novels stands as evidence of its status as a transitional novel that retains some elements of 
late-eighteenth-century children’s literature’s promotion of clever, self-aware children, but also 
embraces a new Romantic paradigm of the unselfconscious child.  
That paradigm is largely responsible for the shape of the canon of Golden Age children’s 
literature. As my next chapter will argue, one of the Golden Age’s most beloved creations, Peter 
Pan, is a complex response to the paradigm of the unselfconscious child. But it should be noted 
that even as this Romantic invention, the unselfconscious child, came to dominate the Victorian 
imaginary, it did not completely edge out the kinds of semi-old-fashioned, sometimes self-
reflective childhood seen in Sinclair’s Holiday House and Mozley’s Fairy Bower. Frances 
Hodgson Burnett, for example, recalled her own childhood as free of self-consciousness and yet 
wrote child characters who are at home in adult society and who display strong signs of self-
consciousness.194  
In her memoir of her childhood, The One I Knew Best of All (1893), Burnett firmly 
disassociated her adult narrating self from her remembered child self by using first person 
pronouns for the former and third person pronouns for the latter, as when she writes, “I have not 
the remotest idea of what she looked like.”195 The child Burnett, referred to as the Small Person, 
is syntactically quarantined from the self-conscious act of memoir-writing in which the adult 
Burnett engages. The first pages of the memoir further insist on the Small Person’s utter lack of 
self-consciousness; Burnett-the-narrator claims to be unable to recall “what the looking-glass 
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reflected back” at the Small Person, a sly way of insisting that her child self was so completely 
unselfconscious as to accord no importance to her reflection in the mirror: “there were so many 
serious and interesting problems to be attended to that a reflection in the looking-glass was an 
unimportant detail.”196 As adult narrator, Burnett continues to assert the Small Person’s lack of 
self-consciousness by emphasizing that “I do not remember regarding her as a personality at 
all,”197 so as to suggest that the child Burnett didn’t even have a sense of self of which to be 
conscious. Even though she became a voracious reader as a very young child, Burnett stresses 
that the Small Person remained unselfconscious:  
She wanted stories -- any kind of stories -- every kind -- anything from a romance 
to a newspaper anecdote. She was a simple, omnivorous creature. She had no 
precocious views about her mind or her intellectual condition. She reflected no 
more on her mind than she did on her plump legs and arms -- not so much, 
because they were frequently made red and smarting by the English east winds -- 
and it did not occur to her that she had an intellectual condition.198  
Burnett’s childhood reading was not limited to children’s fantasy with its Coleridgean seal of 
approval, its promise to guard against self-consciousness; nevertheless, Burnett reports that her 
childhood unconsciousness was never imperiled by her wide and sophisticated reading, perhaps 
because her other chief occupation was frolicking on the grounds of her home—a garden which 
she pointedly calls “The Back Garden of Eden.” Perhaps readers are meant to understand that 
this natural “fairyland” counteracted the effects of all of those novels and newspapers. 
Yet however strong her disavowal of self-consciousness in her own childhood, Burnett 
did not write completely unselfconscious child characters. She frequently describes both Little 
Lord Fauntleroy and Sara Crewe of A Little Princess as “old-fashioned,” a term that in the 
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nineteenth century was used to mark a child as serious and even unchildlike. In an 1893 
MacMillan’s article Frederic Adye observes that the old-fashioned child’s mind is “not 
necessarily morbid, but introspective and reflective beyond its years.”199 R. L. Green’s article on 
Golden Age literature notes that in writing Mary Lennox and Colin Craven of The Secret 
Garden, Burnett evinced an “unusual understanding of introspective unlikeable children.”200 In 
Green’s early exercise in forming a canon of children’s literature, Burnett’s Secret Garden is 
considered an oddity for its inclusion of these self-conscious and thus unlikeable children, but 
the novel squeaks into the canon anyway, probably because its conclusion sees both Mary and 
Colin reformed into garden-dwelling Romantic children. 
Burnett’s work gives us an example of the uneven developments of formations 
concerning childhood and self-consciousness. Her memoir and her fictions for children seem to 
indicate that while she herself was a bit of an infant prodigy, and while she enjoys writing infant 
prodigies—the term was applied to both Little Lord Fauntleroy and Sara Crewe by unfriendly 
critics—she also felt the influence of the trend towards strenuously denying the precocious self-
consciousness of children. Another indication that the older ideals of self-reflective childhood 
did not disappear is the continued popularity of domestic novels for children, with their emphasis 
on social interaction and self-regulation. Though the early twentieth-century formation of a 
canon of children’s literature may have highlighted works of Victorian and Edwardian fantasy—
the Alice books, The Wind in the Willows, etc—domestic realism maintained a strong presence in 
the Victorian nursery. The domestic tales of Maria Edgeworth, Sarah Trimmer, and Mary 
Sherwood kept their places on children’s bookshelves well into the Victorian years, and were 
joined by works of domestic realism by Mary Louisa Molesworth and Charlotte Yonge.  
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My next chapter will focus on one very well-known figure from children’s literature—
Peter Pan—who both calls attention to and solves a cultural paradox that results from the 
particularly Victorian permutations of thought on childhood and self-consciousness. Just as 
domestic realism (with its old-fashioned self-reflective child characters) maintained a presence in 
the Victorian nursery library despite the fact of the growing prejudice against self-consciousness 
in children, many Victorians praised the increasingly visible phenomenon of child stage 
performers despite the fact that many other Victorians reviled all signs of self-conscious 
performance in the young, including and maybe especially the child on the stage. For the most 
part these kinds of uneven developments mean that conflicting paradigms exist within a culture 
in a constant state of tension. Peter Pan, as the next chapter will contend, is the rare figure that 
manages to imaginatively dispel that tension. He does so by convincing his audiences of the 
possibility of a totally unselfconscious stage child. 
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4.0 THE RIDDLE OF PETER PAN’S EXISTENCE: AN UNSELFCONSCIOUS 
STAGE CHILD 
You’re not as natural, when acting the Duke, as you were when 
you acted Alice. You seemed to me not to forget 
yourself enough….If you are ever to be a good actress (as I hope 
you will), you must learn to forget “Isa” altogether, and be the 
character you are playing….and do forget that there’s anybody else 
listening!  
---Lewis Carroll, letter to child actress Isa Bowman, 4 April 1889, 
after seeing her performance of the Duke of York in Richard III201 
For a large portion of adults in the nineteenth century, sometimes a child was not a child. 
Following the re-theorization of children and self-consciousness by writers such as William 
Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, one quality that could disqualify a young person 
from the exalted state of childhood was self-consciousness. In 1879, the British periodical 
Golden Hours, an illustrated magazine for family reading, ran a two-part article—titled “Tyrants 
of the Nineteenth Century”—lamenting what it identified as the growing cultural phenomenon of 
the self-conscious child, “the little mincing, studied, over-conscious mannikin or womankin, that 
can sustain with perfect self-possession the attention of some twenty or thirty people.”202 With 
palpable disdain, the Golden Hours writer denounced the reign of the tyrannical child who 
wields absolute power in the middle-class home, demanding unceasing attention and admiration 
from parents, servants, and guests alike. The “spoilt, self-conscious, clever darling”203 that so 
disgusted the Golden Hours writer—and so many Victorian and Edwardian adults, as I will 
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show—is positioned here as the despotic star of its very own domestic stage, whose immodesty, 
self-consciousness, and self-possession are necessary enablers of “its performance of the part it 
has to play.”204 
Given that the self-consciousness of the child who struts in the figurative spotlight of the 
home could inspire such revulsion, it comes as no surprise that the self-conscious child who 
strode the boards of the actual theater could elicit a storm of controversy. On the one hand, the 
widespread loathing for precocity in stage children hinged on their critics’ perception that stage 
children were supremely self-conscious. Those who expressed antipathy for the self-conscious 
stage child contrasted him with the properly unconscious child whose “beautiful timidity,” as the 
Golden Hours writer puts it, amounts to a blessed “kind of ‘stage fright.’”205 On the other hand, 
the self-consciousness of the stage child is exactly what produced the artful theatricality that 
delighted so many theatergoers.206 The cultural tension between a commonly expressed 
predilection for the unconscious child and a similarly prevalent celebration of the theatrical child 
can be understood to hinge on whether the child is perceived as having a “self” and how the child 
can—and whether she should—have knowledge of that self. Both the domestic child actor and 
the professional juvenile performer can be understood to be not only conscious that they possess 
a self but also knowing enough to manipulate the effects that self has on adults. It is this self-
aware manipulation of the audience by a child performer that weighs on Lewis Carroll’s mind 
when he writes to beg Isa Bowman to forget herself on stage, and moreover to forget the 
audience even exists. 
These conversations about the unselfconscious child and the theatrical child converge in 
the discourse surrounding Peter Pan on the stage starting in 1904, and on the page beginning 
with Peter’s brief appearance in Barrie’s adult novel The Little White Bird (1902), and his more 
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fully elaborated literary presence in Barrie’s novelization of the play in 1911 and his published 
play script of 1928. Peter combines the best of both worlds in that he is supremely theatrical 
while being at the same time entirely unconscious of himself—or, if you will, unconscious of his 
self.207 As Hook remarks in the novel version of Barrie’s tale, Peter and Wendy (1911), “Peter 
did not know in the least who or what he was, which is the very pinnacle of good form.”208 
Situating the phenomenal popularity of Peter Pan in the Edwardian theater alongside the 
discourses of self-consciousness with regard to the figure of the child will help solve the riddle of 
Peter Pan’s existence, a riddle that troubles both Hook and Peter. I argue that the answer to this 
riddle is that Peter effectively has no self of which to be conscious, and that by having no self he 
combines unselfconsciousness and theatricality—highly valued but seemingly antithetical 
characteristics often attributed to the child in the nineteenth century. Criticism of Peter Pan has 
yet to elucidate an important characteristic of the eternal boy: he is pure theatricality devoid of 
knowingness. This chapter will trace the development of anti-self-consciousness among the 
Victorians—both as a general cultural phenomenon and as it applied particularly to children and 
children’s culture, literary and theatrical— and demonstrate that as a figure Peter embodies an 
impossible ideal for his anti-self-conscious audience—artfulness without self-consciousness.  
4.1 VICTORIAN ANTI-SELFCONSCIOUSNESS 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Romantic writers like Friedrich Schiller, 
William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge positioned the entrance of both cultures and 
individuals into self-consciousness as a kind of fortunate fall. In their dialectical configuration, 
the fall from originary, unselfconscious wholeness and grace into self-consciousness alienates 
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humans from nature and themselves, but fortunately also moves them towards a higher ideal of 
conscious unity with divinity, whether that divinity is figured as spiritual transcendence or as 
God. Many Victorians inherited their Romantic forbears’ preoccupation with self-consciousness 
but found it more difficult to see the fortune in the fall. The prospect of an eventual 
transcendence dimmed as the century waned, until self-consciousness came to seem a soul-
crushing modern curse, a nearly inescapable pall on human life whose horrors, by way of 
contrast, only further sanctified the idyllic unselfconscious space that the culture held childhood 
to be. 
Self-conscious reflection is one version of the ideal of critical distance that Amanda 
Anderson, in Powers of Distance (2001), locates behind an array of Victorian projects, including 
“the prevalent project of Bildung, or the self-reflexive cultivation of character.”209 Anderson 
notes that critical distance was an ideal for which Victorian scientists, social theorists, 
philosophers, and poets strove (remember that for Wordsworth poetry required emotion reflected 
upon retrospectively, from a distance), but also a general ideal for the self-fashioning middle 
class. Yet, as she points out, those who strove for critical distance were not without reservations 
about its effects: 
[M]any Victorians were wary of certain distancing effects of modernity, 
including…forms of alienation and rootlessness that accompanied modern 
disenchantment, industrialization, and globalization of commerce. As a result 
many writers displayed a complex ambivalence toward the powers of modern 
distance.210 
The unselfconscious child—the child not standing at a distance from self—is a fantasy that 
corrects against the alienating perils of critical distance. Victorians wary of distance “elevate 
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modes of life and work that recover a lost, prereflective unity,” and for an age that inherited so 
many Romantic ideals, the unselfconscious child served as one of those elevated modes of 
being,211 and Peter Pan’s Neverland imaged the child’s prereflective unity as existing on an 
island both lost to adults but also briefly accessible through narrative and theater. 
Thomas Carlyle identified self-consciousness as the plague of modern humanity. John 
Stuart Mill termed Carlyle’s narrative of diseased modernity an “anti-self-consciousness 
theory.”212 In Sartor Resartus (1836) Carlyle declared Coleridge’s imperative, “Know thyself,” 
to be an “impossible Precept,”213 and Carlyle rejected self-reflection in favor of un-
contemplative action. Where earlier discussions of self-consciousness as the Fall had meditated 
wistfully on the loss of original grace but looked forward to the attainment of a still greater 
apotheosis for humanity, Carlyle helped to initiate a new habit of dwelling on a less hopeful 
understanding of the fall into self-consciousness: the Fall as the entrance of evil and disease into 
human life.  The 1831 essay “Characteristics” gives the fullest expression of Carlyle’s 
theorization of self-consciousness as an individual and cultural illness.214 He begins with a 
medical truism, that the healthy are unconscious of their health; only the sick are conscious of 
the operations of their bodies, precisely because those operations have become disordered. 
Likewise, he argues, in matters “moral, intellectual, political, [and] poetical” (313) the “sign of 
health is Unconsciousness” (315) The very prevalence of inquiry in all of these categories during 
his time is to Carlyle proof that the nineteenth century suffers from the disorder of self-
consciousness more than any age before. The pursuit of knowledge in science and metaphysics 
can only be, for Carlyle, a “symptom of Derangement”  advanced to such a critical stage that 
even the memory of “paradisaic Unconsciousness has faded away into an ideal poetic dream” 
(314).  
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That paradise can be recalled most easily, Carlyle writes, by “looking back on young 
years”; again childhood operates as a prelapsarian, pre-self-conscious preserve of unity with 
oneself and nature, proof that the fallen state of the adult is not the rightful, natural state of 
humanity (313). Antedating the darkness of “diseased self-consciousness” when “everything lies 
impotent, lamed, its force turned inwards, and painfully listens to itself,”  (326) childhood 
contained “seasons of a light, aërial translucency and elasticity and perfect freedom” (313): 
We knew not that we had limbs, we only lifted, hurled and leapt; through eye and 
ear, and all avenues of sense, came clear unimpeded tidings from without, and 
from within issued clear victorious force; we stood as in the centre of Nature, 
giving and receiving, in harmony with it all; unlike Virgil's Husbandmen, “too 
happy because we did not know our blessedness.” (313-4) 
Though Carlyle’s vision of self-conscious maturity is generally darker and more shadowed by 
sickness and morbidity than that of earlier writers, his depiction of pre-Fall childhood accords 
closely with what had come before. Childhood is a lost but lovingly remembered period of 
joyous unity, unconscious physicality, clear vision, and harmony with nature. If the tenor of the 
discourse on self-consciousness grew more shrill and discordant as the nineteenth century 
progressed, the exaltation of unselfconscious childhood remained an unwavering accompanying 
note, bolstered by the nineteenth-century theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, and thus 
children literally embody pre-modern humanity. 
The enormous extent of Carlyle’s influence on Victorian thinking in general is without 
question, but here it will be useful to notice his influence on one particular acolyte: J. M. Barrie. 
Barrie’s mother, to whom he accredited his lifelong involvement in letters, regularly read her 
beloved fellow-Scot Carlyle aloud to her large family. Scholar Carol Anita Tarr documents 
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Barrie’s familiarity with and admiration of Carlyle215, whose name Barrie said “bulked largest 
next to Burns” in his home, and who was “the only writer I ever tried to imitate.”216 In fact the 
realm of Neverland gives geographic form to Carlyle’s vision of childhood as an era of 
“paradisaic Unconsciousness,” a kind of Eden before the Fall into self-conscious adulthood. 
When Peter refuses to join the Darling household, then, he returns to Neverland to remain in the 
season of a “light, aërial translucency and elasticity and perfect freedom,” the timeless time—
existing outside of modernity and the disease of self-consciousness—that Carlyle had declared 
childhood to be. 
Carlyle’s may be the most well-remembered voice against self-consciousness in the 
Victorian period, but plenty of others diagnosed their era with the same disease. In an essay on 
Jeremy Bentham, Mill fingered self-consciousness as the “dæmon of the men of genius of our 
time, from Wordsworth to Byron, from Goethe to Chateaubriand.”217 The effect of the growing 
prevalence of these metaphors of disease and demonism over the course of the nineteenth 
century is twofold. First, self-consciousness thus figured becomes an even more highly 
undesirable state; rather than merely lamentable in its distance from originary grace, self-
consciousness is positively hellish, a filthy contamination of the human mind, body, and soul. 
Second, in its juxtaposition and opposition to this diseased and cursed state, childhood as the 
Eden of unselfconsciousness grows even more precious and exalted. By 1909 G.K. Chesterton, 
looking around him at contemporary London life, declares that one “cannot call up any wilder 
vision than a city in which men ask themselves if they have any selves.”218 In contrast to the 
sickly city of self-contemplation, childhood stands as a protected garden of unselfconscious 
health, a Neverland without the disease of modernity. 
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 It is worth noting that these Victorian adherents to the anti-self-consciousness theory did 
not entirely despair of the possibility of escaping self-consciousness. Like Schiller and Coleridge 
before him, Carlyle did understand the passage through fallen self-consciousness to be a 
necessary evil on the way to the transcendence of humanity: self-consciousness may be both 
cause and symptom of the fallen-ness of humanity, but “it is also the attempt towards cure.”219 
The fever of self-conscious inquiry will burn itself out, he speculates, and humanity will tire of 
self-conscious skepticism and inquiry and return to faith. Mill believed himself to have effected a 
degree of transcendence above self-consciousness in his own lifetime and advised others that 
they could slough off the shackles of self-consciousness too. In his Autobiography (1873) he 
writes of breaking out from a period in which he was mired in self-conscious despair in part by 
realizing that happiness cannot be an end in itself—a refutation of his Benthamite upbringing—
and in part by learning, from Wordsworth’s Immortality Ode, that there are “compensations”220 
for self-consciousness. As Edward Alexander notes, Mill, unlike Carlyle, embraced the belief of 
the Romantic poets Wordsworth and Coleridge that the suffering of self-conscious analysis also 
leads to insight and the creation of art.221 Thus in his inaugural address as Lord Rector of the 
University of St. Andrews, Mill affirmed that the “meditative self-consciousness” of the modern 
mind “has discovered depths in the human soul”222 that surpass anything the unselfconscious 
ancients could have achieved. As will be discussed further, for all his unselfconscious dwelling 
in the prelapsarian Neverland, Peter Pan’s arrested development means he will never achieve 
Carlyle’s transcended state of humanity or Mill’s depths of the soul—a limitation that exposes 
some of the more disturbing implications of the doctrine of unselfconscious childhood. 
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4.2 CHILDREN, THEATER, AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
It is one of those puzzling examples of the ability of a culture to simultaneously hold seemingly 
antithetical ideas that so many Victorians and Edwardians, among them such connoisseurs of 
childhood as Lewis Carroll and J. M. Barrie, who were very much under the sway of the anti-
self-consciousness doctrine, particularly in relation to children, could also esteem the child on 
stage so highly. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw increasing discomfort with any 
signs of self-consciousness in children, and theatricality in children —whether in the home or on 
the stage—was certainly one of those signs. And yet the Victorian and Edwardian theater 
swarmed with child performers—the stars who played Alice and Peter Pan, to be sure, but in 
much greater numbers the hundreds who swelled the ranks of the chorus—who had a complex 
relationship to self-consciousness and to their audiences. Perhaps because they believed that 
contact with the ideal of unselfconscious childhood was a balm to their alienated modern souls, 
adult audiences managed to enjoy the performances of stage children while at the same time 
denouncing the theatricality that they believed threatened to destroy the idyllic state of 
childhood. 
Many writers voiced a widespread Victorian concern that the supposedly natural 
unselfconsciousness of childhood was threatened by the growth of what was variously referred to 
in article titles as “The Cult of the Child,” “Babyolotry,” and “The Worship of Children,” one 
sign of which was the growing presence of children on stage. But theatrical self-consciousness 
did not limit its threat to children on the literal stage: the figurative domestic stage posed many 
dangers itself. Doting middle-class parents of the nineteenth century did what parents of earlier 
times—the times when Maria Edgeworth warned that children should not be brought out in 
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company—did not do; they showed off their children, making them the center of the entire 
household instead of shuffling them off to a nursery on the periphery of the house, like the 
Darlings’ attic nursery. This new centrality of the child, writers fretted, had made children 
conscious of their own desirability, and thus consummate performers of the kinds of childhood 
adults valued, whether that was intellectual precocity—the child reciting poetry at a dinner for 
adults—or unconscious naivety—the child who says the darnedest things.  What at mid-century 
was an apprehensive anxiety about what would happen when the celebrated “artlessness” of 
children “gets to know its power”223 and becomes an artful performance of itself, was by the end 
of the century for some adults a wholesale disgust with the supposedly charming little ways of 
childhood. The Little Book of Bores (1900), an abecedarium in which each letter pillories a 
particular brand of “Bore,” reserves T for the child forced upon adult company to elicit their 
admiration: “T is a Terrible Tot / Who says things he’d much better not. / A child of that age / 
Should be kept in a cage, / And fed—if at all—through a slot.”224 Here the concern is no longer 
for the fate of the child; the child depicted in the accompanying illustration is a monster 
disguised as an angel, a horror foisted upon adults so weary of showcased children that the 
gentleman interlocutor clutches his knees in suppressed rage at being confronted with this 
spectacle. The fad for introducing children into adult social situations, then, is here represented 
as being bad for the child, converting the valued quality of unselfconsciousness into a self-
conscious performance of naiveté, exaggerated by the faux innocence of the finger in the mouth 
and the supposed unconsciousness of the risqué exposure of the doll clutched behind the back. 
But the lyric, with its facetious recommendation of child-imprisonment and starvation, seems 
more concerned for the ways in which the staging of the child in adult company is bad for the 
adult, who was so frequently a captive audience to the performances of adored children. Granted, 
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the adult in the upper left seems amused by whatever inappropriate utterance the child has just 
made, but the foregrounding of the distinctly un-amused gentleman and the tenor of the poem 
indicate that any adult amused by such a performance is only abetting the exasperating 
theatricalization of children.  
Figure 2: “T is for Tot,” Oliver Herford, The Little Book of Bores (1900) 
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 At the same time as the anti-self-consciousness pundits employed the language of 
theatricality to condemn self-conscious children, audiences flocked to see the self-consciously 
performing child of the Victorian and Edwardian stage. The children’s literature of the Golden 
Age was regularly adapted for the stage, with extremely popular productions of the Alice books, 
as well as Burnett’s Little Lord Fauntleroy and A Little Princess, starring child actors, and 
bringing huge numbers of children and adults to Victorian theaters.225 Marah Gubar has written 
extensively about the phenomenal popularity of child actors not only as members of mixed-age 
casts like that of Peter Pan but also in all-child productions of fashionable shows like H. M. S. 
Pinafore.226 At home, the private theatrical, a common form of entertainment for and by middle-
class families, often included children or was performed by a cast entirely made up of 
children.227 Even paintings of children performing were popular, with Charles Hunt making a 
specialty of painting at-home child productions of Shakespeare’s tragedies and fairy tales for the 
Royal Academy. His oil painting of children performing the play-within-the-play scene from 
Hamlet includes both children who take their roles quite seriously—Claudius, Gertrude, Hamlet, 
and Ophelia—and those who approach the scene with more levity—the players performing the 
play within the play behind the curtains. In this case, it is the grinning boy who disregards the 
gravity of the scene—he is supposed to be on the verge of being murdered, after all—who seems 
more self-conscious, by virtue of his open gaze out at the audience of the painting, his awareness 
of being watched. His arguably poor performance evinces more self-consciousness than the more 
absorbed performances of the children fully engaged in their theatrical roles. 
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Figure 3: Children acting the ‘Play Scene’ from “Hamlet,” Charles Hunt (1863), Yale Center for British Art 
But though the child who performed on a literal domestic stage was tolerated and even 
celebrated by the Victorians, it was no accident that when the author of the Golden Hours article 
with which I began this chapter fished for a metaphor with which to condemn self-conscious 
children, the one he came up with was theatrical. Children were obviously not new to the stage in 
the Victorian era; boy companies doing Shakespeare were popular in the sixteenth century, and 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw a spike in “Infant” performers in the theater. 
But the child on the stage arguably came to mean something new in the Victorian age. Following 
the work of historians of childhood such as Phillipe Ariès, sociologist Viviana Zelizer has traced 
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the transformation of the child from useful members of society before the nineteenth century 
(they were valuable as laborers or as the future of a dynasty), to “economically worthless, but 
emotionally priceless.” Zelizer points out that children on the stage “created a curious paradox,” 
in that they were “child laborers paid to represent the new, sentimentalized view of children.” 
This paradox was partly responsible for the fact that the child on the stage was a highly visible 
and highly controversial figure in Victorian culture, and as the work of Jacqueline Rose, Nina 
Auerbach, Anne Varty, Carolyn Steedman, and Marah Gubar has demonstrated, the stage child is 
a case that can tell us a lot about nineteenth-century constructions of the child.228 Indeed, the 
stage comprises an extremely important site on which competing notions about childhood and 
self-consciousness collided.  
 What is noteworthy about the enthusiasm for the child actor evinced by a culture that in 
large part adored the unselfconscious child is that the theatrical child was commonly remarked to 
exhibit precocious self-consciousness. Of course, as the instructional manuals for amateur 
theatricals show, not all acting done by children was understood to be a sign of precocity. In fact, 
one of the originators of the enthusiasm for the unselfconscious child characterized some 
childhood acting as inoffensive. The “little Actor”229 of Wordsworth’s Immortality Ode indulges 
in “endless imitation”230 of adult activities—weddings, funerals—with complete earnestness and 
unconscious absorption in his play, and all within the privacy of his home. Wordsworth 
characterizes him as neither precocious nor knowing, but simply as an instinctive mimic, 
blissfully unaware of any audience and acting only to please himself. His isolation in his own 
world of imaginative play and his total unselfconsciousness about performing preserve him as a 
Romantic child. The professionalized child actor is differentiated from Wordsworth’s natural 
child mimic by the publicness, precociousness, and self-consciousness of her performance. Her 
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precocity inheres not only in the worldly knowingness cultivated by her introduction into the 
adult public milieu of work but also in her self-conscious ability to please an audience. She 
shapes her performance on the stage to suit the wishes of her audience just as the adult self-
consciously shapes behavior and ultimately self to suit the demands of the social milieu. Whether 
playing an adult role, or—perhaps even more troublesome for devotees of the Romantic child—
performing childishness, the theatrical child was understood by many adults to be a supremely 
self-conscious being. And yet she too was beloved by huge numbers of Victorian and Edwardian 
theatergoers.231 
Some Victorian commentators on the theatrical child attempt to recover her Romantic-
child simplicity by denying that stage-acting engenders premature self-consciousness in the 
juvenile performer. For example, the author of “The Child on the Stage” (1897)232 acknowledges 
the misgivings of the “man in the stalls” (623) at a performance including a child actor: “Even 
the child who charms you on the stage arouses an admiration not unmixed with regret. Nor is the 
reason far to seek: she is a child who is consciously making believe” (624). Some audience 
members may find it difficult, the writer admits, to be “quite in love with the child on the stage” 
precisely because “she has grown self-conscious” (623). Before entering the theater, “it was her 
charm” that she was “always acting and never knew that her proceedings were not in dead 
earnest,” (623) much like Wordsworth’s “little Actor.” As a professional performer, though, she 
has fallen from the Edenic state of unconscious play: 
Now she has eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and knows (what no child 
ought to know) that there is such a thing as acting. She is doing consciously and 
for the sake of applause what she ought to do without thought of reasons, as 
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naturally as she draws her breath or as the rose gives sweetness. She is of 
necessity precociously wise, and so we are a little sorry for her. (624)  
To know that one’s behavior can be self-consciously shaped, that it does not simply arise 
spontaneously and authentically from one’s essential being, is what “no child ought to know.” 
Self-consciousness casts out of the paradise of childhood the child who has sinned by knowing 
what a child should not. The writer of this article is quick to insist, however, that “a child is a 
child,” and relates that when the little actress goes home her friends and family can attest that 
“she may be just as simple in her pleasures as her sisters who are actresses only in the ordinary 
way” (624). Furthermore, the writer maintains that “the baleful quality of self-consciousness may 
be developed just as well in the nursery as on the stage” (624). So even if the child actor does 
grow self-conscious, well, that’s no worse than what happens to other children who have never 
trod the boards. 
4.3  PETER PAN 
While the Victorians and Edwardians could easily adore the unselfconscious performance of 
natural mimics like Wordsworth’s “little Actor” while upholding the Romantic paradigm of 
childhood, their enthusiasm for professional child actors sat uneasily beside their enthusiasm for 
a Romantic lack of self-consciousness in children. In 1904, however, a child character appeared 
on the London stage233 with the power to resolve the cultural tension between celebrating the 
child on stage and rejecting the self-consciousness of performance as unchildlike. At once 
eminently theatrical and eminently unconscious, the figure of Peter Pan managed to embody that 
seeming impossibility—the utterly unselfconscious child on stage. The phenomenal popularity of 
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J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan in both England and the U.S., I contend, can in part be understood as a 
result of Peter’s virtuoso combination of turn-of-the-century ideals of the child. Peter solves for 
audiences the puzzle of loving the unselfconscious child and the child on the stage, and he solves 
it by having no self. Without any stable sense of a self of which to be conscious, Peter exists 
suspended in a state of pure possibility. He is all that the anti-self-consciousness league could ask 
of a child: presocial, authentic, free, autonomous, boundless, and of course unselfconscious. But 
another wonderful consequence of lacking a defined self is that Peter can perfectly inhabit any 
role from moment to moment; he is the consummate child actor. And there he is, on stage, in all 
his paradox-resolving glory, available to be adored, but entirely unconcerned to procure our 
admiration.   
 Roger Lancelyn Green reports that Nina Boucicault, the first actress ever to play Peter, 
experienced some difficulty with comprehending the role she originated. Feeling “defeated by 
her part,” Boucicault requested that Barrie please explain Peter—his essence, his being, his self. 
“What is Peter Pan?” Boucicault asked Barrie.234 Barrie replied, rather enigmatically, “Well, he 
was a bird a day old!” This non-definition of selfhood is a bit of playful nonsense that not only 
keeps open the possibilities of Peter’s identity (Is he even human? Does he exist in time at all?) 
but moreover puts an unsolvable riddle in place of a self for Peter.  In fact throughout the 
constellation of texts Barrie produced about Peter, the author stressed the mystery at the heart of 
the eternal boy, and hinted that the mystery only thinly concealed an absence. In a scenario that 
Barrie wrote for a proposed silent film of Peter Pan (sadly never made), he addresses the 
question that puzzled Boucicault and so many who encountered Peter: “Who was Peter Pan? No 
one really knows. Perhaps he was just somebody’s boy who was never was born.”235 No one 
really knows who or what Peter is, including Barrie, and, more importantly, including Peter 
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himself. When asked who he is, Peter, like his creator, can answer only with a riddle about a 
“little bird” (PP 145).236 In the script for the film scenario, Barrie hints that Peter simply lacks a 
self when he facetiously suggests that Peter might be unborn, a nobody.  
A boy without self, Peter is enabled to be supremely and, for his audience, satisfyingly 
unselfconscious. His lack of self-consciousness is such an important aspect of the character that 
Barrie required unconsciousness of the actors that play Peter, too. In Barrie’s notes “On the 
Acting of a Fairy Play,” which prefaced later versions of the script, he insists that all of the actors 
in Peter Pan should “never do anything because there is an audience, but only and entirely 
because you think this is how the character in the fanciful world would do it.”237 They are meant 
to appear unmindful of the audience, so that their performance in some ways is not performative 
at all but rather “spontaneous” and “artless.”238 The stage directions to the opening scene of the 
play note that “naturalness” must be “the aim of every one in the play”; the actors “must wear a 
child’s outlook on life as their only important adornment”—in other words, they must be 
unselfconscious (PP 88). But the appearance of unconsciousness was especially highly praised in 
actresses playing Peter. Green quotes Barrie biographer Denis Mackail as lauding the 
performance of Boucicault— “the Peter of all Peters”—for its seeming unconsciousness: both 
“unearthly” and “real,” Boucicault “had the touch of heart-breaking tragedy that is there in the 
story or fable from beginning to end; yet she never seemed to know it.”239 Boucicault was thirty-
seven when she began her run as Peter, and yet managed to seem as unconscious as any 
Romantic child to at least some audience members to the degree that they could be persuaded to 
forget the artificiality of the stage and the fact that the person who stood before them was not a 
boy but in fact a grown woman.  
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Being eternal is an essential aspect of Peter’s ability never to develop a self of which to 
be conscious, and thus never to exit the Romantic Eden of childhood and become a self-
conscious performer. Anne Varty, who proposes that the shadow play in Peter Pan originates in 
part from the “Victorian fondness for domestic shadow theatre as an entertainment for children,” 
points out also that outside of the theater, in the natural world, shadows come and go and change 
position in reference to the position of the sun, but “Peter Pan’s shadow is independent of all 
these factors, a defiant assertion of his unique timekeeping.”240 Perhaps one had rather say that 
Peter ignores time-keeping entirely, that for him as for Hamlet time is “out of joint.” Barrie’s 
play contrasts the clock-time of the nursery to the fluid, unstructured time of Peter’s world, 
where the eternal boy does not keep time. The action of the play commences as the nursery’s 
“cuckoo clock strikes six,” at which sound Nana promptly performs her pre-bedtime ritual of 
turning down beds and such (PP 88). In quick if somewhat untidy succession, the audience 
witnesses the children’s bedtime and bath time, and time for Michael’s medicine, demonstrating 
the Darlings’ reliance on clock-time to structure their daily activities. Peter, on the other hand, 
has no sense of time as a regularized constant that structures existence. When, in the novel, 
Wendy asks Peter his age, he replies, “I don’t know, but quite young” (PW 99). 
And no wonder he does not know, for living in Neverland does not provide one with 
many accurate ways to keep time; in Neverland “all the four seasons may pass while you are 
filling a jug at the well” (PW 106). The Darling children, embedded in time and thus history, are 
able to develop a sense of self and self-consciousness; Peter, loose in the fluid time of Neverland, 
cannot keep track of his own history and thus lives in a state of unconscious absorption in each 
present moment. As the novel version of the story elaborates, it is “quite impossible to say how 
time does wear on in the Neverland, where it is calculated by moons and suns, and there are ever 
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so many more of them than on the mainland” (PW 106). Of course, not everyone in Neverland  
escapes the confines of clock-time; Hook fears death in the jaws of a crocodile that has 
swallowed a clock. Smee notes to Hook that one day the clock the crocodile has swallowed will 
run down, “and then he’ll get you” (PW 106). The fear of time running down “haunts” Hook as it 
does not haunt the eternal boy, who need not ever fear time his time running out (PW 106). At 
the end of the play, a grown up Wendy explains Peter’s immortality to her daughter Jane in terms 
of time: “you see he had no sense of time. He thought all the past was just yesterday” (PP 159). 
Peter never notices when he has missed a year or many years of coming for Wendy. 
 The immortality of the time-oblivious Peter forms a striking contrast to the mortality of 
Wendy, who grows older as Peter forgets her for longer and longer stretches. Peter and Wendy 
famously opens with a declaration of the growing-up, and thus the mortality, of all children 
except Peter. The opening sentences of the novel tie growing up to knowledge. The passage 
seems to suggest that Wendy grows up because she knows she must: 
One day when she was two years old she was playing in a garden, and she plucked 
another flower and ran with it to her mother. I suppose she must have looked rather 
delightful, for Mrs. Darling put her hand over her hart and cried, “Oh, why can’t you 
remain like this for ever!” That was all that passed between them on the subject, but 
henceforth Wendy knew that she must grow up. (PW 5) 
As Paul Fox notes, the opening page of Peter and Wendy thus presents “a fall from innocence in 
a beautiful garden,” in which “a new consciousness of the self as a ‘subject’ aware of a future 
over which one is bereft of control” signals the beginning of the end of childhood .241 As a tragic 
victim of the Romantic paradigm of childhood, Wendy finds herself being ushered out of Eden 
and into mortality the moment she becomes self-conscious. Peter, who never becomes self-
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conscious, remains forever in his own little version of the paradise of childhood. 
 Peter cannot know himself, cannot become self-conscious, because he lives in a timeless 
state of continual forgetfulness, thinking “all the past was just yesterday” and failing to 
remember most of what happened in that capacious yesterday or even just moments ago. Without 
a sense of his own history, he lives unconsciously in each moment, and thus according to the 
tenets of Romantic childhood, but is also convinced he is the center of the universe, rather more 
like the stage-child in the spotlight. In the course of the Darlings’ journey from the nursery—of 
which Peter has only “an already fading recollection”—to Neverland, he forgets about John and 
Michael, and “soon maybe he will forget Wendy” (PP 115, 114). He can forget a solitary 
adventure “so completely” by the time he gets back to the home under the ground that he will not 
even mention it (PP 128). Only a year after Wendy’s first visit to Neverland, Peter already 
“sometimes forgets that she has been here before,” and he has entirely forgotten the lost boys, 
Hook and Tink, all of whom he knows only as features of Wendy’s stories about him (PP 153). 
Peter thinks he remembers a few things about his life—running away on the day of his birth, then 
trying to return and finding the window closed and his mother caring for a new boy—but the 
narrator of Peter and Wendy cautions us against trusting Peter’s memories: “He really knew 
nothing at all about it, he had merely suspicions” (PW 27). The novel’s narrator also tells us that 
this forgetfulness is the very quality that separates Peter from other children. As he describes the 
reaction of all children to the first act of unfairness perpetrated against them, the narrator notes 
that “no one ever gets over the first unfairness; no one except Peter. He often met it, but he 
always forgot it. I suppose that was the real difference between him and all the rest” (PW 82). 
Because he forgets everyone and everything, even his own history, from moment to moment the 
world confronts him shining and new, and he is at the center of it. What he cannot remember the 
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cause of he assumes he has accomplished himself, creating that fascinating and infuriating 
conceit that Wendy marvels at when Peter immediately forgets her fantastic sewing and believes 
he has re-attached his own shadow. He cannot remember a thing about himself, but from 
moment to moment he is the supreme being in his own world, and thus he combines vanity with 
unconsciousness. 
Peter Pan is a boy without a sense of his own history, a boy with very little capacity for 
memory, little interiority, and no permanent sense of identity. His surrogate mothers, Wendy and 
Jane and their daughters, tell him “stories about himself, to which he listens eagerly” because he 
does not know his own story (PW 153). Reading Peter in the light of Carolyn Steedman’s work 
on childhood and adult interiority suggests that it is precisely because he lacks these things—
memory, history, identity—that Peter never develops a stable self, and thus will never grow up. 
Steedman reminds us that according to Freud “the child develops an individual identity” when 
childhood, “as a cluster of desires, happenings, experiences, assaults and traumas, is relocated, 
put into another place”—the unconscious.242 Thus Freud “discovered a particular meaning of 
childhood…its status as a form of history, and its import for the narration of time.”243 When the 
child tucks away the memory of the vicissitudes of childhood into the unconscious, he gains an 
identity, leaves childhood behind, and becomes an adult with the history of the child-that-was as 
the interior self. Peter, who remembers little, and thus has no history, cannot perform this act, 
and thus cannot begin the process of developing a self, which would lead to growing up. 
Without memory, unable to tell himself his own life story and thus construct a stable 
identity, Peter has no sense of self, or at least no sense of a continuous history that would have 
accorded with nineteenth-century theories of selfhood. With little idea who or what he is, he can 
be both totally unselfconscious (like the ideal Romantic child) and full of possibilities for 
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performing innumerable roles (like the beloved precocious child actor). During the culminating 
one-on-one battle to the death aboard the pirate ship, Hook demands to know “who or what” 
Peter is, and even the “children listen eagerly for the answer,” but Peter—like Barrie responding 
to Boucicault’s query—offers only an enigmatic response: “I’m youth, I’m joy, I’m a little bird 
that has broken out of the egg” (PP 145). In the novel, the narrator swiftly undercuts any wish 
the reader may have to extrapolate on Peter’s identity based on this little riddle. Peter’s assertion, 
the narrator declares, is “nonsense” (PW 130). The truth is that Peter lacks a coherent, stable self, 
which gives him the astonishing ability to play the role of anyone with utter perfection. In 
Neverland battles, “he has a perplexing way of changing sides if he is winning too easily” (PP 
123). Most of all, the play emphasizes his ability to act the role of Hook. In declaring himself 
more than once to be “captain” of the Lost Boys, Peter compares his role to that of Captain Hook 
(PP 101). Indeed, after vanquishing Hook and the other Pirates, Peter becomes captain of Hook’s 
ship, garbed in Hook’s dandy-ish clothes. Peter can “imitate the captain’s voice so perfectly,” 
Barrie observes in the stage directions, “that even the author has a dizzy feeling that at times he 
really was Hook” (PP 120). Certainly Hook’s pirates are bamboozled at the Mermaid’s Lagoon, 
as is Hook himself, who feels, as he listens to Peter announce himself in Hook’s voice, that “his 
ego is slipping from him” (PP 122). As the battle at the lagoon rages, Peter and Hook engage one 
another “strangely” not in the water but atop a rock that they simultaneously and independently 
scale to meet in the middle (PP 123). Here, though in so many ways alike, the two are 
differentiated. Peter fights fair; Hook does not. 
Peter can be Hook at will, but, alas, Hook cannot be Peter, and therein lies the tragedy of 
this “not wholly unheroic figure” (PP 146). The text of the play tells us that the “something in 
Peter that at all times goads this extraordinary man to frenzy…is the boy’s cockiness, which 
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disturbs Hook like an insect” (PP 134). Peter’s infuriating “cockiness” is an amalgam of all of 
the qualities that make him both Romantic child and consummate actor: he has the boundlessness 
of the Romantic child, the unformed self which makes it possible for him to temporarily become 
anything he wishes; living outside of time and without memory, he is the center of his own 
perpetually self-renewing world; and above all, he is entirely unconscious. Karen Coats states 
that Peter lives in a constant state of jouissance, which is the pleasure of plenitude he achieves by 
living—like the ideal Romantic child—outside of time and social bonds. Furthermore, Coats 
points out that, on the other hand, “Hook is imprisoned by the past, by the linearity of time, 
thwarted in his inability to slough tradition and the expectations as to the form his life should 
take.”244 A former public school boy, Hook obsesses over good form, that most sacred of public 
school virtues. Hook knows that he himself frequently displays bad form, as he does atop the 
rock during the battle at Mermaid’s Lagoon, and hates Peter for his flawless good form. What 
especially torments Hook about his boy nemesis is that “Peter [does] not know in the least who 
or what he [is], which is the very pinnacle of good form” (PW 130).245 Peter entirely lacks a 
sense of self, a quality that Hook fetishizes and envies as “the pinnacle of good form.” Hook 
obsesses, like many a public schoolboy, about good form, or in other words unselfconsciousness, 
and thus Hook obsesses about Peter, but what makes things much worse for the pirate captain is 
that Peter is not equally absorbed in their rivalry. In the final moments of the battle aboard the 
pirate ship, Peter has “apparently forgotten the recent doings”: he sits atop a barrel, playing his 
flute as though there was not, just moments before, a battle to the death raging between him and 
Hook (PP 146). It is this fact that breaks Hook’s “great heart” and leads him to leap to his death 
in the belly of the crocodile (PP 146). It would break Hook’s heart all over again to know that 
Peter promptly forgets him after his demise. 
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Perhaps Hook would be comforted to know what we, the readers, are privy to: Peter’s 
jouissance is ever so subtly imperfect. It bothers him that he forgets things; when Wendy 
attempts to excuse his forgetfulness on the grounds that he has had “so many adventures,” Peter 
is “relieved” to hear her flattering explanation (PP 153). Peter has nightmares, about which the 
text of the play says merely that “in his dreams he is always in pursuit of a boy who was never 
here, nor anywhere: the only boy who could beat him” (PP 153). The presence of this uncannily 
superior boy in Peter’s dreams seems to suggest that Peter fears that even he is circumscribed 
within his ostensible plenitude. The novel provides more detailed information about Peter’s 
nightmares. In the middle of the book, as the action moves to a climax, Wendy and the lost boys 
have been kidnapped by the pirates, and only Peter Pan remains behind, unaware of the danger, 
in the home under the ground. Believing that the other children have set off to return to the 
Darling house, Peter falls asleep alone as Hook discovers a way to infiltrate the children’s lair. 
The narrator chooses this moment of terrible suspense to provide the reader with a seemingly 
inconsequential side note about Peter: “Sometimes, though not often, he had dreams, and they 
were more painful than the dreams of other boys. For hours he could not be separated from these 
dreams, though he wailed piteously in them. They had to do, I think, with the riddle of his 
existence” (PW 110). Wendy, the narrator tells us, has often succored Peter as he suffers in the 
grips of this mysterious bad dream. However, Peter is not at this point in the book having one of 
those dreams. Instead, he has “fallen at once into a dreamless sleep,” and thus Captain Hook 
finds him and notes his “open mouth, the drooping arm, the arched knee” (PW 111). In fact it is 
Peter’s utter ease, his “impertinent appearance” while sleeping that “steel[s] Hook’s heart” to kill 
the boy by poisoning his medicine (PW 111). 
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Why tell us about this dream, “more painful than the dreams of other boys,” at a time 
when Peter sleeps peacefully, even impertinently? The preoccupations of Captain Hook may 
help unravel the mystery. Peter’s lack of self and self-consciousness, marked here as 
impertinence, plagues both Hook and Peter. If the price of never growing up is never attaining an 
interior self, Peter does not pay that price entirely painlessly. Once in the course of Peter and 
Wendy we do observe him suffering this uniquely personal nightmare. After the defeat of Hook 
and the pirates, Peter prowls the decks of the pirate ship while the lost boys sleep, at last falling 
asleep himself beside Long Tom, the ship’s gun. In the last sentence of the chapter “Hook or Me 
This Time” the narrator remarks simply that Peter “had one of his dreams that night, and cried in 
his sleep for a long time, and Wendy held him tight” (PW 153). With the Darlings and the lost 
boys returning home, and Hook and the pirates vanquished, Peter has lost his provisional 
identities as “father” to the children and nemesis to Hook, and the “riddle of his existence” 
returns to haunt him. 
The “riddle of his existence” might haunt Peter occasionally, but the audience embraces 
his difference from other children because it makes Peter the solution to a problem for them: it 
makes him a child both entirely unselfconscious and perfectly suited for performing. Being 
unlike other children has its benefits for Peter, too, such as fearlessness. Finding himself in the 
potentially fatal situation of near-drowning at the lagoon, for instance, Peter does not suffer from 
any anxieties; instead, he feels “just the one,” stands erect, smiles, and listens as his heart 
declares, “To die will be an awfully big adventure!” (PW 84). But the text of the play tells 
readers that at the moment when Peter makes his grandly fatalistic pronouncement, his heart is “a 
drum beating in his breast as if he were a real boy at last” (PP 125). Though he knows perfectly 
well that he could fly away and escape the rising tide at any moment, Peter relishes facing the 
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possibility of mortality because it makes him feel like a “real boy.” As we saw with Wendy, 
according to the logic of Peter’s universe, the “beginning of the end” for most children happens 
precisely at the dawning of self-consciousness. In this world of Barrie’s creation, to be self-
conscious is to be mortal. The “riddle of his being” has, Peter intuits, something to do with his 
difference from other children, and if “he could get the hang of the thing”—of the riddle of his 
existence, that is—“his cry might become ‘To live would be an awfully big adventure!’” (PP 
153-4). If he could solve the riddle of himself, and become self-conscious, he, like other 
children, would grow up and live a real life, a life embedded in the social, in time, and in 
mortality. However, he would no longer be the perfect solution to paradox of the audience’s 
simultaneous adoration of the Romantic child and fascination with the child actor. Never fear, 
though: Barrie assures us that Peter “can never quite get the hang of it, and so no one is as gay as 
he is” (PP 154). Peter maintains his joy, and the audience maintains its joy in him, but the cost is 
that Peter is not quite alive. 
Peter is not quite a real boy; he might even be a dead boy. In his earliest incarnations in 
The Little White Bird and “Peter Pan in Kensington Gardens,” Peter, who has himself flown out 
of his nursery window—rather like a ghost—only to return and find it barred and his mother 
mourning his loss, watches over children who have been abandoned in the gardens overnight and 
are likely to die. He eagerly buries those who have died, happy to be no longer alone. By the 
time of the play and later the novel, Peter’s domain has been relocated from Kensington Gardens 
to Neverland, and his stewardship of the dead is no longer explicit, but he still reigns over a place 
outside of time to which children come after tumbling out of a window. But the children never 
do stay with him, no matter how tempted. The Darlings and the Lost Boys return to the comforts 
of home; Peter returns to Neverland alone. 
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Both of Peter’s realms, Neverland and Kensington Gardens at night, are uncanny places, 
familiar and yet strange, a pairing that Freud points out provides the distinctive flavor of the 
unheimlich.246 An embodiment of both the Romantic ideal of unselfconscious childhood and the 
theatrical ideal of the child performer, Peter himself is quite uncanny in his combination of two 
seemingly antithetical paradigms. In fact, the stage directions leading up to Peter’s entrance into 
the nursery explicitly call the intruder “uncanny” (PP 96). His presence is threatening and dark 
enough to put out the sweet, domestic, house-shaped night-lights that Mrs. Darling promised her 
children would watch over them just as faithfully as her own motherly eyes.247 Peter’s 
uncanniness is signaled from his first semi-appearance in the play, for which he consists only of 
a disembodied “strange little face” and “a hand groping” at the window, spotted by Mrs. Darling 
(PP 89). Forgotten briefly during the cozy bustle of a bedtime routine, Peter emerges again into 
Mrs. Darling’s consciousness as she prepares to depart for the evening. She warns her husband 
of the necessity of Nana’s keeping watch in case Peter comes back for his shadow, shorn from 
his body by the swiftly closed nursery window a week ago. Mr. and Mrs. Darling contemplate 
Peter’s shadow, a “flimsy thing” that yet “has human shape” (PP 93). That Peter’s shadow can 
be severed from his body by something so mundane as a nursery window suggests that the boy is 
something extremely uncanny, something none-too-human despite its human shape. Peter’s 
uncanniness could easily tip over into ghastliness, and yet instead it is the very thing that makes 
him so charming and delightful for audiences. He is uncanny because he has no defined self, and 
it is because he has no defined self that he can remain eternally unselfconscious even as he is 
eternally performing on stage for the pleasure of audiences.  
Judith Plotz notes the uneasy “destitution” at the core of the Romantic child. She argues 
that the “triumphal lightness of being,” the “mobility and emotional vagrancy” of Wordsworth’s 
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child figures “is connected to an inner emptiness, destitution.”248 In finding an emptiness at the 
heart of the idealized child of the nineteenth century, Plotz corroborates the work of James 
Kincaid, who has persuasively demonstrated how, beginning in the nineteenth century, childhood 
“can be made a wonderfully hollow category,” and children themselves imagined as empty 
vessels to be filled with the projections and desires of adults.249 The empty child is a kind of 
attractive revenant, a beautiful cipher. Plotz links the emptiness of the idealized child to the 
category of the uncanny when she points out that the Romantic child’s  “combination of 
lightness and loss is evident in the uncannily euphoric music makers” of Wordsworth’s poems, 
the “power and discomfort” of which “lies in the uncanny juxtaposition of seeming happiness 
and inner emptiness.”250 These uncanny music makers perhaps prefigure Peter Pan, who plays 
only fairy music on his pipes, “the only music he knows,” and whose playing gets more “riotous” 
as he defiantly declares “I just want always to be a little boy and have fun” (PP 133). There is 
something desperate about his music, and there is something terribly sad about the 
insubstantiality of him. Peter, as the lost boys know but never mention to him, has “no weight at 
all,” does not seem to need food, and cannot be touched, ghost-like (PP 124).  
Through Peter, Barrie illustrates the problems of the Romantic paradigm of childhood, 
even while allowing the adult audience to revel in its pleasures. The unselfconscious Romantic 
child has no self to speak of, which means the continuance of an exciting state of possibility but 
also a severance from the social world, from the pleasure of relationships with other people 
founded on mutuality and responsibility to one another. Peter is saddened by the departure of the 
Lost Boys and the Darling children, suggesting that he (and the imagined figure of the Romantic 
child that he embodies) can be neither entirely self-sufficient nor permanently euphoric. Peter’s 
freedom from the limitations imposed by self-consciousness thrills the audience, but Barrie also 
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reminds them of what Peter loses by never growing up. As the Darling family rejoices in their 
reunion, the novel’s narrator points out the pathetic sight of Peter “staring in at the window”: 
“He had ecstasies innumerable that other children can never know, but he was looking through 
the window at the one joy from which he must forever be barred” (PW 141). To be part of a 
family is to have a social self, defined and delimited by the demands of others, and thus to grow 
up. Only by disavowing the pleasures of the real, social world—of life—can Peter remain a child 
forever. For the Victorians, self-consciousness may have figured as a terrible disease, one from 
which they imagined children to be blissfully free, but Barrie reminds us that desiring perfect 
unselfconsciousness in children is terribly akin to desiring their death. 
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5.0  A “DISQUIETING REFLECTION”: GOOD FORM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
BOY 
Good form! However much he may have degenerated, he still 
knew that this is all that really matters. From far within him he 
heard a creaking as of rusty portals and through them came a stern 
tap-tap-tap, like hammering in the night when one cannot sleep. 
“Have you been in good form to-day?” was their eternal 
question…. Most disquieting reflection of all, was it not bad form 
to think about good form? His vitals were tortured by this problem. 
It was a claw within him sharper than the iron one.  
---J.M. Barrie, Peter and Wendy (1911)251 
In order to illuminate the peculiar psyche of Captain Hook, the narrator of J. M. Barrie’s  Peter 
and Wendy (1911) stresses the pirate captain’s “passion for good form,” announcing that—
however much the former Etonian Hook may have “degenerated” from his public school days—
he still knows that good form “is all that really matters” (117). What is good form? Why was it, 
as this chapter will demonstrate, so crucial to public school masculinity? Why is it so important 
to Hook, and why does it torment him so? This chapter will argue that the foundations of good 
form rest on a paradox, one best expressed by Captain Hook’s “disquieting reflection” as he 
ponders and envies Peter Pan’s perfect good form: Hook wonders, is it not “bad form to think 
about good form?” Good form signifies the consummate self-discipline of a gentleman, and yet it 
also calls for total unselfconsciousness. Hook’s “vitals were tortured by this problem. It was a 
claw within him sharper than the iron one” (117). Hook blames Peter for the loss of his hand, 
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which has been replaced by the iron claw, but Hook’s deeper grievance against the eternal boy is 
that Peter’s flawless good form relentlessly reminds Hook of his own bad form, and thinking 
about good form (or the lack thereof) guarantees that Hook will never achieve good form. For it 
is, indeed, bad form to think about good form. 
The apotheosis of good form is having it but not knowing that you have it—like Peter 
Pan, who does “not know in the least who or what he was, which is the very pinnacle of good 
form” (130). Thus Hook cannot have it precisely because he gives it so much thought. Self-
conscious consideration of one’s relation to good form is the enemy of good form. One cannot be 
self-conscious and be in good form. But good form is also an accomplishment, something to 
achieve, something to strive toward as an aspiring gentleman. It is a public school boy’s 
crowning laurel, and it demands both perfect behavior and perfect unselfconsciousness. Though 
good form was an ideal not only for public school boys—girls, women, and men all could and 
did strive for a version of it—the British public school was the site at which its demands were the 
most strenuous, and where, therefore, the incredible burden on the individual engendered by this 
paradoxical code of being and belonging can be most vividly witnessed. It is no accident, I 
suggest, that a system of self-regulation requiring paradoxical unselfconsciousness found its 
most intense expression in an institution for the education of middle-class children.  
The concept of good form emerges in the late-Victorian period following a time during 
which the public schools were reformed to serve middle-class needs, and the masculine ideal 
aimed at by public school boys shifted from the profligate aristocratic male to the respectable, 
self-disciplined gentleman.  As Edward Mack recounts in his history of British public schools, in 
1861 Parliament appointed the Public School Commission in response to a widespread call for 
reform in Britain’s nine premiere public schools, including Eton and Harrow.252 In 1864 the 
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commission made their recommendations, many of which were implemented. This government 
intervention into the public schools—which until the 1860s had been almost entirely self-
regulated—was unprecedented, and marked the future of the institution in two ways: first, the 
public schools, from this time on, gradually came to be thought of not merely as schools but as 
the forges of British character, producing and produced by an essential Britishness; second, the 
rolls of the public schools, formerly filled with the names of English aristocrats’ sons, began to 
swell with the less-illustrious but increasingly powerful names of the middle classes. The 
purpose of the public schools shifted from providing a space for barons’ sons to hobnob with 
their kind while getting a cursory education in ancient Greek, to turning out respectable middle-
class British gentlemen. Reformists such as Sir John T. Coleridge ushered the public school into 
a new era in which the institution was intended to foster “that assemblage of qualities which, 
combined with integrity and goodness, constitute the accomplished gentleman.”253 And the code 
of the gentleman—always a mess of contradictions and anxious, vague, and shifting demands on 
character—was encapsulated in the tellingly unspecific phrase “good form.”254  
The gentleman is largely a middle-class construction; the achievement of gentleman 
status, ironically, may have proven especially difficult for middle-class men. As James Fitzjames 
Stephen points out in an 1862 article in Cornhill Magazine, the definitive characteristic of the 
English gentleman is “plain, downright, frank simplicity,”255 and while simplicity (especially of 
speech) is, according to Stephen, native to both the upper and lower classes, the middle class 
lacks simplicity. Stephen offers as an example the commercial clerk, who “thinks about himself, 
and constantly tries to talk fine.”256 Thinking about himself, the clerk proves self-conscious 
rather than simple, and thus falls short of the demands of gentlemanliness. Anne Mozley’s 1861 
Blackwood’s article “On Manners” likewise defines the gentleman as entirely unselfconscious; to 
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have “a good manner”—a phraseology that suggests an evolution towards the discourse of good 
form—is to “be one's self everywhere; everywhere at home—amongst ladies, amongst public 
men, amongst the learned, the fashionable, the idle, the precise; to be neither obtrusive, nor shy, 
nor uncomfortable; to be right without thinking of it, as a matter of course, because it is 
ourself.”257 Charles Kingsley described the great friend of his youth, Charles Mansfield, as the 
most perfect gentleman he had ever met, a man whose secret was the at once simple but not 
easily mastered art of “merely never thinking about himself,” a secret he “attained by not trying 
to attain it.”258 For middle-class Victorian men, to try consciously to achieve a good manner is to 
risk falling on the wrong side of a tricky performance of personality and be dismissed as an 
affected failure, a false gentleman.  
In the discourse on the gentleman, defined and identifiable by his good form, self-
conscious striving is repeatedly linked with failure, and success requires that one be “right 
without thinking of it.” And yet the popularity of books like Samuel Smiles259’s Self-Help (1859) 
demonstrates just how many British men were striving to reach the status of gentleman, even 
resorting to the self-conscious studying of lessons in a conduct manual to guide them in their 
endeavor. What an impossible situation they found themselves in, wherein to be seen to be trying 
is already to have failed. It is this masculine double-bind that James Eli Adams theorizes so 
deftly in Dandies and Desert Saints. As Adams articulates, Victorian masculinity implicated men 
in a paradox: the masculine man defines himself through a self-discipline that he opposes to the 
spectacle of femininity or aristocratic manhood, but he must also perform that self-discipline for 
the world, thus ultimately making a spectacle of his self-regulation. The paradox of good form 
overlaps with the paradox of Victorian masculinity as explored by Adams, but the two are not 
identical. For both good form and Victorian masculinity the peril of self-conscious theatricality 
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looms large. Good form, however, at least in its public school incarnation, incorporates an added 
layer of anxiety because it applies to children—specifically to boys, who, since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, have been increasingly imagined to be naturally, simply unselfconscious. 
For a public school boy, then, to be self-conscious is to be triply in bad form: at once an 
effeminate milksop, an ungentlemanly cad, and an unnatural child. 
In this chapter, I will trace some of the sources of public school good form in the 
literature consumed by the middle-class boys who swelled the ranks of the public schools. In the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, the resurgence of the cult of chivalry and the growth of 
English nationalism meant that tales of ancient Britons such as King Arthur and Robin Hood, 
disseminated to boys in a myriad of publications, provided masculine models of gentlemanliness. 
As I will demonstrate, these models promoted unselfconsciousness as a masculine virtue; yet the 
very nostalgia for another age—and the very transformation of these figures of myth, oral 
narrative, and poetry into novelistic characters—suggests a deeply self-conscious undertaking on 
the behalf of authors. Furthermore, the call for boys to model their selfhood on these novelized 
lives of heroes while maintaining perfect unselfconsciousness constitutes a perhaps impossible 
psychic demand. I will explore a similar dynamic at work in public school novels, which seek to 
teach readers how to achieve good form while simultaneously seething with a self-conscious 
awareness that the very endeavor of teaching good form might be antithetical to good form. In 
examining a number of popular public school novels beginning with Tom Brown’s Schooldays 
(1857) and ending with The Loom of Youth (1917), I will show that the genre itself grows 
increasingly self-conscious as unselfconsciousness becomes an increasingly stringent demand 
made by the code of good form. Finally, I will explore the trope of the schoolboy burn-out in 
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order to determine how much this public school type is a victim and/or indictment of the 
demands of unselfconscious good form. 
5.1 THE CULT OF CHIVALRY AND BOYS’ LITERATURE 
The nineteenth-century revival of chivalry exerted an enormous influence on constructions of the 
gentleman and the public schoolboy. In 1790 Edmund Burke had pronounced the age of chivalry 
dead, but even then, as Mark Girouard notes, chivalry’s star was rising once more in British 
culture, Benjamin West having painted his portrait of Edward III and the Black Prince in 
1788.260 Enlightenment interest in historical documents and artifacts had helped bring chivalry 
back into favor along with the Middle Ages. In addition, the French Revolution induced a 
measure of nostalgia for feudalism in English aristocrats, gentlemen, and clergy. Walter Scott 
updated chivalry for the nineteenth century by creating a fusion of the knightly virtues and 
middle-class ideals. His “Essay on Chivalry,” first published in the Encyclopedia Britannica of 
1818, traces a line of descent from the knight-errant of old to the modern gentleman, claiming 
that “from the wild and overstrained courtesies of Chivalry has been derived our present system 
of manners.”261  
While Scott mixed praise for certain aspects of chivalry—courtly love, manly devotion to 
ideals—with censure for the excesses of its historical practitioners, Kenelm Digby registered a 
less qualified endorsement of chivalry for the modern world in The Broad Stone of Honour, or, 
Rules for the Gentlemen of England (1822). As the second half of his title suggests, Digby 
championed the study of chivalry for youths who wished to become gentlemen, and his odd 
volume, which mixes retellings of tales of chivalry from history and myth with Digby’s own 
130 
impassioned dilations on knightliness, had a surprisingly wide audience for a work of such manic 
enthusiasm and perplexing eccentricity. The Broad Stone of Honour had a significant influence 
on the nineteenth-century cult of chivalry, and found some surprising devotees among writers of 
significant influence in their own right. For example, Girouard notes that William Wordsworth 
dedicated a poem to Digby262, and John Ruskin wrote approvingly of him in Modern Painters, 
saying that it was from Digby that he “first learned to love nobleness.”263 
Digby’s characterizations of chivalry contributed to the evolving notion that to be a 
gentleman one should be unselfconscious. He calls for “simplicity…imagination and innocence” 
over scrupulous intellectualism. This call evokes not only descriptions of the ideal gentleman but 
also prescriptions for proper childhood reading practices throughout much of the century, such as 
the edict pronounced by both Coleridge and Wordsworth that children read not realism but 
fantasy, guaranteed to take the child out of himself, thus preserving unselfconsciousness.264 
Indeed Digby yokes together chivalry and childhood, claiming that, as long as the two survive, 
“imagination and piety shall not have spread their holy wings totally to fly the earth.”265 In 
contrast, Digby assures readers that  “scrupulous anatomy of the mind” has a “direct tendency to 
the debasement of our nature.”266 Anatomizing of one’s mind will be considered antithetical to 
both chivalric gentlemanliness and childhood in the nineteenth century, and the good form of the 
schoolboy is the site where those constructs—both defined in opposition to self-consciousness 
and self-analysis—intersect. Digby articulates as much when he argues that the system of 
education under chivalry carries on in the system of boy-rule in public schools. Almost 100 years 
later, Henry Newbolt, the poet and public school enthusiast, echoes Digby when he proclaims 
that the “old method of training the young squires to knighthood produced our public school 
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system.”267 Newbolt’s expansive “our” makes the public schools national property, and the 
chivalric good form of schoolboys a national asset. 
How did boys learn the values of chivalry? In part they learned from the nineteenth-
century explosion of books published for children and featuring chivalric heroes. Knights filled 
the pages of children’s literature, with figures like the Black Prince and the Chevalier Bayard 
reinterpreted for the nursery library. Arthuriana, after having fallen out of favor under the sway 
of eighteenth-century rationalism, made a triumphant return to the British imaginary, 
representing for the Victorians and Edwardians a moral manliness that had much more to do with 
their own needs and tastes than with any possible historical Arthur—who would have been, if 
anything, a bloody conqueror.268 As Inga Bryden comments in Reinventing King Arthur, “the 
Arthurian type of manliness was above all that of the chivalric gentleman.”269 Likewise Robin 
Hood gained renewed popularity and got a makeover for a new century270; in place of the bawdy, 
violent trickster of an older tradition, nineteenth-century children’s books offer a gentlemanly, 
high-minded Robin Hood—usually identified as a dispossessed earl271—fit to model masculinity 
to middle class boys.  
As a testament to the importance of these heroes of chivalry as models for schoolboys, 
the frame story of Stephen Percy’s Robin Hood and His Merry Foresters (1841) sets the book up 
as a tale being told by a boy narrator to another boy (and, as the tale goes on, more and more 
boys who gather to listen), while they both sit under a sycamore outside their boarding school. 
The tale proceeds as the narrator recalls and recounts all that he knows of Robin Hood from his 
reading of ballads.272 The first chapter is titled “Early School Days,” though the only “school” 
Robin attends is the greenwood school—Nature is his only tutor. Presumably, then, the school 
days referred to in the chapter title are those of the narrator, who is telling his tale at school. The 
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other chapter titles indicate which meeting of the teller and his listener this is (“Our Second 
Meeting”) with the exception of one that names a special occasion for the tale’s continuation 
determined by the school calendar (“Our Half-Holiday”). The tales of greenwood chivalry are 
thus closely tied to the world of school, drawing together the schoolboy and Robin Hood as his 
model. Percy’s Robin Hood initiates a tradition linking Robin Hood to the nineteenth-century 
schoolboy; Robin Hood becomes less a hero of the downtrodden and more a figure of boyhood 
character education. 
George Manville Fenn’s Young Robin Hood (1899) envisions the benefits of Robin 
Hood’s example for boys by placing its boy protagonist—significantly also named Robin—
directly under the tutelage of the knight of the greenwood.273 The book begins with Young 
Robin, the son of the Sherriff of Nottingham, being teased by his servant about his childish 
dependence on the protection of others as they ride through the bandit-ridden forest. The convoy 
indeed comes under attack by robbers—Robin Hood’s merry men—and in the fray Robin gets 
thrown from the horse. When he regains consciousness, the reader receives another clue that 
young Robin is in need of some reformation of character: Robin “could think of nothing but 
himself, his aching head, and his scratches, some of which were bleeding” (11). That self-
absorption, along with his previous threats to report his servant’s insolence to his aunt, marks 
young Robin as something of a milksop, that tale-bearing, self-conscious, timid figure of 
schoolboy disdain. His position as milksop is only confirmed when he is humiliatingly robbed of 
his fine clothes by a swineherd. 
Young Robin quickly falls in with Robin Hood, and the courteous outlaw immediately 
understands who the boy is and asks after his missing clothes. When Young Robin relates the 
swineherd’s theft, Robin Hood demands that the thief be punished, but also asks of Young 
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Robin: “Why did you let him [rob you]? Why didn’t you fight for your clothes like a man?” (22). 
Young Robin explains that the swineherd had the advantage of size, and Robin Hood concedes 
“that makes all the difference,” but the matter of Young Robin’s manliness has been raised 
nonetheless (22). The remainder of the book is devoted to his education into true, noble 
manliness under the care of Robin Hood and his men, an education that is imparted indirectly 
onto the presumed boy reader. At first both Maid Marian and Little John treat Young Robin like 
a baby: Marian feeds him milk and bread, the repast of the nursery, and Little John says Robin’s 
fingers are “like babies’ fingers” (28). But Little John assures Young Robin that a “lad who tries 
hard can do nearly anything,” and promises him that “when you can hit anything you shoot at 
you’ll be half a man” (47). Young Robin learns to fight with the quarterstaff too, and he’s a 
thorough enough forester and fighter halfway through the book that he manages to tame a fawn 
and thrash the swineherd who shamed him previously. 
When the Sheriff locates his son and requests his return, Robin Hood sends word that the 
Sheriff must fetch the boy himself, setting the scene for Young Robin to prove his education has 
fully erased all traces of the milksop. Robin Hood’s men bring the Sheriff into the outlaw camp 
bound and blindfolded, and young Robin draws his dagger and demands to know who has dared 
to do this to his father. He frees his father, and the outlaws look on tenderly as father and son 
embrace. The Sheriff approves of his “bigger and stronger” son (69). When the boy says 
goodbye to his forest friends, he speaks “manfully,” his sojourn among outlaws having 
masculinized him (70). With Robin Hood as erstwhile father, the boy has made considerable 
strides towards gentlemanliness. Nineteenth-century tales of chivalry for children promised the 
same transformation from potential milksop to gentleman to their boy readers. 
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Though Robin and the other chivalric heroes of children’s literature had their manners 
updated to those of the Victorian gentleman, nineteenth-century versions of their tales do not 
generally go so far as to transform the heroes into the psychologized protagonists of the  
nineteenth-century novel. In fact, Howard Pyle’s immensely popular retellings of the King 
Arthur and Robin Hood legends describe heroes so without depth that they seem to have lived 
before self-consciousness was invented. In The Merry Adventures of Robin Hood (1883), Pyle’s 
protagonist is as two-dimensional as his gorgeous illustrations, the prose devoid of the kinds of 
conventions the nineteenth-century perfected for creating a sense of interiority in narrative: 
interior monologue, free indirect discourse, and the like. Pyle gives little or no attention to 
Robin’s motives, intentions, thoughts, feelings, or general mental life. His Robin, who 
inaugurates the popularity of the figure in America and secures the hero’s move from penny 
weeklies to respectable children’s literature, is simply a merry, completely unselfconscious 
medieval rambler. 
The Robin Hoods of the most widely read nineteenth-century renderings are remarkable 
for being described as completely transparent, readily legible surfaces without interiority. Pierce 
Egan, whose version of the Robin Hood legend appeared in penny weekly parts from autumn 
1839 to summer 1840, offers Robin as an “honest, open-hearted lad” who wears his heart on his 
doublet sleeve and whose hazel eyes convey a “clearness…which would tell the beholder the 
tenor of the thought passing in their possessor’s mind ere his lips could give it utterance.”274 Like 
Peter Pan, who does “not know in the least who or what he was, which is the very pinnacle of 
good form,” Egan’s Robin Hood declares merrily “I do not know who I am,”275 a cheerful 
avowal of unselfconsciousness that, by the terms of the Victorian code of the gentleman, proves 
his gentility. John Marsh’s preface to his 1865 The Life and Adventures of Robin Hood makes a 
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point of remarking that “no attempt has been made to develop the character of the principal 
actors,” implying that a lack of development preserves the greatest virtues of Robin Hood and his 
merry men.276 In fact, by referring to them as “actors” rather than “characters” or “protagonists,” 
Marsh suggests that Robin Hood belongs more to the subjectivity-less world of pantomime 
theater than to the realm of the novel, with its demand for deep subjectivity in and subtle 
development of its characters. In their very two-dimensionality the chivalric heroes of 
nineteenth-century children’s literature exemplify the unselfconsciousness of the gentleman’s 
good form. 
Yet these books seem to be extraordinarily self-conscious exercises in their nostalgic 
exhumation of these legendary lives, in their bringing up-to-date of medieval or pre-medieval 
characters to suit the moral tastes of the nineteenth century, and in their yearning for a simpler 
and more masculine past. The worth of Robin and Arthur as exemplary gentlemen depends on a 
self-conscious comparison of the perceived lack of satisfactory masculine models in the present 
with the yearned-for chivalry of the past. The entire endeavor of offering up unselfconscious 
heroes from the past, then, implicates the authors of these tales of chivalry for children in a 
counter-logic of self-consciousness. And what of the child readers? Do these tales not ask the 
reader to assess his own character, and the character of his age, in relation to what he reads? Can 
that process be anything but self-conscious? Is it likely that a child reader may strive to live up to 
the model of unselfconsciousness he reads about without being self-conscious about his progress 
(or lack thereof) toward the ideal? For a partial answer, we might look to Tom Sawyer. Though 
rooted in a European past, the cult of chivalry in the nineteenth century was a transatlantic 
phenomenon. In fact, many of the volumes of chivalric tales in the Victorian nursery would have 
been imports from America, including the immensely popular books of Howard Pyle. Tales of 
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Arthur and Robin Hood circulated widely among American children too, even before Pyle’s 
remarkable volumes, which is why Mark Twain gives us Tom Sawyer and Joe Harper playing 
Robin Hood in the woods of St. Petersburg, Missouri. Like all of Tom’s games, the Robin Hood 
game is dominated by Tom’s literary knowledge; he insists that Joe do the dialogue in their play-
acting “by the book.”277 Tom’s play is not spontaneous and unconscious (in other words, that is, 
up to the Romantic ideal), but rather supremely self-conscious, and it is so because he reads—
and specifically, here, because he reads tales of chivalry, tales that promulgated a fully 
transatlantic craze by 1876.278 
The spread of the Boy Scouts through both Britain and the United States further attests to 
the transatlanticism of the cult of chivalry. Robert Baden-Powell infused his organization with a 
curious combination of the American and the British. His Scouting For Boys (1908) teaches 
fundamentals of woodcraft and warcraft gleaned from American “Red Indians” and 
frontiersmen, but also assures boys that the first Scouts were the knights of old, and urges boys 
to fight, like St. George, against “everything evil and unclean”: “In the old days the Knights were 
the real Scouts and their rules were very much like the Scout Law which we have now…You 
Scouts cannot do better than follow the example of the Knights.”279 In a chapter devoted to the 
“Chivalry of the Knights,” Baden-Powell’s “Hints to Instructors” includes his urgent call to 
revive in the boys “some of the rules of the knights of old, which did so much for the moral tone 
of our race.”280 Once again, the key to that chivalric moral tone is the self-discipline of the 
gentleman; the “Hints” that begin by invoking the rules of the knights ends by declaring that 
“Our effort is not so much to discipline the boys as to teach them to discipline themselves.”281 
Part of that self-discipline involves Baden-Powell’s maxim that boys be constantly vigilant and 
prepare for all contingencies. As Troy Boone observes, this “thorough self-regulation” aligns the 
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Scout with “middle class ‘character,” suggesting that chivalry, gentlemanliness, and Scouthood 
all require an intense self-consciousness.282 And yet elsewhere in Scouting Baden-Powell 
recommends that the young Scouts perform “African” chants and dances, exercises he deems 
valuable precisely as a “corrective of self-consciousness.”283 The Scout, descended from the 
knight of old, must somehow be both self-disciplined and unselfconscious. This paradoxical 
demand structures both the code of chivalry and the code of Boy Scout—and the code of the 
public schoolboy. 
Henry Newbolt called in 1917 for a “widening of the chivalric fellowship”284 to all 
classes, and praised Baden-Powell for bringing lower class boys into the Scouts, calling the 
institution a “school for Happy Warriors,”285 his phrase evoking William Wordsworth’s poem on 
the ideal man at arms. Unsurprisingly, the author of “Vitaï Lampada”—the poem that famously 
implored the schoolboy to “Play up! play up! and play the game!” on both the cricket field and 
the field of battle (as the former has its essence in preparation for the latter)—has even higher 
praise for the public schools. Newbolt declares that schoolboys have collectively kept alive the 
tradition of chivalry so that it might be imparted to new generations and new institutions like the 
Boy Scouts. In general the nineteenth century saw an increasingly strong tie between the public 
schools and chivalry in the British imagination. As Girouard notes, many of the prizes awarded 
at public schools were volumes of chivalric tales, and the decorations of the grounds and 
buildings often imaged chivalry.286 He also points out that Thomas Hughes’s Tom Brown’s 
Schooldays (1857) repeatedly employs chivalric conventions. The first chapter of Book One 
begins with an illuminated letter that invokes St. George; it depicts a small boy (presumably 
Tom) dressed up as a knight, wrangling another child disguised as a dragon. The English 
countryside of Tom’s youth is layered in legends that connect it to St. George (and other English 
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heroes like Alfred the Great and Sir Walter Scott). According to Girouard, the many St. Georges 
depicted in public school chapels always seem to have the faces of public schoolboys.287 The 
schoolboy and the knight were so strongly linked that they shared a face. The code of chivalry 
demanded unselfconscious gentility, but the constant, self-consciously nostalgic appeals to the 
past that surrounded the schoolboy must have made it difficult to be knightly without thinking 
about being knightly—to be in good form. 
And indeed, the public school story—from the mid-nineteenth-century Tom Brown’s 
Schooldays to Alec Waugh’s early-twentieth-century The Loom of Youth (1917)—traces an 
increasing concern about self-consciousness in schoolboys, as the genre itself grows more self-
conscious about its aims and its possible failures. How can good form be learned and be 
unselfconscious? How can the literature of school life teach boys good form without making 
them think about good form (which is bad form)? Do not the myriad of rules that fall under the 
umbrella of good form—concerning dress, proper address, even where to walk and when to 
talk—require a constant self-regulation (like the constant vigilance of the Boy Scouts) that 
virtually precludes unselfconsciousness (which is the essence of good form)? One of the 
cleverest mobilizations of this paradox in the genre is writers’ repeated use of a storyline in 
which a boy’s good form is mistaken for bad form, and the plot culminates with his eventual, 
triumphant vindication—a paradigm that recalls the late-eighteenth-century warnings, discussed 
in Chapter One, that simplicity might be mistaken for affectation, and vice versa. The increasing 
centrality of this plot to school stories is one indicator of the genre’s growing anxiety about the 
problem of good form, an anxiety that participates in a wider cultural quandary about its 
paradoxical nature. 
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5.2 THE SCHOOL STORY AND GOOD FORM 
The phrase “good form” does not appear in Tom Brown’s Schooldays, but Tom’s first interaction 
with a Rugby boy consists of East, Tom’s future study mate, correcting Tom’s choice of 
headwear—“we never wear caps here”—and explaining that “a great deal depends on how a 
fellow cuts up at first. If he’s got nothing odd about him, and answers straightforward, and holds 
his head up, he gets on” (90, 91).288 The business about the hat involves a superficial brand of 
good form—abiding by the correct customs and manners—but the latter advice gets at the heart 
of the more philosophical nature of good form, which combines conventionality of thought, even 
conventionality of being, straightforwardness, and an easy unselfconsciousness about that 
conventionality. Tom is not entirely unselfconscious at his arrival, for he is “not a little anxious 
to show his friend that although a new boy he was no milksop” (97). A truly straightforward boy 
would unthinkingly demonstrate his lack of milksoppery through naturally ideal behavior. Tom’s 
anxiety to prove he is not a milksop shows the gap between the ideal of good form and the 
measures that must be taken to appear to embody that ideal. Given that Tom is the protagonist, 
his anxiety and striving amount to an admission on the part of Hughes that good form must be 
sought. When he writes that one must “never try to be popular,” then, we should interpret him to 
mean that one must never appear to try to be popular (167-8). Total unselfconsciousness creates 
a boy like Diggs, a “queer fellow” who doesn’t display good form or bad form so much as a total 
lack of form, and is thus a sort of outcast who remains indifferent to the coolness with which the 
others treat him (175). In East’s terms, he’s got something odd about him. 
Hughes’s novel, frequently cited as inaugurating the popularity of the school story genre, 
combines an earlier ethic requiring children to engage in pious self-reflection in order to attain 
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salvation (see Chapter One) with an emerging sense that a certain kind of self-consciousness is 
an unfortunate necessity in the pursuit of good form. That Tom Brown’s Schooldays has been 
remembered by readers most often as an ideal portrait of straightforward, unselfconscious, 
natural boyhood indicates a perhaps willful misreading. In the later nineteenth century, and on 
into the twentieth, readers wanted a representation of the perfect good form of the schoolboy, 
and they made Tom Brown’s Schooldays into that representation. But in truth rather than 
promoting the unthinking right-ness of good form that became the public school ideal later in the 
century, Hughes preaches that boys must leave behind the thoughtlessness that he, as an inheritor 
of some Romantic ideals of childhood, believes is natural to boyhood—boys “hate thinking,” the 
narrator declares (168)—and embrace the thoughtful contemplation of duty that Hughes learned 
as a primary virtue under Rugby’s famous headmaster and reformer, Dr. Arnold. 
Hughes acknowledges that the first entrance into self-conscious Arnoldian piety can be 
unpleasant: “For a short time after a boy has taken up such a life as Arnold would have urged 
upon him, he has a hard time of it. He finds his judgment often at fault, his body and intellect 
running away with him into all sorts of pitfalls, and himself coming down with a crash” (xliii). 
The boy here has fractured into a collection of parts—judgment, body, intellect—that are 
alienated from one another by self-conscious striving towards a new ideal. Though the Arnoldian 
boy at this point may get labeled a “prig” by outsiders, Hughes insists that he is “one of the 
humblest and truest and most childlike” of the criticizer’s acquaintance (xliii). And in time, 
Hughes promises, “when the ‘thoughtful life’ has become habitual to him,” it will fit him “as 
easily as his skin” (xliii). The self-consciousness will have worked a new magic and reintegrated 
the body, mind, and soul of the Arnoldian boy. Though Tom begins his time at Rugby with 
“thoughtlessness enough to sink a three-decker” ship (143), Arnold will implant a new, 
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thoughtful nature in Tom, principally through the device of Arthur, the pious boy in need of 
protection. In the words of the narrator, Arthur teaches Tom “the value of having an object in his 
life, something that drew him out of himself” (236). The last sentence is curious, because in fact 
Arthur eventually leads Tom to a painful self-scrutiny, in which Tom must question and reject 
many behaviors that he had previously accepted in himself as natural, such as cribbing and 
antagonizing the masters. When Tom finally finds out that the Doctor set him up with Arthur in 
order to install “manliness and thoughtfulness” (365) in him, Tom becomes a full-blown hero-
worshipper, “who would have satisfied the soul of Thomas Carlyle himself” (367). It is through 
this Carlylean hero-worship, Hughes believes, that a boy must come to “the worship of Him who 
is the King and Lord of heroes” (376). If anything it is his hero-worship of Arnold, not his 
friendship with Arthur, that draws Tom “out of himself.” 
The novel, then, reflects a continuing belief in the value of self-reflection in children, but 
it also champions certain kinds of unselfconsciousness. The best and brightest of the village boys 
with whom Tom plays before his Rugby days is Harry Winburn, who is praised for his “bright 
unconsciousness” (59). Even the narrator seems to long for unselfconsciousness. Chapter Seven 
of Part One begins with a meditation on the joys of a half-waking state, “the dreamy delicious 
state in which one lies, half asleep, half awake, while consciousness begins to return” (135). 
These joys are, the narrator laments, never long-lasting: “the stupid, obtrusive, wakeful entity 
which we call ‘I,’” forces itself back to “take possession of us down to our very toes” (136). Self-
consciousness here is a demonic presence violating not only the mind but also the body, which is 
inexorably filled to the toes with it. Unselfconsciousness, in contrast, carries with it a sort of 
religious grace. For example, Arthur’s parents succeed in their Christian mission precisely 
because they go about it so unselfconsciously: “They didn’t feel that they were doing anything 
142 
out of the common way, and so were perfectly natural, and had none of that condescension or 
consciousness of manner which so outrages the independent poor” (240). Likewise at school 
Arthur sets an example of piety for the other boys but does so “unconsciously to himself, and 
without the least attempt at proselytizing” (242). However, though Arthur might be 
unselfconscious about his influence over the other boys, he remains always more thoughtful than 
Tom, and thus “less of a boy” (351).  
Tom Brown’s Schooldays was a transitional work between older and emerging views on 
childhood self-consciousness, and, though it clearly looks forward to the unselfconscious ideal of 
good form that would dominate the public schools later, it still urges boys to engage in the kind 
of deeply reflective self-conscious piety that would later seem antithetical to good form. Yet Tom 
Brown’s Schooldays was embraced by generations of readers because, despite Hughes’s earnest 
Arnold-inspired preaching, the author filled much of the book with fairly unreflective scenes of 
the corporal and corporeal hijinks of Tom and his more high-spirited friends. Indeed, reviewers 
would repeatedly refer to the healthy, vigorous, “unconscious” boyhood of Hughes’s novel as an 
antidote to the sickly self-consciousness of Frederic Farrar’s public school novel Eric: or, Little 
by Little (1858) despite the fact that one of the faults that Farrar sought to warn readers against 
was, in fact, excessive self-consciousness. 
Even before he enters Roslyn School Eric’s problem is that he has “pride to a fault”: “he 
knew well that few of his fellows had gifts like his, either of mind or person, and his fair face 
often showed a clear impression of his own superiority.”289 The “clear impression of his own 
superiority” marks Eric as a particular public school type, the prig—“one who is conscious of his 
own excellence and satisfied with it,” as a 1906 article tracing the tradition of “School Tales” 
defines it.290 It is Eric’s self-conscious pride that opens him up to being “spoilt and ruined” as his 
143 
cousin and tutor Fanny fears school will make him.291 Unlike Tom Brown, who literally dives 
into school life thoughtlessly by jumping into a football match, Eric on his first day awkwardly 
makes his way into a classroom and is “painfully conscious that all the boys were looking at 
him.”292 Evidencing the fact that this initial moment of self-consciousness forebodes evil, the 
next time Eric is described as “painfully conscious” of the eyes of his schoolmates on him he is 
awaiting his sentence after having been caught drinking, an episode that very nearly leads to 
expulsion, the ultimate disgrace for a schoolboy.293 Though he escapes expulsion, Eric does fall 
into ruin and eventually an early death, a fall precipitated first and foremost by an excessive self-
consciousness. 
Given that such a dire warning against self-consciousness seems to be in line with the 
ever-increasing nineteenth-century endorsement of unselfconscious good form for public 
schoolboys, why have so many critics unfavorably compared Eric to Hughes’s tale, with all of its 
Arnoldian self-reflection? Edward Mack, like many before him, declares Tom Brown’s 
Schooldays to be "pervaded by the sunlight of happy, irresponsible boyhood"294; Farrar's Eric 
and St. Winifred’s, or, The World of School (1862) strike him as "rather the nightmare emanation 
of some morbid, introverted brain."295 The problem seems to be that Farrar, in writing about the 
dangers of self-consciousness, strikes his critics as introverted, as thinking too much about 
thinking, and, more perilously, encouraging child readers to think too much about thinking. 
Certainly the reviewer for the Saturday Review believed as much, and is worth quoting at length: 
[S]uch a book as Eric appears to us eminently calculated to involve a nervous and 
conscientious lad in all sorts of useless and injurious speculations. Am I like Eric? 
Am I like Wildney? Am I like Owen? Am I like Montagu? Have I, by allowing an 
improper joke to pass without rebuke, ruined myself for time and eternity? Did 
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“the scale of” my “destiny hang on a single word?” And if so, did it go the wrong 
way? and if not, why not, and how otherwise? These speculations are most 
unhealthy. A boy—or a man either—may know and may think a great deal to 
much about himself….He is as likely to do right if he acts upon the simplest 
principle as if he had read a ton of novels about it; and he is rather more likely to 
feel the force of the principle if he is half-unconscious of its existence than if he 
has all the morbid anatomy of the sins produced by its neglect at his fingers’ 
end.296 
Farrar, the reviewer declares, invites too much self-contemplation on the part of his child 
readers. The reviewer’s concern that the “lad” reading will compulsively compare himself to the 
child characters—either models of righteousness or models of sinfulness—recalls Coleridge’s 
warnings against children’s books about “Master Billy and Miss Ann,” which he deems 
“ridiculous and extremely hurtful” in their tendency to encourage self-conscious comparison on 
the part of child readers.297 Yet the reviewer does not condemn all novels about school as ruining 
the unconscious, simple rightness of the schoolboy; once again, Tom Brown’s Schooldays is 
praised as being full of “animal life and spirit.”298 
 As public school culture grew more and more averse to any evidence of self-
consciousness in boys, and as reviewers of children’s books grew increasingly censorious of 
children’s books that might encourage self-consciousness in its child readers, authors of school 
stories had to attempt to represent and teach good form without appearing to think to much about 
it, or seeming to ask readers to think too much about it. Yet writers could hardly represent school 
life accurately without acknowledging the self-consciousness endemic to school culture. For the 
new boy, especially, entrance into school meant a constant awareness that there were a hopeless 
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number of arbitrary rules of good form specific to his school that no one would tell him about 
unless they were rebuking him for breaking them. And so school stories traditionally begin with 
bad form—Tom wearing the wrong hat—and the protagonist’s intense self-consciousness about 
his bad form: Peter, of The Harrovians (1913), grows “acutely self-conscious” when unsure 
where to walk on the street in relation to a few “bloods” strolling down the middle part of the 
street Harrow reserved for the most elevated schoolboys. 
 As if attempting to appease critics who found Eric too self-conscious, Farrar made 
Walter, the protagonist of St. Winifred’s, a complete natural at unselfconscious good form. 
Walter begins school a perfect boy of thirteen, “hardy, modest, truthful, unselfish, and obedient,” 
and emphatically not “some youthful prodig[y].”299 He is, as good form demands, popular 
without trying. When a dashing older boy, attractive but aloof and thus not as popular, asks 
Walter how he manages to make friends so easily, Walter answers, “I really don’t know; I never 
think about my own manner or anything else.”300 This specimen of natural good form, though, 
still did not satisfy many critics: the editors of Every Boy’s Magazine felt “bound to enter a 
protest against the general bearing of the book,” and the boys of Rudyard Kipling’s Stalky & Co. 
(1897) find it just as impossible to sell off an unwanted volume of St. Winifred’s as it is to unload 
an unwanted copy of Eric—both, tellingly, gifts from a maiden aunt. Perhaps the problem with 
Walter’s natural good form is that in its very perfection it invites boys to compare themselves, 
and their own self-conscious anxiety about good form, unfavorably to Walter’s ease. That critics 
object to both Eric and Walter—both excessive self-consciousness and perfect 
unselfconsciousness in the schoolboy—suggests that writers of school stories after Farrar did 
well to depict their protagonists as somewhere between abject failure and total perfection in the 
art of good form. 
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 In fact, the preponderance of school stories seem to represent the public school as places 
that teach good form and then, more crucially, teach boys to hide the traces of its attainment. 
Arnold Lunn, in The Harrovians, acknowledges that existing in a constant state of public display 
and keeping up the demands of good form is exhausting for his boy protagonist, Peter, for it is 
difficult to “walk to your place in Hall with an affectation of unconsciousness, while acutely self-
conscious, beneath the gaze of pitiless eyes” (236).301 Yet the experience of achieving good form 
without seeming to try, Lunn avows, teaches a valuable lesson: “If [Peter] had been privately 
educated he would have grown up stupidly self-conscious, without the power to anticipate or the 
composure to survive a snub” (239). Instead, after leaving Harrow Peter “earned the reputation 
of being indifferent to dislike and proof against the most violent of snubs. That a boy naturally 
sensitive should achieve such a reputation is a startling tribute to the moral value of a Public 
School training” (239). Harrow teaches Peter to make being a gentleman seem natural to anyone 
on the outside. He leaves school with his mask perfected, the traces of his having ever been a 
sensitive, self-conscious boy hidden from observation by the outside world. 
 Yet if this is the purpose of the public school—to create a gentleman, a paragon of good 
form, and then erase the traces of his creation—the school story endangers this purpose by 
representing that process to outsiders. The purpose of the school story is to act as a preparation 
for, supplement to, or replacement of the public school, but it troublingly puts what should be 
hidden away on display for all, including potential outsiders. The public schoolboy is unmasked 
by the genre that reveres and hopes to re-create him endlessly. From the genre’s beginnings 
critics questioned whether school stories could represent the ideals of the public schools without 
betraying them. James Fitzjames Stephen, reviewing Tom Brown’s Schooldays in 1858, 
discerned the influence of Charles Kingsley’s doctrine of muscular Christianity, with its 
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“admiration of simplicity and unconsciousness,” but wondered whether it was possible to 
promote those qualities through the writing of novels in which the boy hero is “intended to 
display the excellence of a simple massive understanding united with the almost unconscious 
instinct to do good” when it seems likely that reading such an account is “calculated to produce 
an artistic admiration for simplicity and vigour, rather than simplicity and vigour themselves”?302 
When reviews of Alec Waugh’s The Loom of Youth began appearing fifty years later in 1917, 
reviewers—now armed with a new, pseudo-psychological lexicon—were still warning that the 
school story’s open depiction of boyhood self-consciousness would harm readers, undermine the 
“development” of schoolboys, and bring unwanted scrutiny to the public schools by its exposure 
of what should remain hidden. Ex-headmaster of Eton Edward Lyttleton, reviewing Waugh’s 
controversial novel for The Contemporary Review, opines that while it is true that adolescence 
brings about the “sudden realisation of the self, the personality, the ego,” Nature demands a 
“rather dark veil” over this period of self-revelation, “as the dark processes of development go on 
most healthily if they are left to be secret and undisturbed.”303 By writing a novel with the 
intensely self-conscious boy Gordon at its center, Waugh has drawn aside the veil and 
endangered this dark process, usually protected by the walls of the school and the doctrine of 
good form, which forbids acknowledgement that self-knowledge even exists. 
School story writers’ awareness of this conundrum—that writing about the public school 
perhaps inevitably imperils the veiled development of gentlemen—along with the paradoxical 
fact that representing good form may always be bad form, created a genre that was self-
conscious about itself and its potential failures from its earliest instantiations, and only became 
more so as it grew in popularity. Tom Brown’s Schooldays displays its self-consciousness in its 
paratextual materials: its prefaces, which declare the novelist’s intentions and, later, clarify his 
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choices; its footnotes, particularly the famous one about the dangers of the “small friend system,” 
which appeals to the privileged knowledge shared by old Rugbeans304; and, finally, in its 
narrator’s frequent direct address of boy readers. Many school stories carried on the tradition of 
the self-conscious preface; in his preface to Talbot Baines Reed’s The Fifth Form at St. 
Dominic’s (1880), G. A. Hutchison self-consciously wards off criticisms that had been leveled at 
Farrar’s widely read and widely criticized school stories when he declares Reed’s boys “neither 
angels nor monstrosities,” and he promises that readers will find the book free of 
“affectation.”305 In other words, the preface self-consciously avers to the unselfconsciousness of 
the story. The dedicatory epistle of Lunn’s The Harrovians self-consciously attests to the book’s 
authenticity by noting that the story is based on Lunn’s own diaries, kept when he was a boy at 
Harrow. The authenticity of the story rests, then, on the self-conscious endeavor of journal-
keeping. 
 Another testament to the deep-seated self-consciousness of the school story genre is the 
frequency with which the boy characters refer back to earlier school stories. The boys of Stalky 
& Co. disdain the works of Farrar; there’s nothing worse, in their view, than “beastly 
Erickin’.”306 John Verney, protagonist of Horace Annesley Vachell’s The Hill (1905) arrives at 
Harrow with a store of literary knowledge with which to compare his entrance into school: “John 
knew his Tom Brown.”307 Waugh’s The Loom of Youth has its young protagonist reading and 
responding passionately to another school story, Lunn’s The Harrovians, which is itself largely a 
send-up of the clichés of school life as depicted in school stories. The first pages of The 
Harrovians find young Peter imagining how his first day at school will surely go. He expects 
that some “half-hostile critics” will ask him about his father, to which “he would retort with a 
version of the traditional reply, ‘My father was a gentleman; what was yours?’” (7). The question 
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never materializes. The “traditional sequence of events” following his “traditional reply” should 
lead to him knocking out a “lout” and thus proving his good form, but poor Peter never gets the 
chance, and is baffled by what to do next (7). By 1913 schoolboy literature has made schoolboy 
life a series of self-conscious clichés, but Peter’s first moments do not follow the pattern, and he 
feels “not in the least like a hero of school fiction” as everyone ignores him (8). He resorts to 
displaying his own good form by remonstrating a foreign boy for his dress—fiction having 
taught him that English boys are inherently superior—and is surprised to find himself soundly 
beaten, with the approval of all the other English boys: “His favorite school stories were 
beginning to lose their charm” (11). After three terms of acting disastrously based on cliché, 
Peter comes to the conclusion that school stories are “rotten piffle” (15). 
 The genre’s self-consciousness about self-consciousness is made productive in Lunn’s 
loving satire. But a far more common way that school stories exploited the contradictions of self-
consciousness was by mobilizing them as a plot structure. Tasked with representing good form 
without engendering self-consciousness about good form—which would be the pinnacle of bad 
form—school stories made their central dilemma into subject matter in the form of the “wrongly 
accused” plot, in which a boy’s good form is mistaken for bad form. This trope is a brilliant play 
on slippery nature of good form and the difficulties of representing it, but in its later 
instantiations it also enabled authors to mount a criticism of the possible failures of the public 
schools under the thrall of good form. 
 An early and fairly conventional example of the “wrongly accused” plot can be found in 
Reed’s 1880 school story The Fifth Form at St. Dominic’s. Originally published serially in the 
Boy’s Own Paper, the book is naturally episodic, and the “wrongly accused” plot constitutes 
only part of the story. In this segment of the story, Oliver of the fifth form finds his honor 
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questioned by the school when he refuses to return an unwarranted blow from a sixth form boy. 
His schoolmates’ disdain for him only deepens when Oliver chooses not to respond to an insult 
directed at him by the same boy at the next day’s cricket match. His refusal to do as the 
schoolboy code commands and answer these insults with a fight earns him a reputation as a 
coward. He seems to be in bad form. But in truth he has actually violated a lesser tenet of good 
form (fight for your honor) in order to observe a higher tenet of good form (control your temper). 
Good form also demands, unfortunately, that he cannot explain himself and defend his 
reputation. The first rule of good form is that you do not talk about good form. Oliver faces a 
dilemma analogous to that of the school story writer, who cannot write directly about good form 
without being in bad form. Oliver remains silent, and in disgrace, until his friends finally catch 
on and apologize for cutting him. The writer of school stories must also remain mostly silent 
about good form and hope that somehow his readers will catch on. 
  The “wrongly accused” plot is only one part of Reed’s book; it is the plot of P. G. 
Wodehouse’s 1907 tale of school life, The White Feather. In this case, a schoolboy called Sheen 
walks away from a scuffle between his fellows and a couple of townies and finds himself 
universally reviled as a result. In school parlance, he has shown the white feather. In order to win 
back his classmates’ approval, he secretly learns to box and then wins a big competition for the 
school. Like Oliver, Sheen confronts suspicion about his motives; unlike Oliver, he is forced into 
bad form by the need to explain himself. He has to appeal to a boy named Drummond in order to 
get permission to fight on the school’s behalf, explaining that he hopes to win honor for the 
school. Drummond feels that Sheen is "trying to ‘do the boy hero’”; Drummond’s thoughts on 
the matter underscore the self-consciousness of a genre that is always writing back to itself, but 
they also show that by 1907 it has grown nearly impossible to do the right thing without your 
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good form looking like self-consciousness or bad form:  
In the school library, which had been stocked during the dark ages, when that type 
of story was popular, there were numerous school stories in which the hero 
retrieved a rocky reputation by thrashing the bully, displaying in the encounter an 
intuitive but overwhelming skill with his fists. Drummond could not help feeling 
that Sheen must have been reading one of these stories. It was all very find and 
noble of him to want to show that he was No Coward After All, like Leo 
Cholmondeley or whatever his beastly name was, in The Lads of St Ethelberta’s 
or some such piffling book; but, thought Drummond in his cold, practical way, 
what about the house?308  
Because Wodehouse is writing a comedy, Sheen does indeed get a chance to recover his honor, 
but the very difficulty of his task—it takes him the entire book to succeed—evidences the 
growing burdens of the public school tradition of good form. 
 Those burdens become a matter of national importance in that, as Jonathan Gathorne-
Hardy attests, the ideals of the public school, including the ideal of unselfconscious good form, 
became national ideals: he writes that "the ideals, ideas, taboos and standards of the public 
schools—that thin wafer of privilege—had become national ones, they had sunk deep into the 
unconscious of the nation. This was especially so by the years 1900-1914."309 The fact, then, that 
good form could so easily be mistaken for bad form was not just a problem for boys at school; as 
the ideals of school life migrated outside of school, this misinterpretation threatened adherents of 
good form anywhere. A. E. W. Mason’s The Four Feathers (1902) issues a dark warning about 
the threats posed to the British Empire by the problems of good form.  
In Mason’s novel a young officer, Harry Feversham, abruptly and secretly resigns his 
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commission when he receives a telegram informing him that they will be called on to fight in the 
Mahdist War. As the novel makes clear, Feversham resigns not because he is afraid but because 
he fears he will be afraid. He acts in a manner that is perceived by others as cowardice, but 
paradoxically he does so for fear that he will prove a coward if he doesn’t resign—a fear that has 
haunted him from his childhood, when his father told dinner party stories about men who proved 
cowards, and when the faces of his forefathers seemed to stare down at him from their portraits 
in the great hall, seeing the cowardice he imagined to be hidden within his heart: “All my life I 
have been afraid that some day I should play the coward.”310 Even the word “play” suggests 
Feversham isn’t a true coward, but merely taking on the role of one. Unfortunately three of 
Feversham’s military friends discover his secret and send him three white feathers, to which his 
fiancé adds a fourth; Feversham spends the rest of the novel performing acts of suicidal courage 
in order to earn the right to return the feathers.  
What Feversham’s efforts to regain his reputation prove is that he is in fact an ideal 
soldier. He goes alone to Africa and performs the most dangerous missions, missions that no one 
else has been able to accomplish. And yet the Empire, represented by the senders of the feathers, 
rejected him. The book makes a powerful argument: imperial men are encouraged to embody an 
unselfconscious heroism, but the very best of those men are stricken by a self-conscious fear that 
they will not be able to perform. They cannot vocalize this fear—to do so would be 
humiliating—but they are rejected for it nonetheless. Yet that fear, that imaginative foresight, 
proves to make them the bravest of all once the action begins—as Feversham is once he throws 
himself in dangerous missions in Africa. Feversham “was a man who so shrank from the 
possibilities of battle, that he must actually send in his papers rather than confront them; yet 
when he stood in dire and immediate peril he felt no fear.”311 Feversham’s best friend eventually 
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comes to see his disgrace as a great blessing, a gift of self-knowledge: “It’s his opportunity to 
know himself at last. Up to the moment of disgrace his life has all been sham and illusion; the 
man he believed himself to be, he never was, and now at last he knows it.”312 Knowing it, 
Feversham becomes the hero that he fears he is incapable of being. Mason argues that the 
Empire suffers when it cultivates the unconscious heroism which is merely an adult version of 
schoolboy good form, and which is ultimately “sham and illusion”; the greatest heroes, like 
Feversham, are heroic because of their self-knowledge. Mason’s plot, like his title, echoes that of 
Wodehouse’s The White Feather, but Mason reveals that the stakes are raised when the 
paradoxes of good form follow men out of school and threaten the empire. 
Three years later, in 1905, novelist Reginald Turner issued a scathing denunciation of 
good form in Longman’s Magazine, arguing that it created “two national failings” among the 
middle classes: “suspicion” of all non-conformity in others, and “moral cowardice,” or the self-
conscious fear of doing anything remarkable because it might bring on the bad opinions of 
others. An aesthete of Oscar Wilde’s circle, Turner’s critique of the middle-class cult of good 
form, and its detriment upon the nation, did not gain much approval or even notice in its time. 
But following World War I and its horrors, the tides of opinion turned against the public school-
led cults of chivalry and good form, both of which were blamed for making British soldiers dull, 
idealistic, conformity-obsessed canon-fodder. The critiques of Mason and Turner begin to look 
prophetic in hindsight.  
5.3 THE MYTH OF THE SCHOOLBOY BURNOUT 
If these are the imagined stakes for Britain and its empire collectively, what are the stakes for the 
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individual exposed to the paradoxes of good form at school? Nineteenth-century educational 
discourse abounds with references to the phenomenon of the schoolboy burnout,  who 
experiences a kind of moral-psychological breakdown under the intense pressures of 
gentlemanliness. This type of failed schoolboy is a figure not entirely coextensive with those 
doomed monsters of Victorian parental nightmare, the encephalitic prodigies of nineteenth-
century lore—though the two types overlap. The type under consideration here is rather the 
sensitive, even nervous, boy who strives more for moral than academic perfection—though he 
can be a scholastic success too—and eventually experiences a sort of psychic collapse that leaves 
him incapable of fulfilling his childhood promise. Attempts to locate historical examples of this 
phenomenon, however, seem to offer up only a single concrete instance—that of Rugbean Arthur 
Clough. The schoolboy breakdown, it seems, is more a myth than a phenomenon—historian 
Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy calls it a “false archetype”313—based on a single (shaky) case and 
bolstered otherwise by what seems to be a widespread sense that such a phenomenon should 
exist, that the public school should produce this alarming result. 
In 1860 the Quarterly Review issued a review of recently published school stories; the 
same piece addressed a newly published lecture from Sir John T. Coleridge on the subject of 
public school reform. The article gives voice to a cultural concern that emerged as the public 
schools were reformed to educate the middle classes, a development which involved, at least in 
theory, a stronger emphasis on Christian morals and a more serious commitment to academic 
achievement for the boys. The reviewer warns that reformists must not increase the boys’ 
workload too much: “We dread over-cramming, and have a horror of prodigies.” The warning 
that over-cramming might backfire and make “idiots” out of the boys raises, unsurprisingly, the 
specter of the encephalitic prodigy, satirized in Kingsley’s Water-babies as turnip-heads, tragic 
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children whose minds have been so crammed with facts that their brains deliquesce.314 But the 
reviewer also cautions reformists against creating “prigs”—a term that, as we have seen, 
indicates a moral-psychological flaw, an excessive self-consciousness. The myth of the 
schoolboy breakdown, it seems likely, is an extension of this distaste for prigs. A culture 
censorious of self-conscious children invented a monster, a prig grown so priggish as to collapse 
under the weight of his own self-conscious introspection. Often this boy monster is linked 
specifically to the tutelage of Dr. Arnold, the mid-century headmaster of Rugby who, largely due 
to Arthur P. Stanley’s hagiographic biography, was celebrated by many Victorians as the greatest 
of the public school reformers.315 
In the same review of Tom Brown’s Schooldays in which he questions the ability of 
school story writers to effectively represent Kingsleyean unselfconsciousness, James Fitzjames 
Stephen criticizes the effects that Arnold’s insistence on moral thoughtfulness had on the 
“imaginative sensitive boy of sixteen” the headmaster so often enthralled in Rugby’s sixth 
form.316 It is, Stephen asserts, “most undesirable to be in the constant habit of referring every 
action to the great fundamental principles of right and wrong,” and this “very unwholesome” 
practice of constant moral thought is sure to “stimulate a diseased consciousness.”317 In other 
words, the boy already inclined to priggish self-consciousness, finding himself under the 
influence of Dr. Arnold, is in danger of utter ruin. The Times review of Hughes’s novel likewise 
excoriates Arnold’s sixth form favorites, boys burdened with an “obtrusive self-
consciousness.”318 The North British Review, again reviewing Tom Brown’s Schooldays, 
remarks that “a clever boy could scarcely be under [Arnold] without being stimulated to think—
perhaps almost too much so.”319 Lytton Strachey seized on this strain of criticism against 
Arnold—marginal though it had been during a nineteenth century that largely revered him—
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when he eviscerated the former headmaster in Eminent Victorians (1918), and Strachey’s 
critique likely authorized the twentieth-century re-evaluation of Arnold. Indeed, in his 1984 
history of the public schools John Chandos continues the tradition of casting Arnold as a bad 
influence on boys when he argues that Arnold’s sixth form elite “had been trained to be self-
consciously and demonstratively righteous,” and gained a “morbid scrupulosity sustained by 
probably inappropriate expectations.”320 
And what is Chandos’s evidence of the ill effects of Arnold’s influence? He cites the life 
of Arthur Hugh Clough, who was at Rugby under Arnold 1829-1837. Clough, as stated before, 
seems to be the sole case ever cited of this dangerous, Arnold-induced, disease of self-
consciousness actually causing a schoolboy’s ruin. When Edward Mack diagnoses Frederic 
Farrar as possessing a “morbid, introverted brain,” he drives the point home by comparing the 
author to Clough.321 By the time Mack was writing in 1938, Clough had become such a byword 
for the phenomenon under discussion that Mack could assume that not only would his readers 
know Clough—despite the fact that Clough was only ever a minor poet and certainly not a public 
figure of any stature—he could assume that they would know exactly the pathology that attached 
to that name. Clough had gained his reputation for spectacular failure shortly after his death, 
probably due to G. H. Lewes’s 1862 Cornhill Magazine review of his posthumously published 
works that described Clough as “one of those prospectuses who never become works.”322 Lewes 
alludes to the “intense conviction” of Clough’s friends “of some excellence which Clough might 
have achieved, ought to have achieved, but somehow did not.”323 And why not? According to 
Lewes, the “bent of his mind seems to have inclined him to an almost morbid scrupulousness, 
and to speculation without end”—note the direct echo in Chandos’s phrase “morbid 
scrupulosity” to describe Arnold’s influence over 100 years later. This inclination toward self-
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conscious speculation having come under the influence of Arnold meant that Clough never 
“recovered from the hotbed system of Rugby.”324 Strachey is most likely writing with Lewes’s 
estimation of Clough in mind when he calls out Clough as the most “conspicuous” example of a 
boy who fatally “fell completely under [Arnold’s] sway.”325 Clough’s 1962 biographer Katharine 
Chorley demonstrates the longevity of Lewes’s diagnosis when she titles her first chapter on 
Clough, which documents his youth, “The Problem.” 
But other than the vague conviction of Clough’s friends that he should have done more, 
as cited by Lewes, what makes Clough the poster boy for public schoolboy burn-out? He left 
Rugby having won every prize possible, in good health, and seemingly stable enough, though 
Chorley notes that even in his boyhood his letters were sometimes “morbidly introspective.”326  
He did endure two bouts of exhaustion while at Rugby: once after composing and reciting the 
poem that won him the English essay prize, and again after successfully completing the exam for 
the Balliol scholarship. But he made it to Oxford nonetheless. There he encountered the 
Tractarians; as he grew in sympathy with Cardinal Newman and his acolytes, Clough’s diary, 
according to another biographer, became “full of relentless self-examination.”327 Certainly all of 
this indicates an intense scholasticism and a self-conscious moral seriousness, but what of the 
ruin, the withering of potential, the infamous failure? There is one tale repeated more than any 
other as evidence of his having been irrevocably damaged by Rugby: after surprising his tutors 
by finishing his undergraduate exams with merely Second Class Honours, Clough walked from 
Oxford to Rugby to announce to his former headmaster that he had failed. It is a dramatic story, 
but it is not the end of Clough’s biography. He went on to travel, enjoy a happy marriage, have 
children, teach, lecture, serve as Florence Nightingale’s right hand man, and publish a number of 
poems before dying at age forty-two of malaria (not exactly a psychological disease). One 
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imagines he would have rather resented having this full life called a failed prospectus. 
So the poster boy for this supposed phenomenon of the overburdened schoolboy mind, 
taxed with moral earnestness and self-conscious strain to the point of utter collapse, provides if 
anything a highly dissatisfactory case study. The poem for which Clough is best remembered, 
“Say Not the Struggle Naught Availeth” (1849), does not chronicle collapse but rather exhorts 
readers to continue their valiant moral struggles even when they cannot perceive any positive 
results—quite the opposite of a defeated exhaustion. The entire phenomenon of the schoolboy 
burnout looks to be a myth, and the question becomes one of how we explain the creation and 
sustainment of such a myth. It appears that Victorian culture had become so certain that self-
consciousness would harm children that they imagined it had. The codes of public school life—
whether that be the moral earnestness of Arnold’s Rugby, the “simple” unconsciousness of 
muscular Christianity, or the paradoxical strictures of good form—seemed so implicated in the 
problem of childhood self-consciousness that their ill effects, it seemed, must exist. So a 
mythical worst-case scenario was invented, and his specter hung over the public schools, and the 
literature they inspired, for more than a century. 
5.4 MORBID SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL GHOSTS 
If the schoolboy burnout was the figurative specter hanging over the public schools at the turn of 
the century, J. M. Barrie proposed that an actual ghost haunted Eton: Captain Hook. In a 1927 
speech Barrie delivered at Eton, he claimed to have reports from reliable informants that for one 
night every year, after locking-out time (the hour at which the gates to the school grounds are 
locked for the night), the ghost of Hook haunts the grounds around Eton, unable to enter but 
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“gazing with peeled eyes through the darkness of his present to the innocence of his past.”328 
Even in death Hook longs to return to his beloved public school, a place where, as Barrie reports 
the library records show, Hook obsessively read the works of the Lake poets, those proponents of 
unselfconscious childhood. Barrie’s supposed chief informant on these supernatural appearances, 
a Mr. G. F. T Jasparin, is another old Etonian haunting (figuratively) his old school. Barrie 
deems Jasparin one of many Eton graduates “whom love for their old school has gently 
paralysed.” He lives in Windsor, which “lies under the shadow of Eton,” in rooms he has 
furnished “exactly like an Eton room,” socializes with other similarly paralyzed old boys, and is 
essentially a ghost, a boy who died upon graduating and refused to grow up—a schoolboy Peter 
Pan.329 The type is not a figment of Barrie’s imagination: Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited 
(1945) features another specimen of the species. Sebastian is another self-consciousness school 
boy, a grown up Christopher Robin still trailing his his teddy bear at Oxford, ultimately 
destroyed because it turns out he cannot, Peter-Pan-like, merely refuse to grow up. In terms of 
contemporary pop psychology, this is the Peter Pan syndrome—the man who wants to remain a 
boy—and the syndrome seems to have most prominently struck the old boys of the public 
schools in the early twentieth century. 
That well-known and highly regarded writers like Barrie and Waugh figured the public 
schools as producing abject failures hounded to their deaths by their obsession with their school 
days indicates the extent to which the schoolboy, failure, and death became entwined in the 
popular imagination. In a sense, the school story, chronicle of public school life, had always been 
about failure. The genre shares with the novel a tradition of using a social mistake and its 
consequences as the central narrative mechanism. As Kent Puckett’s Bad Form: Social Mistakes 
and the Nineteenth Century Novel so persuasively argues, bad form—the social mistake—
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engenders identity-formation by, in his psychoanalytic terms evidencing the repression that fills 
the subconscious with all those self-creating bits of history that create subjectivity. In the novel, 
the mistake is the grounds for coherence in a character, and often the engine of the plot. As we 
have seen with the frequent use of the “wrongly accused” plot in the school story, this essentially 
novelistic genre revolves around a self-conscious consideration of social self-consciousness. It 
should not surprise us, then, that despite the incredible popularity of school stories in the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, only one example—Tom Brown’s Schooldays—has 
secured anything close to a slot in the Golden Age canon. 
Also contributing to the self-consciousness that marks the genre, many school stories 
were semi-autobiographical, written by old boys like Hook, reminisicing fondly about their 
school days. Hook, as far as we know, does not write his own memoirs, but he does dictate his 
autobiography to Smee on the occasion of his first appearance in the novel Peter and Wendy: 
“Hook heaved a heavy sigh, and I know not why it was, perhaps it was because of the soft beauty 
of the evening, but there came over him a desire to confide to his faithful bo’sun the story of his 
life. He spoke long and earnestly, but what is was all about Smee, who was rather stupid, did not 
know in the least” (53). The “story of his life,” as I argued in Chapter Three, is just what Peter 
can’t tell; that’s why Wendy has to tell it for him. Because Hook, unlike Peter, is self-conscious, 
he can produce an autobiography, just like all those diary-keeping children in Chapter One. The 
very crafting of an autobiographical story of school life—like Hook’s, like those of the old boys 
who published school stories—is a self-conscious endeavor, and therefore violates good form. It 
takes a “subtle mind” like Hook’s to construct a self-conscious narrative of one’s life (Peter and 
Wendy 104).  
In contrast, Smee—of the lower classes and certainly no graduate of a public school—is 
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much less self-conscious than Hook, perhaps because he is “rather stupid.” He has no idea that 
the children love him, going cheerily on his way in the belief that he terrifies them. The narrator 
of Peter and Wendy describes him as “infinitely pathetic,” in part because he is “so pathetically 
unaware of it” (116). Perhaps it is because he is so “unconscious” that the children love him and 
not Hook (116). As Hook contemplates this question—“why do they find Smee lovable?”—a 
“terrible answer” comes to him: “'Good form?’ Had the bo’sun good form without knowing it, 
which is the best form of all? [Hook] remembered that you have to prove you don’t know you 
have it before you are eligible for Pop” (118). With this remembrance of Hook’s, the narrator 
makes light of the terrible dilemma facing schoolboys held to a standard of good form that must 
be attained in order to join Pop, the highest rank in the school monitorial system, and the 
ultimate sign of boyhood achievement. Successful embodiment of good form must be proven, 
but to prove it is to acknowledge its existence, which is to violate the rules of good form. Boys 
are stuck in the unenviable position of having to prove that they have something but don’t know 
they have it. The very contemplation of this horrible paradox nearly drives Hook to strike his 
Smee down:  
With a cry of rage he raised his iron hand over Smee’s head; but he did not tear. 
What arrested him was this reflection: “To claw a man because he is good form, 
what would that be?” “Bad form!” The unhappy Hook was as impotent as he was 
damp, and he fell forward like a cut flower” (118).  
Caught in his knowledge of the paradox that is good form, Hook is doubly emasculated: the 
narrator forthrightly declares him “impotent” and drives home the insult by comparing the 
dreaded pirate to a drooping flower, a metaphor of feminine nervous delicacy. 
Hook’s effeminacy and impotence—evidenced in everything from his dandy-ish Cavalier 
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costume to the suggestively bent hook that replaces his hand after Peter symbolically castrates 
him—glances at a type of public school bad form that garnered particular cultural anxiety at the 
turn of the century: a brand of theatrical homosexuality. Good form is ultimately a performance, 
a consummate theatricality; it crafts a self poised perpetually between the virtuoso performance 
of unselfconsciousness, sincerity, and authenticity, and the very real possibility that the 
performance will fail under the pressure of its own haunting self-reflexiveness. If it fails, the 
result is what was widely called “morbid” self-consciousness, a sort of new psychopathologic 
designation of neurotic self-involvement, a turning in of the self that, as the term “morbid” 
implies, is linked to disease and death. On the one hand, the explicit morbidity is mental: an 
excessive self-consciousness leads to isolation, mental disease, withdrawal from life. But on the 
other hand, the inward-turning nature of “morbid self-consciousness” suggests that the disease 
may extend to the physical, may escalate into the sexual “disorder” beginning to be known, in 
Hook’s time, as inversion.  
Since the middle of the nineteenth century homosexual activity in the public schools had 
periodically become a site of great cultural anxiety, and with as the outrage against Alec 
Waugh’s frankly homoerotic The Loom of Youth indicates, the turn of the century was certainly 
one period of heightened anxiety.  Here it is instructive to recall Miles of Henry James’s ghost 
story and/or psychological thriller, The Turn of the Screw (1898). Expelled from public school 
for an unspoken (or unspeakable?) reason, the attractive and well-mannered boy returns home to 
torment his governess by possibly having congress (of what sort?) with the ghost of Peter Quint. 
In her mounting distress over the boy—Was he sent home for engaging in homosexual activities? 
Does he continue to indulge those habits with the ghost of a grown man?—the governess 
eventually kills Miles. The only way to exorcise the specter of schoolboy homosexuality, in this 
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tale, is through the death of the schoolboy. Hook too elects to end his own torment with his 
death, though if we consider Barrie’s speech the poor pirate continues to be tormented by the 
memory of his school days even in death. 
It is Peter’s flawless good form that finally tips Hook towards his death. In their final 
battle aboard the ship, Hook seems to be winning but loses the advantage the moment he notes “a 
tragic feeling that Peter was showing good form” (130). In response to Hook’s tortured question, 
“Pan, who and what art thou?” Peter gives a nonsensical answer—“I’m youth, I’m joy…I’m a 
little bird that has broken out of the egg”—and the riddle is “proof to the unhappy Hook that 
Peter did not know in the least who or what he was, which is the very pinnacle of good form” 
(130). Hook’s only triumph before dying is an awareness that in his last moments he is “true to 
the traditions of his race,” in that he is thinking not of the battle with Peter but of the playing 
fields of Eton, and his “shoes were right, and his waistcoat was right, and his tie was right, and 
his socks were right” (131-2). To top off this sartorial rectitude, Hook finally manages to trick 
Peter into showing bad form by kicking when he should stab, and the pirate’s dying words as he 
launches himself into the jaws of the crocodile are “Bad form” (132). Hook, alas, only fools 
himself, for we already know that good form goes much deeper than appropriate clothes, and, 
furthermore, we know that it is bad form to think about form at all—one’s own or another’s.  
Even in his dying moments Hook evinces the preoccupation with dress that is one aspect 
of schoolboy good form. Hook wears not an Eton suit but rather a version of a Cavalier costume, 
like the one famously worn by Oscar Wilde on his 1882 American tour. By 1904, post-Wilde-
trials, the costume would certainly have been pretty well irreversibly associated with 
homosexuality, but long before the trials Frances Hodgson Burnett, friend of Wilde, had made it 
the costume of her child protagonist Little Lord Fauntleroy in 1886. The early twentieth century 
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saw a retroactive pathologicization of the costume, which apparently had been imposed on many 
children by mothers besotted with Burnett’s little hero.330 The stringent reprisals against the 
trend carried undertones of what we would now call gay panic: the “million fond mamas” who 
imposed the Little Lord Fauntleroy suit on their boys were accused of setting up their “army of 
little lords” for beatings from “that other taunting army of Huck Finns,” the natural response of 
the rough-and-tumble manly American boy being to dole out a sound thrashing when faced with 
golden curls and lace.331 Interestingly, at the same time, Thomas Gainsborough’s portrait the 
Blue Boy, also dressed in Cavalier costume, was the most famous painting in the world.332 The 
Blue Boy enjoyed such popularity in part because, as Anne Higonnet deftly demonstrates in 
Pictures of Innocence, it provided a potent symbol of Romantic childhood as detached from 
time, as the boy, painted in 1770 wore the clothes of a seventeenth-century aristocrat.  He 
borrowed his costume from masquerade tradition of copying the fancy dress seen in portraits of 
an earlier era; the Blue Boy took his sartorial cues from Van Dyke’s 1635 portrait of a very self-
conscious aristocratic boy.  
To follow the trail in reverse: in 1635 Van Dyke paints a young and very knowing 
George Villiers in the costume that indicates his eventual aristocratic adult masculinity; in the 
eighteenth century, masqueraders seize on this style of dress, the Cavalier costume, as one of a 
handful of “genres” of masquerade costume; in 1770 Gainsborough paints the Blue Boy in a 
version of the Cavalier costume, in the process creating an image that becomes famous for its 
representation of timeless Romantic childhood; in 1882 Oscar Wilde, famous for his self-
conscious performativity, praises the Cavalier costume as the epitome of masculine attire and 
adopts it for his American tour; in 1886, most likely inspired by her friend Wilde, Frances 
Hodgson Burnett dresses Little Lord Fauntleroy (and her own sons) in just such a costume,333 
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inspiring other mothers to dress their sons in copies of the costume; in 1895, in a series of highly 
publicized trials, Wilde is convicted of, in essence, homosexuality; in 1904, Peter Pan debuts, 
with the villainous, effeminate, good-form-obsessed old Etonian Captain Hook dressed 
conspicuously in Cavalier costume; and finally, in the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
Little Lord Fauntleroy costume—indelibly marked by its association both with Wilde and with 
the “old-fashioned,” self-conscious protagonist of Burnett’s now-out-of-favor book and play—is 
retrospectively converted into an instrument of boy-torture or a machine for producing 
effeminate milksops that was “fastened upon thousands of helpless small boys” in the wake of 
the book and play’s popularity.334 The singular example of the Cavalier costume is meant to 
convey a few points. First, it traces a history of childhood that accords with the claims this book: 
the same costume means first the child’s value as a future adult, then the radical malleability of 
identity in the masquerade, then the prelapsarian identity of Romantic childhood, and at last the 
pathological identity of the morbidly self-conscious and possibly homosexual child, thus 
emblematizing the beginnings of the association between psychopathology, homosexuality, and 
self-consciousness. Finally, the history of the Cavalier costume in representations of childhood 
highlights the ways that the child’s embeddedness in or (imagined) freedom from social self-
consciousness can be encoded in dress, which was of course one aspect of the rules of good 
form. This last observation may seem rather trivial but it illuminates a final aspect of Peter Pan, 
who in so many ways brings forward everything this book wants to note about the consequences 
of the nineteenth century’s preoccupation with childhood self-consciousness.  
The schoolboy code of good form required scrupulous attention to dress (the right hat, the 
right shoes, the right tie), imposed bizarre rules about general comportment (where to walk, who 
to talk to), and above all demanded that one be right without ever seeming to try. The complexity 
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of the codes could not help but produce endless mistakes and/or self-conscious, “morbid” 
anxiety. Peter Pan escapes the pressure of sartorial rules by being nearly naked, but his 
nakedness is ultimately just another sign of his severance from life. By the Edwardian era, the 
cultural preoccupation with childhood self-consciousness has created two poles: the morbidly 
self-conscious schoolboy, who Barrie gives us in the form of Hook (who jumps to his death, who 
is the Eton ghost, who can be seen by the other old boys who are figurative ghosts), and the 
perfectly unselfconscious and probably perfectly dead Peter Pan. Hook’s inability to return to his 
Etonian childhood—his ghost is always trapped outside he grounds of Eton after locking-out 
time—parallels Peter’s inability to re-enter his childhood bedroom once his own fatal “locking-
out time” has gone into effect.335 Self-consciousness—having it, not having it—has become such 
a burden on childhood by the early twentieth century that Barrie envisions death as the outcome 
either way. It’s dead if you do and dead if you don’t. 
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6.0 EPILOGUE 
“[R]emember the wise saying that there are more things in heaven 
and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy.” 
-Sigmund Freud, “An Infantile Neurosis”  (1918)336 
In quoting Hamlet when describing the astonishing findings of his psychoanalytic practice, Freud 
suggests that the patient who has experienced these extraordinary and incredible details of 
neurotic development is the self-conscious, disturbed Hamlet, assuring Freud-as-Horatio that the 
world is indeed strange, and leaving it to Horatio-Freud to communicate the story to us, the 
wider audience. Freud’s phrase forges strong links between Hamlet, the self-conscious mind, and 
the subject of psychoanalysis. However, Freud’s remarks on the unsuitability of children as 
subjects of psychoanalysis reaffirm the nineteenth-century sense, present as early as Charles 
Lamb’s version of Hamlet, that the Hamlet-condition—self-conscious reflection—is 
incompatible with childhood.  
Yet Freud also makes the unselfconsciousness of childhood the necessary prerequisite of 
adult-centered psychoanalysis. We might, then, reconsider Freud’s quotation of Hamlet. Perhaps 
Freud himself is the Hamlet with knowledge of those undreamt-of things, and we his readers are 
Horatio, carrying his legacy forward even after his work has ended. This second interpretation 
reminds us how much those ideas about childhood and self-consciousness have been carried 
forward into the contemporary culture by the wide diffusion of Freudian paradigms of the mind. 
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In this epilogue, I will briefly consider the implications of some versions of Freudian ideas on 
childhood that have gained significant traction in the popular imagination. 
As has been well documented, Freudian psychoanalysis did not fabricate an entirely new 
theory of selfhood at the beginning of the twentieth century; rather, it integrated into a 
particularly persuasive and durable form many theories and discourses of selfhood that had been 
supplementing and reinforcing each other since the eighteenth century at least, many of which 
have been considered in the course of the present study. Likewise, when Freud theorized the 
formation of the self in childhood, he drew on ideas disseminated in the nineteenth century. To 
cite one well-established example, the architecture of the psychosexual stages of childhood 
grows out of recapitulation theory. As Carolyn Steedman puts it, Freudian psychoanalysis was 
not so much inventing a new theory of identity formation in childhood as “summarizing and 
reformulating a great many nineteenth-century articulations of the idea that the core of an 
individual’s psychic identity was his or her own lost past, or childhood.”337  
Other widely circulating beliefs about childhood contributed to Freud’s theories. 
Crucially, the accepted notion that childhood existed outside of culture underwrites Freud’s 
entire project of basing identity in personal libidinal conflicts, rather than in wider cultural and 
social relations. For example, his analysis of the Wolf Man case makes it clear that other 
physicians, critical of Freud’s analysis, located the origins of adult neuroses not in libidinal 
forces but in cultural forces—anxieties about social standing, work pressures, and so on. Freud 
uses the child’s ostensible position outside of culture to counter these claims:  
The study of children’s neuroses exposed the complete inadequacy of these 
shallow or high-handed attempts at re-interpretation. It shows the predominant 
part that is played in the formation of neuroses by those libidinal motive forces 
 169 
which are so eagerly disavowed, and reveals the absence of any aspirations 
towards remote cultural aims, of which the child still knows nothing, and which 
cannot therefore be of any significance for him.338  
By tracing the source of all neuroses to childhood, which the nineteenth century consensus 
locates childhood outside of culture, Freud makes the development of the psyche a matter of 
individual dramas of desire. 
If the child’s ostensible location outside culture underpins Freud’s theory of the roots of 
psychopathology, another truism about the nature of childhood forms the essential foundation of 
psychoanalytic practice and confirms Freud’s architecture of the self: the axiomatic 
unselfconsciousness of childhood. As is clear in Freud’s account of the Wolf Man case, adult 
analysis assumes, even requires, unselfconscious childhood. Nearly all of the material for 
analysis in the Wolf Man’s case consists of recollections of childhood events and fantasies of 
which the patient, Freud insists, could not have been fully conscious at the time they originally 
occurred. The lack of self-consciousness endemic to childhood, Freud explains, makes the 
analysis of children much less fruitful than the analysis of adults who recollect, however 
wrongly, a childhood that went unanalyzed at the time:  
An analysis which is conducted upon a neurotic child itself must, as a matter of 
course, appear to be more trustworthy, but it cannot be very rich in materials; too 
many words and thoughts have to be lent to the child, and even so the deepest 
strata may turn out to be impenetrable to consciousness. An analysis of a 
childhood disorder through the medium of recollection in an intellectually mature 
adult is free from these limitations; but it necessitates our taking into account the 
distortion and refurbishing to which a person’s own past is subjected when it is 
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looked back upon from a later period. The first alternative perhaps gives the more 
convincing results; the second is by far the more instructive. (8-9) 
The child’s understanding of his own experiences, and his ability to relate those experiences to 
the analyst, come up against two limits, Freud believes, inherent to childhood: the linguistic 
limit—simply not having the necessary vocabulary to communicate complex feelings and 
events—and the mental limit—not having the self-reflective ability to form conscious thoughts 
about oneself. So that despite—even because of— the distortions adult memory places on 
childhood occurrences, the self-conscious recollections of the adult are more instructive in 
understanding the neuroses of the now-vanished child. In the case of the Wolf Man, the events 
and fantasies brought forth for analysis by the twenty-five-year old patient originated between 
ages one and four; however, “only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp with 
his conscious mental processes what was then going on in him” (45 n.1).  
Only one of Freud’s case histories involves a child patient, and even in the case of five-
year-old neurotic Little Hans, Freud depends upon Hans’s father to stand in as a sort of auxiliary 
self-consciousness. Necessarily, Freud points out, analysis is an act of collaborative 
interpretation carried out by two adults. When the patient is an adult, the patient and the analyst 
form the interpretive team. But when the patient is a child, assumed to be unselfconscious and 
thus incapable of self-interpretation, the analyst teams up with the parent, as in the Hans case. 
Clearly Freud sees the success of this case as an outlier, however, enabled by Hans’s father’s 
long association with Freud and intimate knowledge of his theories. Freud, for the most part, sees 
psychoanalysis as incompatible with child patients, making him a typical late-Victorian. 
Strikingly, when Freud again met Hans as a nineteen-year-old, Hans related that he remembered 
nothing of his early phobias and analysis, and read his own case history “as something 
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unknown.”339 Freud seems to offer this “amnesia” as proof, against those who condemned the 
project of subjecting a small child to psycho-analysis, that it had been harmless. (In fact he 
implies that Hans’s good mental and physical health as a young man may be the positive result 
of early analysis.) But it should be noted that the process of analysis, which Freud claims is 
normally (for adults) intended to bring repressed material out of the unconscious into the 
conscious mind where it can be self-consciously confronted and reconciled, when practiced on a 
child, results in Hans’s complete unawareness of his own history. And Freud approves. 
Childhood is, for psychoanalysis, the “prehistoric period,” a time before the individual’s history 
began, because a history must be self-consciously constructed, and the child lacks self-
consciousness (“Infantile Neurosis”18). 
 The structure of selfhood, and the process of psychoanalysis, articulated by Freud 
requires childhood to be the lost—but recoverable through analysis—prehistory of the self. In an 
adult patient the analyst goes through a process of “uncovering the psychical formations, layer 
by layer,” which eventually lays bare the “patient’s infantile sexuality” and thus exposes the 
“motive forces of all the neurotic symptoms of later life.”340 Here we have the adult self as an 
accretion of layers, a set of nesting dolls, at the center of which is the child. The notion that 
identity formation is a process located in childhood but only available to consciousness in 
adulthood has filtered into the popular imagination so thoroughly that one need not have read 
Freud to employ his formulation as a working theory of selfhood. Freudian psychoanalysis so 
dominated the practice of psychology in the twentieth century that even someone who has never 
experienced analysis or read The Interpretation of Dreams will have encountered countless 
scenes in novels, television, cartoons, etc., in which the patient lies down on the couch and the 
doctor intones “Tell me about your childhood…” 
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Around 1910 Freud fully developed the centerpiece of his theories: the Oedipal crisis, the 
unconscious process of childhood desire and repression that creates identity. As is clear in his 
joint reading of Oedipus Rex and Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud named the 
Oedipus complex after Sophocles’s hero because he saw in the Greek tragedy an astonishingly 
in-the-open working out of what he believed to be a universal human experience.341 But he also 
believed that the Greeks were able to acknowledge these desires so openly only because they 
were still creating modern civilization. Once civilization settled in, as it were, humans could no 
longer give such bare expression to the formation of subjectivity through desire and repression. 
For Freud, this is exactly why Hamlet can never confront the fact that his entire problem is 
Oedipal. In Freud’s reading of the play, Hamlet hesitates to kill his uncle precisely because 
Claudius has done what Hamlet, in the Oedipal stage, dreamed of doing: kill Hamlet’s father and 
marry his mother. For Hamlet to kill Claudius would be to confront his own repressed desires. 
Neither Hamlet, nor the play, nor the audience, can acknowledge this truth, so we all dance 
around it together, and Freud declares that it is left to him to “unearth” the fact that Hamlet “has 
its roots in the same soil as Oedipus Rex.”342 
Another important difference between Sophocles’s hero and Shakespeare’s is that while 
Oedipus solves the Sphinx’s riddle—a riddle about the mysterious metamorphoses of the human 
lifespan, about life and growth and death—Hamlet merely dithers over his own riddle about 
existence: “To be or not to be.” In linking both of these adult characters, and their riddles, to the 
formation of the self in childhood, Freud brings us back to Peter Pan, a boy plagued by the 
“riddle of his existence.” Remember that the narrator of Peter and Wendy tells us that if Peter—
who is arguably a dead child, a kind of glorious ghost—could solve the riddle of himself, he 
would realize that the ultimate adventure is to live, instead of to die. By conceiving of and 
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representing childhood as unselfconscious, we imagine children as riddles, ghosts even. It is this 
sense of the child self as a riddle to solve, as a ghost that haunts, that gave psychoanalysis its 
aim. The adult patient makes contact with the ghost, solves the riddle, and is healed. To live 
becomes a great adventure. 
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convincing argument that the vision of childhood one actually finds in Wordsworth’s work is 
much more complex, and not nearly so angelic. Plotz, Romantic Vocation of Childhood. 
4In her piece “A Century of Children’s Books” for the National Review, Evaline Godley calls 
Mr. Fairchild’s corpse-viewing outing “grotesquely shocking to modern ideas, while L. B. Lang 
deems the same scene a “ghastly episode” and wonders that “any man should voluntaritly have 
exposed children to such an ordeal”; Godley, “Century of Children’s Books,” 96; Lang, “The 
Fairchild Family,” 466, 467. 
5 Lang, “The Fairchild Family and Their Creator,” 465.  The article is attributed to “L. B. Lang,” 
who is presumably Leonora Blanche Lang, author of children’s books and wife of fairy-tale 
collector Andrew Lang. 
6 “Children’s Literature,” 326.  
7 For the apparent origin of this designation, see Green, “The Golden Age of Children’s Books.”  
8 See for example: Field, The Child and His Book; White, “Children’s Books and Their 
Illustrators.”  
9 Field, Child and His Book, 9. Field’s book is notable as a first attempt at a long form history of 
children’s literature. Field also wrote several popular children’s books, including Bryda (1889) 
and Mixed Pickles (1900). 
10 Nineteenth-century writers seem to have chiefly used “unconscious” as the antyonym of “self-
conscious,” and I will, in representing nineteenth-century beliefs and formulations, occasionally 
do the same. According to the OED, the term “unselfconscious” was in use by writers like 
George MacDonald and John Ruskin in the Victorian period, but as a neologism it had not yet 
entered general usage in the nineteenth century. 
11 “Children’s Literature,” 311. 
12 Ibid., 320. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 311. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Stevenson, “A Gossip on Romance,” 69. 
17 Wordsworth’s recommendation of fairy tales for childhood reading comes in book five of the 
Prelude; Coleridge puts them forth as ideal nursery fare in an 1813 lecture on education. Chapter 
Two deals with their endorsements in more detail. 
18 These biases against self-reflection on the part of child protagonists and readers probably also 
account to some degree for the popularity of the adventure genre in the nineteenth century, with 
its focus on setting and event, and it’s terribly flat characterization. There’s a reason every boy 
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122 Bate, Romantics on Shakespeare, 2. 
123 To be clear, I am not making an argument about what Hamlet is—only an argument about 
what he has meant to others, and what his meaning to them can do to illuminate the course of 
thought on self-consciousness in the long nineteenth century. 
124 Quoted in Schlegel, Lectures on Dramatic Art, 90. 
125 Ibid., 308. 
126 Ibid., 309. 
127 Schlegel, Lectures on Dramatic Art, 307. 
128 Coleridge, “Characteristics of Shakespear,”136. 
129 Ibid., 135. 
130 Hazlitt, Shakespear’s Plays, 325. 
131 Byron, “The Character of Hamlet,” 338. 
132 Shelley, “The Character of Hamlet,” 342. 
133 It is probably worth noting here that the Romantic consensus on Hamlet wasn’t perfect. 
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137 Lamb, “Tragedies of Shakespeare,” 115. 
138 Shakespeare, Hamlet, III.i.83. 
139 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 475. Though it has been overwhelmingly influential in the 
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149 For more on the intertwining issues of education and subjectivity in the Romantic period, see 
Richardson, Literature, Education, and Romanticism. 
150 “The child,” of course, is a cultural construct, separate from and never identical to historical 
children. I will continue to use the phrase “the child” in this chapter because, as has been well-
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original 1928 publication, and will be cited by page number and the designation PP in the text. 
Quotations from the 1911 novel Peter and Wendy, which Barrie based on the play, come from 
the Penguin edition of 2004, and will be cited in the text by page number and the designation 
PW. The textual history of the Peter Pan texts, in all its dazzling complexity, has been well 
documented by scholars such as Peter Hollindale, and I will not rehearse it here, but it is worth 
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literary, and his consequent unselfconsciousness, put Huck much more in line with the ideals of 
chivalry, and the ideals of nineteenth-century childhood, than Tom Sawyer. For more on Tom’s 
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